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Center for Urban and Regional Policy 
The Center for Urban and Regional Policy (CURP) was launched in 1999 at Northeastern University as a “think and do 
tank”—a center where faculty, staff, and students from the university pool their expertise, resources, and commitment 
to address a wide range of issues facing cities, towns, and suburbs with particular emphasis on the Greater Boston 
region. It has produced an array of reports on housing, economic development, transportation, and workforce training; 
created new computer-based information tools for researchers, students, and government agencies; and sponsored major 
“action” projects, including the World Class Housing Collaborative devoted to assisting community groups develop 
housing in their neighborhoods. CURP has also focused its attention on inner city development in older industrial cities 
in Massachusetts. In 2000, CURP produced the New Paradigm for Housing in Greater Boston report, a comprehensive 
report detailing the nature of the housing crisis in the region. CURP’s web site, www.curp.neu.edu, is a leading source 
of information for community leaders, public officials, urban researchers, and students. CURP staff played a critical role 
in the creation of Northeastern’s new School of Social Science, Urban Affairs, and Public Policy.
Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association
Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association (CHAPA) is a statewide organization that represents the interests of all 
players in the housing and community development fields, including non-profit and for-profit developers, municipal 
officials, homeowners, tenants, bankers, real estate professionals, property managers, and government officials. The 
organization is a sponsor of many research projects concerned with housing and in 1998 commissioned a study from the 
Donahue Institute at the University of Massachusetts entitled “A Profile of Housing in Massachusetts.” This report began 
the work of measuring progress in key housing policy areas such as supply, affordability, and accessibility. Over the past 
five years, CHAPA has assisted in the funding and development of each of the Greater Boston Housing Report Cards.
The Boston Foundation 
The Boston Foundation, Greater Boston’s community foundation, is one of the oldest and largest community foun-
dations in the nation, with assets of over $930 million. In 2007, the Foundation and its donors made more than $92 
million in grants to nonprofit organizations and received gifts of more than $155 million. The Foundation is made up 
of approximately 900 separate charitable funds established by donors either for the general benefit of the community 
or for special purposes. The Boston Foundation also serves as a major civic leader, provider of information, convener, 
and sponsor of special initiatives designed to address the community’s and region’s most pressing challenges. For 
more information about the Boston Foundation, visit www.tbf.org or call 617-338-1700.
UNDERSTANDING BOSTON is a series of forums, educational events and research sponsored by the Boston Foundation 
to provide information and insight into issues affecting Boston, its neighborhoods, and the region. By working in 
collaboration with a wide variety of partners, the Boston Foundation provides opportunities for people to come together 
to explore challenges facing our constantly changing community and to develop an informed civic agenda.
We gratefully acknowledge Karl “Chip” Case, Tim Warren, Eleanor White, and  
Bonnie Heudorfer, who provided our research team with good counsel, important data sets,   
and an acute understanding of the Greater Boston housing market.
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Letter
Dear Friends,
The significance of the role of housing in Greater Boston’s regional economy is hard to overstate . 
Beginning in 1995, prices soared for houses and rental apartments, ultimately helping to make this 
the most expensive place to live in the nation for a family of four . The impact of that long, relentless 
climb was harsh as many area residents found they had been priced out of the American Dream . It 
also undermined the region’s ability to attract and retain the young workers and families we need 
to grow and thrive as a community .
The implications of this trend was first documented in a ground-breaking report, called A New  
Paradigm for Housing in Greater Boston, released in 2000 by the Center for Urban and Regional Policy 
at Northeastern University (CURP) . This was followed by an annual series of Housing Report Cards 
published by the Boston Foundation and presenting research by a team lead by Bonnie Heudorfer 
and economist Barry Bluestone, Director of CURP and Dean of the Northeastern University’s School 
of Social Science, Urban Affairs and Public Policy . These reports tracked housing costs and supply 
year by year, from 2000 onward . In addition, they documented the impact of legislation promoted 
by the Commonwealth Housing Task Force, which addressed the need to expand the supply of 
affordable housing .
Today, it is time to set a new baseline for understanding the impact of housing on the regional  
economy and the lives of area residents . 
The result is a far-reaching report that updates that seminal research published in 2000 . The title of 
this new report, From Paradigm to Paradox: Understanding Greater Boston’s New Housing Market, refers 
back to that original work commissioned by the Boston Archdiocese . In addition, it captures the 
current market, in which housing prices are falling at frightening speed—yet remain out of reach  
for far too many area residents .
Under Barry Bluestone’s leadership, CURP has produced a report that brings exceptional clarity 
and focus to this complex and important field . It is at once a call to action and a sobering record  
of the impact of more than a decade of runaway housing prices and constricted supply . It is a  
challenging report that provides a solid foundation for future action . 
I invite you to read it as a work of deep understanding and insight into the forces that will surely 
shape our future . 
Paul S . Grogan
President and CEO
The Boston Foundation
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From 1995 through 2005, housing prices and rents 
in Greater Boston soared, making it one of the most 
expensive metro areas in the nation . Because of esca-
lating housing costs, more than a third of the region’s 
homeowners were paying more than 30 percent of 
their income for shelter and more than half of all 
renters were similarly challenged in their ability to 
afford housing and have enough of their incomes left 
over to pay for other necessities . Without substantial 
rental subsidies, low-income households were not 
able to afford housing at all and research revealed that 
Greater Boston’s housing costs were a major factor in 
the region’s slow growth in employment and in the 
region’s loss of young working families . In its well-
known report, A New Paradigm for Housing in Greater 
Boston, first released in September 2000, the Center for 
Urban and Regional Policy noted that escalating hous-
ing prices and rents created a “moral obligation” to 
provide affordable housing for the region’s households 
and an “economic necessity” to assure the region’s 
continued prosperity .
Now we face a housing paradox in Greater Boston . 
Home prices are still too high . . . but they are falling too 
fast. This combination leaves much of the affordability 
problem unresolved at the same time that an explosion 
in subprime mortgage lending and falling prices have 
combined to cause a dramatic increase in home fore-
closures and the possibility of a downward price cycle 
in many neighborhoods . This could lead to abandon-
ment, vandalism, and community disintegration . Solv-
ing the housing paradox will require a sophisticated 
set of public policies .
This report combines elements of the original New 
Paradigm study with the annual report cards CURP 
has issued along with The Boston Foundation and the 
Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association for each 
of the past five years . Like the New Paradigm study, 
this report tries to explain the nature of the housing 
problem facing Greater Boston and provides estimates 
of how much additional housing must be produced 
to meet our housing needs . It also delves into what 
caused the current vicious circle of rising foreclosures 
and falling prices . 
Yet like the annual housing report cards, it also tracks 
trends in the overall regional economy, in housing 
production, in prices and rents, in affordability, and in 
federal, state, and local housing policies . 
Key Findings
Housing Affordability from 2000 to 2005
In the spring of 2000, the median selling price for 
a single family home in Greater Boston was under 
$235,000 . By September 2005, it would reach $420,000 . 
Because family incomes rose only slowly over this five 
year period (and actually declined for renter house-
holds), housing became increasingly unaffordable for 
those who wished to get into the housing market . Effec-
tive rents nearly doubled between 1990 and 2000 and 
have remained at an average of more than $1,500 ever 
since . The result is that the proportion of homeowners 
paying more than 30 percent of their incomes for hous-
ing increased from about a quarter in 2000 to nearly 
four in 10 in 2005, and the proportion of renters paying 
this much of their income for apartments increased 
from nearly 40 percent to over half . The number of 
“affordable” communities among Greater Boston’s 161 
municipalities declined from 101 to only 19 . 
The rising cost of housing contributed to the loss of 
young families in the region . Not only did the absolute 
cost of housing skyrocket, but the relative cost as well . In 
1995, after controlling for higher per-capita income in 
Greater Boston, housing was only 5 percent less afford-
able here than in the Charlotte metro region . By 2005, 
this cost disadvantage had soared to 87 percent . Boston 
was becoming more and more expensive relative to 
almost every other metropolitan region in the country, 
making it less attractive to young Massachusetts fami-
lies who might have liked to stay here, and making 
it quite unattractive to families who might otherwise 
consider moving to Boston from other regions .
What caused the explosion in home prices and rents 
was inadequate housing production . Little new hous-
ing stock was produced despite increased demand . 
Executive Summary
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Housing Prices and Rents Still Too High 
The recent decline in home prices has increased hous-
ing affordability at the margin . Between 2005 and 2007, 
nominal median household income has increased by 
an estimated 9 .3 percent while home prices during this 
period dropped by 5 .5 percent . As a result, the ratio 
of home price to household income has declined from 
6 .68 in 2005 to 5 .77 in 2007 . By mid-2008, with continu-
ing erosion in prices, we estimate the ratio to be 5 .43 .
But this ratio is still well above the 4 .53 ratio in 2000 
and 4 .02 in 1990 . As such, housing is still well beyond 
the reach of many families . Moreover, with fewer 
households able to become homeowners, there has 
been renewed demand for rental units and this has 
served to keep rents from falling . Combined with a 
sharp decline in renter incomes, rental affordability is 
more of a challenge today than ever before .
How Much More Will Housing Prices Fall? 
It is hard to tell whether home prices will continue 
to fall in the Greater Boston region . On the one hand, 
there are still a lot of subprime mortgages with adjust-
able rates in the market and the national economy 
seems to be weakening by the month . Without the 
dramatic actions of the U .S . Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve Bank during September 2008, it is virtually 
certain that housing prices would have plummeted 
further . Financial institutions would have essentially 
stopped writing mortgages and the economy would 
have gone into full recession . Even with these actions, 
it is too early to tell how quickly mortgage markets 
will be repaired .
On other hand, there is some evidence that we are near 
the end of the housing meltdown nationwide . Accord-
ing to Case-Shiller single family home price data for 
Greater Boston, prices began to rise in July . If prices 
continue to trend as they have during past cycles, we 
should see housing prices firm up and continue to rise, 
albeit very slowly . Data on gross residential invest-
ment and housing starts prepared by Karl Case also 
point to the possibility that we are near the trough of 
this housing cycle .
Vacancy rates fell to extraordinarily low levels, creat-
ing sellers’ markets for homes, condominiums, and 
rental apartments . Between 1990 and 2000, only 82,600 
new units of housing were developed in Greater 
Boston to meet the needs of nearly 123,000 new house-
holds . This shortfall was not remedied sufficiently 
after 2000, so housing prices continued to rise .
What was behind the lack of production and therefore 
the decline in housing affordability were local zoning 
laws that made it extremely difficult for developers to 
build a sufficient supply of new housing units . 
The Housing Situation Since 2005
Housing prices in Greater Boston stopped rising in the 
fall of 2005 . Since then, the median price of a single 
family home in the region has fallen by 11 percent . A 
combination of factors has been responsible for this 
reversal in prices . The first is slow population growth . 
Prices became so high that homebuyers voted with 
their feet and many left the region . This, in itself, 
reduced housing demand and contributed to a slow-
down in price appreciation .
The second factor was an increased supply of housing 
that came on line beginning in 2003, much of it due 
to increased concern by policymakers about housing 
prices, and increased opportunities for developers . 
But the third and most important factor was the 
subprime mortgage meltdown . With home prices rising 
so sharply after 1995, everyone who could possibly 
move from renting to homeownership tried to get into 
the market . Many with less than perfect credit bought 
homes with subprime mortgages, and many of these 
had adjustable rates . For those who bought homes 
at the beginning of the housing price spiral, the risks 
were worth taking . For at least 82 percent of these 
homeowners, appreciation more than covered any 
possible loss and these loans have remained sound . 
But for those who bought more recently, housing price 
declines combined with a weakening overall economy 
have led to many foreclosures and a vicious circle 
culminating in rounds of price cuts and foreclosures .
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for prices to fall further, we need to consider creating a 
mortgage instrument that includes some form of price 
insurance along with an appreciation fee to pay for the 
price insurance premium .
To ease the affordability crisis, we need to continue to use 
Chapter 40B to expedite the production of low-income 
housing and Chapter 40R to assure that there is a surplus 
of appropriately zoned land to quickly develop new 
housing when housing demand picks up . We also need 
to assure an adequate supply of rental vouchers from 
the federal government and from the Commonwealth to 
assure that low and moderate income renters can pay for 
housing without so badly compromising their ability to 
pay for everything else their families require .
In short, we need to stabilize prices by reducing fore-
closures and create new housing at price points that 
young families can afford .
Specific Findings  
for 2007–2008
Economic and Demographic Trends in the 
Greater Boston Region
The Massachusetts Economy Compared to the Nation
A range of economic indicators reveal that in 2008, 
Massachusetts lost some of the economic momentum it 
was gaining between 2004 and 2007 . After outpacing the 
nation throughout much of the 1990s, economic activ-
ity in the Commonwealth declined much more sharply 
during the first few years of this decade and for a longer 
period of time than the nation as a whole . By 2004, 
however, the pace of activity had increased to the point 
where it matched the nation’s . Between January 2007 
and January 2008, the state’s economy continued to grow 
while it began to slide nationwide . Like the late 1990s, 
the economy was doing better than most other regions 
in the country . Since the beginning of this year, however, 
the national slump in the economy has begun to have a 
major impact here at home . The Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia’s index of economic activity for the 
Commonwealth is now only a quarter of a point higher 
than that for the nation, and both are trending down . 
While job creation is very low in Massachusetts, it 
appears that employment in this state is not falling 
How Much New Housing Does Greater  
Boston Need?
As in the original New Paradigm report, we have 
attempted to estimate how much new housing will 
be needed to bring housing supply and demand into 
balance so that prices will rise no faster than general 
inflation . Based on demographic and employment 
forecasts out to 2017, we find that we still need to 
boost housing production modestly over recent 
levels to assure a sufficient number of ownership 
and rental units in the region . We will need enough 
housing to permit the region’s aging population of 
“empty nesters” to downsize to smaller units . This 
will free up some housing for younger families . We 
will also need additional housing to accommodate 
expected job growth .
If the metro area’s employment base grows very 
slowly over the next five years (between 0 .1 and 0 .4 
percent per year), we estimate we will need to produce 
about 13,400 housing units per year between now and 
2012 . That is only 15 percent above the annual rate of 
production sustained between 1998 and 2007 . If, on 
the other hand, we increase employment at a rate of 
0 .775 percent a year—a rate equal to the growth in 
employment during the past year and close to the rate 
expected for national employment growth, we would 
need to produce about 17,750 units a year, an increase 
of 53 percent over the past decade’s annual average . 
With proper housing policy, even this higher produc-
tion target could easily be met .
Implications for Housing Policy
The original New Paradigm report focused exclusively 
on policies to increase the supply of affordable hous-
ing . Now, the set of policies required to cope with the 
exigencies of the housing paradox of “housing prices 
too high and falling too fast,” is more complex . 
To ease the foreclosure crisis, we need federal, state, 
and local policies that make it possible to for mort-
gage lenders to restructure loans so that distressed 
homeowners can afford new terms . We also need to 
expedite the transfer of foreclosed properties to new 
owners who can make repairs and occupy these units 
before they become abandoned and vandalized . For 
prospective homebuyers with good credit, but waiting 
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structures at all . Plymouth and Lowell have issued the 
most single family permits in the region since 2000, yet 
even these communities saw a drop in permits in 2007 .
The Greater Boston region is not alone in experiencing 
this downturn in housing production . Most metro-
politan regions reached their peak in 2005 or 2006 and 
permits have since plummeted . However, the cities 
of the Sunbelt have been much more susceptible to 
fluctuations in housing production than the Greater 
Boston region . After issuing four times as many single-
family housing permits (32,000) than Boston in 2004, 
we project that Las Vegas will drop to 5,200 single-
family permits, a decline of more than 26,000 in the 
past four years . Boston should only decline by 5,000 
single-family housing units . 
Rents, Home Prices, and Affordability
Greater Boston’s Rental Market
By 2006, more than half of Greater Boston renters paid 
more than 30 percent of their income for rent and 
utilities . This affordability problem stems from the 
very low vacancy rate in the region: 5 .0 percent in the 
Boston area in 2007 compared to the national rate of 
9 .7 percent . Boston experienced a mix of appreciation 
and decline depending on neighborhood, with rental 
prices in Beacon Hill/Back Bay decreasing by almost 
20 percent, while rental prices in Roxbury continued 
to increase . Only 10 percent of the region’s apartments 
had asking rents below $600, while more than 30 
percent had rents above $1,250 .
Home Prices
One contributor to softening home prices between 2005 
and 2007 was a rising home vacancy rate in Boston as 
well as the rest of the nation . In 2006, the Greater Boston 
vacancy rate reached 2 .0 percent from a low of just 0 .3 
percent in 2002 . However, in 2008, while the national 
rate was climbing to 2 .8, Boston rate dipped to 1 .9 
percent . This level of vacancies is just high enough to 
protect the region from rapid price escalation, but if the 
rate continues to fall, the housing market will becomes a 
seller’s market again contributing to higher prices . 
Between 2006 and 2008, the median price of single-
family detached homes in the five-county Greater 
Boston region fell by 7 .2 percent . Meanwhile, median 
as rapidly as in other states . The nation’s year-over-
year employment growth approached zero in June 
of 2008 while in Massachusetts the level of growth 
was 0 .8 percent over the previous year, a small yet 
positive number . 
Population, Income Trends, and Migration
Changes in the region’s demographic, economic, and 
housing patterns indicate mixed outcomes for Greater 
Boston residents . Early data from the 2007 American 
Community Survey (ACS) shows a loss of 94,000 resi-
dents between 2006 and 2007 after a gain of 174,000 
residents between 2005 and 2006 . Real median house-
hold, family, and homeowner income increased slightly 
between 2005 and 2006, yet the average renter saw his 
or her real income drop by nearly 2 percent . Vacant 
housing units increased 12 .5 percent (12,627 units) over 
2005 . Median home prices declined for the first time 
in a decade, while rents remained stable . However, 
monthly mortgage costs went up by $103 between 2005 
and 2006, and were 22 percent higher than in 2000 . 
Population loss in the state due to outmigration has 
come down from a high of 33,538 between 2004 and 
2005 to just over 8,000 between 2006 and 2007 .
Production of New Housing
Housing production in the Greater Boston region 
plunged in 2007 and again in the first half of 2008, 
with the number of permits dropping by more than 
2,500 in 2007 . This decline in permitting strongly 
affected multi-unit housing . Half as many permits for 
structures with two to four units were issued in 2007, 
compared with 2006 levels . Structures with five or 
more units faced a 20 percent drop in permits between 
2006 and 2007 . The number of single-family homes 
permitted fell to its lowest level in more than a decade .
Housing Production by Type and Location
In 2007, North Reading—one of the 24 municipalities in 
Massachusetts that has adopted the new Chapter 40R 
Smart Growth Zoning Overlay legislation—eclipsed 
Boston in the number of census-reported multifam-
ily units permitted .1 In fact, 73 percent of the 161 
communities studied permitted no units of multifamily 
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State Funding
In 2008, DHCD spending from state funds increased 
to $320 million from a low of $187 million in 2004 . This 
represents the highest level of state support for hous-
ing since 1991, but in inflation-adjusted dollars the 2008 
amount is only 74 percent of the 1991 level and just 45 
percent of the 1989 budget . Thus, the trend is in the right 
direction, but there is still more that the state could do .
The state increased capital spending $40 million in 
FY2008, largely to fund the renovation of state hous-
ing projects . On the operating side, the state increased 
funding for public housing authorities by 17 percent 
in FY2008, added 9 percent to its own rental housing 
voucher program, and 17 percent to a program aimed 
at providing rental subsidies to those who are covered 
by the state’s Department of Mental Health .
If the FY2009 budget is not reduced because of 
expected declines in revenue, the total operating 
budget for DHCD should increase by another 5 
percent . The largest increases will be used for public 
housing and rental vouchers . The capital budget is still 
not available for FY2009, so we have no knowledge of 
how much will be added for subsidizing the construc-
tion of new affordable housing .
Conclusion
At no time since the publication of the New Paradigm 
report in 2000 have we faced more uncertain times 
about housing in Greater Boston . So many factors are 
in play from demographic and employment trends to 
dramatic federal action to staunch the current crisis 
gripping the nation’s financial sector, that it is virtually 
impossible to predict what 2009 or 2010 will be like . 
What we do know is that taking care of the foreclo-
sure problem in the short run and planning for the 
development of additional affordable housing in the 
future is critical . Unless we do both, we will face sharp 
reductions in home prices over the next year or two 
and then sharp price and rent increases after that . This 
will immediately threaten families with foreclosure 
and entire neighborhoods with abandonment and 
vandalism, and then reduce our ability to economically 
compete with other regions of the country .
condominium prices in the region increased by 1 .5 
percent, perhaps reflecting the movement of “empty-
nesters” from larger homes to condos . The difference 
between the trend in average (mean) prices and the 
middle (median) price for homes suggests that the 
most expensive homes in the region are holding value 
or appreciating while the majority of Greater Boston’s 
homes have lost some of their value .
Foreclosures in Greater Boston
Foreclosures, a national economic challenge, have risen 
from 177 in the five-county Greater Boston region in 
2005 to 2,033 single-family foreclosure deeds in 2007, 
with 4,275 foreclosures predicted for 2008 . Brockton, 
Boston, Lynn and Lowell experienced the highest 
foreclosure rates in both 2006 and 2007 . Condominium 
owners in the region have also faced foreclosures, 
though not to the same degree of single-family home-
owners . In 2007, 751 foreclosure deeds were issued to 
condo owners in the five-county region .
Some hope can be found that the foreclosure crisis 
may be lessening in the coming years in that the rate 
of petitions to foreclose, the first step taken by a lender 
to reclaim property from delinquent borrowers, has 
begun to slow . In the first half of 2008, 3,774 petitions 
to foreclose were issued, down from 4,051 filed in the 
first half of 2007 . This dip was partly the result of the 
implementation of the Act Protecting and Preserving 
Homeownership (the “2007 Act”), which provided fore-
closure prevention counseling funds and created a new 
90-day window for homeowners to resolve a mortgage 
default before foreclosure proceedings began . These 
numbers suggest that after several years of significant 
foreclosure activity, the region’s housing market may 
be moving towards more normal levels .
Public Spending on Housing
Federal Funding
Since 2004, the federal government has funded 
the Commonwealth’s Department of Housing and 
Community Development (DHCD) at approximately 
$400 million per year . More than 70 percent of this total 
goes for rent subsidies, home heating assistance, and 
weatherization programs for low-income homeowners . 
For FY 2009, DHCD anticipates a 1 percent increase in 
federal funding over the $430 million in FY 2008 . 
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1.
Introduction
In the summer of 2000, the Boston Catholic Archdio-
cese and the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce 
approached the Center for Urban and Regional Policy 
at Northeastern University (CURP) with a request that 
it conduct an in-depth study to determine why hous-
ing prices were increasing so rapidly in the region and 
what might be done to make both housing prices and 
rents more affordable . With home prices up 48 percent 
in the five years since 1995, and apartment rents up by 
an equivalent amount, Cardinal Bernard Law insisted 
we had a “moral responsibility” to find ways to make 
housing affordable to families of all income levels .2 
Paul Guzzi, President of the Chamber of Commerce, 
concerned about the region’s ability to retain and 
attract younger workers in the face of sharply rising 
home prices, argued that meeting the affordability 
challenge was an “economic necessity .” 
From their request came one of the most compre-
hensive studies of housing ever completed for the 
Commonwealth . In February 2001, A New Paradigm 
for Housing in Greater Boston was released . It assessed 
the reasons why housing prices and rents were rising 
so rapidly, set a target for new production to bring 
housing supply into balance with housing demand, 
and called for action at the level of the community, 
the state, and the nation to make housing more afford-
able .3 The report made the case that the Common-
wealth would suffer in terms of both social equity and 
economic growth if it did not aggressively address the 
housing affordability crisis .
To assess how well Greater Boston was doing in over-
coming the obstacles to developing housing in the 
region and to meeting the production targets estab-
lished in the New Paradigm report, CURP began in 
2002 to publish a set of annual Greater Boston Housing 
Report Cards under the auspices of The Boston Foun-
dation and the Citizens’ Housing and Planning Asso-
ciation . Each year through 2007, CURP reported on 
changes in the economic and demographic conditions 
in the region, housing construction, changes in home 
prices and rents, housing affordability, and public 
spending in support of housing . For the most part, 
these reports demonstrated year after year insufficient 
new housing production, a continued upward spiral in 
home prices and rents, and declining affordability . 
Now we live in very different times . Foreclosures are 
skyrocketing, vacancy rates are rising, home prices are 
falling, and those who have recently bought homes 
worry that their homes are worth less than their mort-
gages . In lower income neighborhoods, concentrated 
foreclosures on a single street lead to fears of wide-
spread abandonment, vandalism, and sharply drop-
ping property values for those on the same street who 
have dutifully paid their mortgages on time but bear 
the brunt of neighborhood deterioration . Nationally, 
the collapse in housing values is seen as the worst 
since the Great Depression .4 
Given this sudden change in the economic environ-
ment, it is time to reassess housing conditions in 
Greater Boston in order to better understand what 
has happened to prices and rents, new construction, 
affordability, foreclosures, and public policies formu-
lated to cope with the growing complexities of the 
housing market . 
This report is the first step in that process . The origi-
nal New Paradigm report led to annual report cards on 
progress toward meeting the region’s housing needs 
and ultimately to new legislation that provides a mech-
anism for spurring the construction of more affordable 
housing in the Commonwealth . We intend for this 
installment of the Greater Boston Housing Report Card to 
be an assessment of how far we have come, a reminder 
of what still needs to be accomplished, and a spring-
board for continued action aimed at improving hous-
ing affordability and maintaining an enhanced quality 
of life for the residents of Massachusetts . 
Housing Affordability in Greater Boston 
(2000–2005) 
Despite the concerns about escalating home prices 
and rents voiced by the Archdiocese and the Cham-
ber in the spring of 2000, the median selling price 
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As a result of skyrocketing home prices, by 2005 only 
19 of the 161 municipalities in Greater Boston had a 
median home price that was “affordable” by a median-
income homebuyer purchasing the median-priced 
house in that community .5 This was down from 101 
“affordable” communities in 2000 and 59 as late as 
2003 . Among homebuyers at 80 percent of median 
family income, not a single Greater Boston municipal-
ity was “affordable” by 2005 . Five years earlier, 87 
municipalities had been affordable to these young 
families (see Figure 1.2) . 
Unless a family was willing to spend well beyond one-
third of its annual gross income in mortgage principal 
and interest, real estate taxes, and home insurance, that 
family simply could not afford to buy a typical home 
in the city or town where existing homeowners had 
incomes similar to theirs . In fact, in 2005 more than 39 
percent of households with mortgages in Massachu-
setts were paying more than 30 percent of their income 
for mortgage, property tax, and home insurance and 
nearly one in seven (13 .9 percent) were paying more 
than half their income for these housing costs . Renters 
were even more cash-strapped for housing . Over half 
of all renters (51 .5 percent) were spending more than 
30 percent of their income on rent and a quarter (25 .0 
percent) were spending more than half their gross 
income to pay their monthly rent .6
for a single family home in Greater Boston was still 
under $235,000 . The run-up in prices that began back 
in 1995 would prove to be merely a prelude of what 
would happen to home values over the next five years . 
Between March 2000 and March 2005, the median 
selling price would rise by another 75 percent to over 
$407,000 and would reach $420,000 six months later . 
The only “good” news was that rents had stabilized, 
albeit at nearly $1,500 per month for a standard two-
bedroom apartment .
If family incomes had kept pace with the explosion in 
housing costs, affordability would not have been as 
great a moral or economic challenge . But this was not 
the case . While home prices escalated, incomes rose 
slowly at best or stagnated . The result was that hous-
ing became increasingly unaffordable for an increasing 
number of households in Greater Boston . As Figure 
1.1 reveals, the median price of a single family home in 
1990 was four times the median household income . In 
2000, a decade later, housing was a bit less affordable, 
with a median price equivalent to 4 .5 times the median 
household income . Over the next five years, however, 
the median-price to median-income ratio would climb 
sharply . By 2005, it took nearly seven times the median 
household income to purchase the median priced 
single family home .
FIGURE 1 .1
Ratio of Median Selling Price to Median Household 
Income in Greater Boston, 1990–2005
Source: Case-Shiller Median Single Family Home Sales Prices; 
U .S . Census Bureau data on Median Household Income
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Analyzing the Greater Boston Housing Crisis
The New Paradigm report not only warned of the 
demographic and economic consequences of spiraling 
housing costs, but also tried to analyze why prices and 
rents had risen so sharply after 1995 . It found that a 
complex combination of supply and demand factors 
was responsible for the growing housing crisis . On 
the one hand, during the 1990s the region’s buoyant 
economy, led by information services and the financial 
sector, boosted the demand for housing . Employers 
in the Greater Boston labor market added more than 
300,000 jobs between June 1990 and June 2000, repre-
senting an increase of over 14 percent in the region’s 
employment base .12 Some of these jobs went to previ-
ously unemployed residents, but the surplus of jobs 
attracted new workers to Greater Boston . More than 
120,000 additional households took up residence in  
the region between 1990 and 2000 .
Many of these new working families moved into 
vacant housing units, reducing the rental vacancy rate 
to just 2 .7 percent and the homeowner vacancy rate 
to just above 0 .5 percent . These were well below the 
rates considered necessary to keep prices from rising 
faster than general inflation (6 percent and 1 .5–2 .0 
percent, respectively) . With so little excess supply on 
the market, Greater Boston became a seller’s market . A 
large number of households bidding for such a small 
supply of housing bid up apartment rents from $930 
per month in 1995 to nearly $1,500 in 2000 while home 
prices increased at double-digit rates annually from 
1998 through 2002 .13 
Prices would not have increased anywhere near so 
rapidly if sufficient new housing supply had been 
built to fill demand . Between 1990 and 2000, though, 
only 82,600 new units of housing were developed in 
Greater Boston to meet the needs of nearly 123,000 new 
households .14
The New Paradigm report probed the supply constraint 
and found a host of reasons why housing development 
was not keeping up with demand . 
n	 Land costs were found to be particularly high 
in Boston, where unimproved land ran an aver-
age of $6 .00 per square foot, compared to $2 .25 in 
Washington, D .C ., $1 .75 in Baltimore, and $1 .00 in 
Philadelphia . 
n	 Land assembly from many smaller parcels had 
never been easy in Boston . 
Young People Abandon the Region
Prices were rising so quickly during the first half of 
this decade that the housing crisis was no longer just 
a problem for homebuyers in Greater Boston . It was 
also becoming a problem for employers, who were 
having trouble retaining their own young workers 
and attracting others to the region . Not only was the 
absolute cost of housing rising faster than household 
income in Greater Boston, its relative cost was increas-
ing sharply against most other metropolitan regions 
across the country . In 1995, after controlling for higher 
per-capita income in Greater Boston, housing here was 
only 5 percent less affordable than housing in the 
Charlotte, North Carolina metro region . By 2005, this 
cost disadvantage had risen to 87 percent .7 The hous-
ing cost disadvantage of Greater Boston relative to 
Phoenix increased over this period from 40 percent to 
80 percent while the cost disadvantage with Seattle 
increased from 12 percent to 63 percent . Early in the 
decade, Boston even had a 12 percent cost disadvan-
tage relative to New York City . 
With the declining affordability of Greater Boston 
homes, it was not surprising that Massachusetts 
suffered a large increase in outmigration of its popula-
tion to other states . Research reported in CURP’s 2005–
2006 Greater Boston Housing Report Card found a strong 
link between housing costs on the one hand and slow 
employment growth and increased domestic net popu-
lation outmigration on the other .8 This was particularly 
true of regions, such as Greater Boston, in the top 
decile of housing costs across the nation’s more than 
300 metropolitan areas . On net, over 230,000 residents 
left the Commonwealth for other states between 2000 
and 2005, with the number growing each year .9 Even 
the continued influx of immigrants from other coun-
tries was not sufficient to offset this loss . Only the fact 
that births exceeded deaths in the state kept the Massa-
chusetts population from falling below ZPG—zero 
population growth . Indeed, between 2002 and 2005, 
the population of Massachusetts actually declined, 
driven by the loss of nearly 13,000 residents in Greater 
Boston alone .10 The population losses were particularly 
acute among households headed by young workers 
(those aged 20–24 and 25–34 years) .11 After a decade 
of extraordinary housing price appreciation from 1995 
to 2005, Greater Boston had finally priced itself out of 
the market for young people, just as the New Paradigm 
report had warned .
13T h e  G r e a t e r  B o s t o n  H o u s i n g  R e p o r t  C a r d  2 0 0 8
then, over the next five years, the report suggested the 
need for the construction of 78,300 new housing units 
in Greater Boston between 2001 and 2005 .16 
Given the actual prevailing production level—8,460 
units per year, on average, between 1996 and 2000—
the New Paradigm report predicted a future shortfall of 
7,200 units per year, or 36,000 units by 2005 . To make 
up for such a shortfall, housing production would 
have to be increased at the rate of 15,660 units per year .
As noted earlier, beginning in 2002, CURP began 
producing a series of annual Greater Boston Hous-
ing Report Cards to keep track of production, home 
prices, rents, and government action undertaken to 
spur housing construction . The results of the very first 
report proved discouraging . Total housing produc-
tion actually declined in 2001 to 9,701 units from 10,342 
the year before . A year later, production had fallen 
even further, to just 9,520 units . The region was clearly 
going in the wrong direction, adding to housing price 
pressure . In 2003, production recovered to a bit over 
12,100 units; in 2004, the rise continued, with 13,556 
units constructed, and in 2005, with 15,561 units .17 The 
trend was finally going in the right direction, but still 
falling short of the New Paradigm goal of 15,660 per 
year . Altogether between 2001 and 2005, total produc-
tion reached 60,460 units, nearly 18,000 shy of what the 
demand projected in the New Paradigm required .
This underperformance in production had severe 
consequences for affordability in Greater Boston . The 
median price of a single family home increased from 
$249,000 in 2000 to over $305,000 two years later . Prices 
continued to rise so sharply that by 2005 the median 
price in Greater Boston was just under $400,000 .18 
Affordability evaporated rapidly, as shown previously 
in Figure 1 .2 . 
Apartment rents, however, reached a plateau of about 
$1,500 in 2000 and stayed there through 2005, thanks 
to the confluence of three factors .19 The first was a 
decline in the number of renters, as more people who 
had previously rented apartments sought to get into 
the homeownership market in order to take advan-
tage of the explosion in home price appreciation . The 
movement of renters into homeownership, while 
contributing to rising home prices, helped raise the 
rental vacancy rate, and thus helped stave off rapid 
rent increases . Second, an expansion in the number of 
student housing units built by area universities further 
n	 Site clean-up and preparation posed another prob-
lem because of the sizeable number of parcels need-
ing brownfield remediation . 
n	 Tax title laws often made it difficult or impossible to 
free up abandoned land for housing .
n	 After 1990, the Commonwealth abandoned much of 
its commitment to providing support for housing 
production in the state . State spending on housing 
construction in 2000 was only 40 percent of what it 
had been in 1989 .15
While all of these factors played significant roles 
in keeping production down and keeping prices in 
Boston abnormally high, the factors that contributed 
most to the lag in housing production were local 
zoning laws and building codes that made it costly and 
time-consuming for developers to build new housing . 
Strict separation of land uses prevented the develop-
ment of housing above commercial spaces in thriving 
retail areas . Large-lot “snob zoning” made it impos-
sible to develop denser housing . Arcane and complex 
building codes added still other barriers to construc-
tion . Behind all of these barriers, according to the 
report, was a system of local zoning control so power-
ful that each community had the ability to prevent new 
housing from being built . Residents in many commu-
nities, fearing greater congestion, increased public 
school costs, or possibly an altered “neighborhood 
environment,” exhibited a strong attitude of “NIMBY-
ism”– Not In My Back Yard . In one town meeting after 
another, residents were quick to vote down new devel-
opments, relying on zoning laws and building codes to 
keep construction to a minimum . The result: with most 
communities restricting development, total construc-
tion fell well below the level needed to keep prices 
from going through the roof .
Setting a Housing Supply Target
Forecasting out to 2005, the New Paradigm report went 
on to project the amount of additional construction 
needed each year to meet housing demand . According 
to its analysis, 51,400 more units would be needed to 
account for the population growth expected between 
2001 and 2005 . Another 17,000 rental units would be 
needed to raise the rental vacancy rate to 6 .0 percent . 
Still another 9,300 units would be needed to raise the 
owner occupied vacancy rate to 2 .0 percent . Altogether 
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became a factor in the location decision of many firms 
and contributed to slow or negative job growth .22 
The second factor was the increased supply of new hous-
ing units that began to come on line in 2003 . Between 
1999 and 2002 there were, on average, 10,056 building 
permits issued per year in the Greater Boston metro 
region . In the subsequent four years, this number 
increased by 37 percent to an average of 13,750 per 
year .23 At the same time, colleges and universities in 
the region boosted their production of residence hall 
units . Between 1999 and 2006, more than 4,600 such 
student apartments were built, freeing up this number 
of units in the private sector . 
Of course, in other housing markets, housing produc-
tion was much stronger . In places like Las Vegas, 
Phoenix, San Diego, and Miami, developers were able 
to build huge developments, many of them on “spec .” 
The result, as we will see, was a much more dramatic 
collapse in home prices as supply greatly exceeded 
demand .24
The third factor was the subprime mortgage meltdown . 
Subprime lending refers to the extension of credit to 
borrowers who are considered “high risk .” Subprime 
loans carry higher interest rates, as well as points and 
fees, that make borrowing substantially more costly 
than conventional loans .25 Until 2003, fewer than 8 
percent of all mortgage originations in the U .S . were 
subprime . The share more than doubled in 2004 and 
reached 20 percent in 2005 and 2006 .26 Such lending 
was particularly prevalent in the nation’s low-income 
census tracts, where 40 percent of new mortgages 
were subprime . In low-income minority communities, 
the rate reached 45 percent, on average .27 The sharp 
increase in the proportion of adjustable rate mortgages 
(ARMs) only added to the potential powder keg in 
the housing mortgage market . In 2001, 12 percent of 
all mortgage originations in the nation had adjust-
able rates; by 2004, the proportion had reached 35 
percent (40 percent in the fourth quarter of that year; 
see Figure 1.3) .28 Those who selected these mortgage 
instruments would be subject to increased borrowing 
costs if interest rates rose .
The boom in housing prices from 1995 through 2005 
helps to explain why subprime mortgages became so 
prevalent . With housing values in many parts of the 
country rising rapidly, and with what seemed to be 
a reasonable expectation that housing prices would 
reduced pressure on the private rental market . Finally, 
a shift in production from single family to multifamily 
housing developments favored renters . From just 3,112 
units in multifamily developments in 2002 to 8,291 in 
2005, the expansion in this housing product helped 
keep rents stable . Conversely, the decline in single 
family home construction from over 8,600 units in 1998 
to just 6,000 in 2003 was largely responsible for the 
continued price inflation in owner-occupied homes .20 
By 2005, those who had bought homes in the 1990s 
or before were in the enviable position of seeing their 
housing assets soar in value . By contrast, those who 
had not purchased a home when prices were lower, 
especially the region’s new generation of young work-
ers, found themselves either spending a huge share of 
their income on housing or moving to less expensive 
housing markets further away from Greater Boston (or 
out-of-state altogether) . 
Not surprisingly, domestic outmigration soared to 
more than 60,000 residents per year in both 2003–
2004 and 2004–2005 .21 Restrictive zoning, and other 
barriers to housing construction, had created such a 
lag in production that the only safety valve remain-
ing was the emigration of Greater Boston residents 
to other regions of the country . If so many residents 
had not left the region, housing prices would have 
risen even more .
The Housing Situation since 2005:  
Falling Home Prices/Stable Rents
By 2005, Greater Boston’s housing bubble was begin-
ning to deflate . A combination of factors led to a rever-
sal in home prices and continued stability in rents . 
The first was slow population growth . As noted just 
above, the housing crisis was partially self-correcting . 
Prices became so high that homebuyers voted with 
their feet . Because of substantial out-migration, there 
was almost no growth in the number of households 
in Greater Boston, and as a result upward pressure on 
home prices moderated . Of course, this self-correction 
came at a price . The loss of so many young working 
families caused leaders and business owners to call 
into question whether businesses in Greater Boston 
would be able to meet their future workforce needs . 
As a number of studies have revealed, this, in turn, 
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subprime mortgage near the beginning of the home 
price spiral in 1998, there would still be nearly seven 
years of rapidly rising house prices . Under these condi-
tions, it is not surprising that the Fed study revealed 
a foreclosure rate of less than 6 percent—that is, a 
94 percent “success” rate—for these early subprime 
borrowers .30
Once the housing price bubble burst in 2005, however, 
the proliferation of new mortgages led to a wave of 
foreclosures both nationwide and in Massachusetts . 
The foreclosure initiation rate for all U .S . mortgages 
increased from 0 .4 percent in 2006 to 1 .0 percent in the 
first quarter of 2008 . The Massachusetts foreclosure 
rate was half the U .S . rate as late as 2003, but by 2007 
it reached the U .S . level and trailed the U .S . rate only 
slightly at the beginning of 2008 (see Figure 1.4) .31 
An extremely disproportionate share of the run-up 
in foreclosures has been experienced by those who 
took out subprime mortgages—particularly those 
with an adjustable rate . Back in the first quarter of 
2000, only 1 percent of subprime adjustable loans 
faced foreclosure . By the fourth quarter of 2007, the 
rate had increased to 7 percent and was now higher 
in Massachusetts than the 6 percent rate in the U .S . as 
a whole (see Figure 1.5) . By contrast, prime fixed rate 
mortgages in the Commonwealth had a foreclosure 
rate of 0 .3 percent in late 2007, hardly higher than the 
prevailing rate throughout the last decade . Even the 
continue to increase, anyone who could possibly 
purchase a home felt he or she was getting a “piece of 
the rock .” Housing seemed a better bet than the stock 
market as an appreciating asset . 
Under these circumstances, if a mortgage company 
was willing to permit a family to get into the home-
ownership market with almost any kind of mortgage 
instrument, it seemed worth the gamble . To meet the 
growing demand for home loans, a proliferation of 
mortgage servicers arose who were only too happy to 
sell as many mortgages as they could . It was in their 
short-term financial interest to qualify buyers, even 
when those buyers had shaky credit ratings . Some 
servicers used questionable promotion practices to sell 
the American dream of homeownership to families 
clearly unaware of the risks they were taking . Some 
seeking to own agreed to subprime mortgages with 
their eyes wide open, understanding the risks but 
awed by the expected gain . 
In many cases, the risks were worth taking . Accord-
ing to a recent Boston Federal Reserve Bank study, 
an overwhelming percentage (82 percent) of those 
in Massachusetts who took out subprime mortgages 
have been “successful,” insofar as they have been able 
to remain in their house and continue servicing the 
monthly mortgage payment over a 12 year period, or 
have elected to sell their home, usually at a profit .29 
Moreover, for those who bought their homes with a 
FIGURE 1 .3
U.S. Subprime and Adjustable Rate Mortgage 
Originations, 2001–2006 
Source: The State of the Nation’s Housing 2008
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the value of their homes and their household income 
remain fixed . 
The third is a decline in housing prices . When home 
prices decline, borrowers’ loan-to-value (LTV) ratios 
can increase to 1 .00 or higher . In such circumstances, it 
is often rational for borrowers to abandon their proper-
ties, returning them to the mortgage company or bank 
that provided their financing . 
Of these three factors, the Fed study mentioned earlier 
found that declining home prices, or what it termed 
“house price depreciation,” is the main driver of fore-
closures .35 Rising joblessness and stagnant income has 
a decidedly weaker impact on foreclosures, if home 
values remain relatively strong . However, homeown-
ers who suffer a 20 percent or greater decline in the 
value of their homes are about 14 times more likely 
to default on a mortgage than homeowners who have 
enjoyed a 20 percent increase .36 As such, when prices 
began to soften in the Massachusetts real estate market 
in 2006, it is not surprising that foreclosures began to 
become more prevalent .
The Housing Situation since 2005:  
Falling Prices in a Vicious Circle
The link between foreclosures and prices is quite 
strong . Rising foreclosures are often part of a more 
elaborate vicious circle of falling home prices which in 
turn leads to even more foreclosures and further price 
reductions . This circle can be depicted as in Figure 
1.6 . A slowdown in population growth, combined with 
an increase in housing production that exceeds demand, 
can trigger an initial housing price decline . If prices 
fall substantially, some homeowners—particularly 
those who have purchased their homes recently at 
inflated prices—see their mortgage loan-to-value 
ratios increase . If these ratios rises high enough, or if 
the borrower’s income declines as a result of a slowing 
economy and rising unemployment, the homeowner often 
chooses to walk away—or is forced into foreclosure—
rather than continue to pay mortgage payments on 
a home worth less than the value of the mortgage . 
Those who have paid a premium for their mortgage 
in obtaining a subprime mortgage, particularly one 
with an adjustable rate, are most prone to foreclosure . 
Unless foreclosed homes are re-sold and re-occupied 
quickly, vacancy rates rise . The increase in vacancies 
foreclosure rate on subprime fixed rate mortgages was 
less than 2 .5 percent .32
Sixty-day plus delinquency rates on home mortgages 
are just about double the rate of actual foreclosure 
initiations . These are mortgages that will likely face 
foreclosure if their borrowers continue to fail to honor 
their monthly mortgage commitments . Back in the first 
quarter of 2000, less than 2 percent of Massachusetts 
subprime adjustable rate mortgage holders were delin-
quent in their mortgage payments . By the first quarter 
of 2008, the number was close to 14 percent—one in 
every seven .33 
Why Foreclosures are Rising
Theoretically, there are three factors that can lead to an 
increase in foreclosure rates .34 The first is rising unem-
ployment and, by extension, falling household income . 
When the economy weakens, an increasing number of 
households find it difficult, if not impossible, to keep 
up with their mortgage payments . Many face mort-
gage delinquency, and if the delinquency lasts more 
than 60 days, foreclosure initiation can begin .
The second is rising mortgage payments . Until recently, 
this was hardly a problem, since most mortgages had 
fixed rates . But with the rise of ARMs, households 
can find their mortgage payments increasing even as 
FIGURE 1 .5
Percent of Loans with Foreclosure Initiations  
in Massachusetts
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association/Haver Analytics
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In today’s market, the foreclosure to home sales ratio 
in Massachusetts has increased by a factor of ten from 
just 0 .6 percent in 2003 to 6 .0 percent in 2007 and is 
likely to be much higher in 2008 . Homeowner vacancy 
rates in Greater Boston, as low as 0 .5 percent in 2002, 
increased to 1 .2 percent in 2005 and 1 .9 percent in 
2007 .38 
In this environment of slow population growth, rising 
foreclosures, and rising vacancy rates, housing prices 
were bound to fall . In Greater Boston, the median sales 
price for existing one-family homes, as measured by 
the Case-Shiller index, has fallen 11 percent from its 
2005 third quarter peak of $420,000 to $373,800 in the 
second quarter of 2008 .39,40 
Figure 1.7 puts these developments in a national 
context, comparing the erosion in housing prices in 
Greater Boston with nineteen other major metropolitan 
areas from their respective peaks to June 2008 . Eight of 
these metro regions have experienced relatively small 
price reductions, including Charlotte (-1 .6 percent), 
adds to the supply of available housing relative to 
demand, depressing prices further . With prices in 
free fall, potential homebuyers remain on the side-
lines waiting for prices to fall even more . This further 
depresses demand, leading to a self-fulfilling prophesy 
of falling prices . This scenario is not unlike a stock 
market crash . Only when enough potential homebuy-
ers believe that prices have stabilized does demand 
pick up to the point to actually stabilize prices .
In the early 1990s, when the economy was in reces-
sion, foreclosures shot up . In 1990, for every 100 home 
sales there were three foreclosures in Massachusetts . 
By 1992, with unemployment rising and incomes 
shrinking, nearly 15 foreclosures occurred for every 
100 home sales . Not surprisingly, following the vicious 
circle described above, home prices declined .37 They 
would not return to their 1989 peak until 1997 . Thus a 
slowing economy led to falling incomes which, in turn, 
led to rising foreclosures and still faster falling prices . 
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FIGURE 1 .6
The Dynamics of Falling Home Sales Prices
Source: Author’s diagram
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to 3 .0 percent . During this same period, the vacancy 
rate in Miami quadruped to 4 .4 percent, while the 
rate reached 4 .9 percent in Las Vegas . With such high 
vacancy rates, homebuyers had a field day, negotiating 
prices down substantially . And with such precipitous 
reductions in housing prices, foreclosure rates soared 
in these metro areas . In 2007, 1 .0 percent of all mort-
gages nationwide were in some stage of foreclosure . 
Meanwhile, in San Diego the rate was 1 .8 percent; in 
Phoenix 1 .9 percent; in Miami 2 .7 percent; and in Las 
Vegas 4 .2 percent . These regions in particular have 
been the poster children for the downward spiral  
associated with the housing price vicious circle . 
Because Greater Boston did not experience a wave of 
speculative housing production, it has been spared 
the worst of the current national housing crisis . Its 
housing prices have fallen only moderately relative to 
other metro regions . Much of the 11 percent decrease 
in home prices since September 2005 is due to the 
slow growth in households in the region, which has 
reduced housing demand, combined with increases 
in the number of foreclosures, which has essentially 
increased housing supply .
Dallas (-3 .1 percent), Denver(-6 .2 percent), and New 
York (-9 .0 percent) . At the other extreme, three metro 
regions have seen median home prices for existing 
single-family homes decline by 30 percent or more . This 
group includes Phoenix (-32 .6 percent) and Miami and 
Las Vegas, both down by 32 .4 percent . 
The dramatic declines in home prices in these particu-
lar metro areas can be understood by looking at two 
sets of data . The first is the ratio of new housing units 
under construction to the increase in the number of 
households . In this case, we have data on the total 
number of new housing units produced between 2003 
and 2007 and the increase in the number of house-
holds over the period 2000 to 2005 .41 In Phoenix, there 
were 19 percent more units constructed than the 
number of new households in the region . The compa-
rable figures for San Diego, Miami, and Las Vegas 
are 41, 39, and 36 percent, respectively . With such an 
increase in construction relative to demand, one would 
expect to see homeowner vacancy rates soar . Indeed, 
they did . In Phoenix, the vacancy rate rose from 1 .0 
percent in 2005 to 3 .7 percent in 2007 . In San Diego, 
the rate doubled between 2004 and 2007, from 1 .5 
FIGURE 1 .7
Percentage Change in Median Sales Price of Existing Single-Family Homes in Selected Metro Areas  
(Peak to June 2008)
Source: Case-Shiller Median Sales Price Data
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35 .4 percent of his or her income on rent, up from 35 .0 
percent a year earlier . Moreover, although U .S . Census 
data have yet to be released for 2007 and 2008 on the 
proportion of renters paying 30 percent and 50 percent 
or more of their gross income on rent, we do know 
that as of 2006, 52 .6 percent of renters were paying 
more than 30 percent of their income on monthly rent, 
the highest proportion ever . Back in 2000, “only” 38 .8 
percent of renters had to pay this much . A quarter of 
renters (25 .6 percent) were paying more than 50 percent 
of their gross incomes in rent in 2006, also a record .
The Greater Boston Housing Paradox:  
Home Prices Too High and Falling Too Fast
With home prices dropping, homeownership is becom-
ing more affordable in Greater Boston . Between 2005 
and 2007, nominal median household income has 
increased by 9 .3 percent while the nominal median 
single family home price has declined by 5 .5 percent . 
As a result, the ratio of home price to household 
income has declined from 6 .68 in 2005 to 5 .77 in 2007 
(see Table 1.1) . By mid-2008, the estimated ratio was 
down to 5 .43, suggesting even greater affordability . 
Still, it is important to recognize that back in 2000—
after five years of housing price escalation—the selling 
price to median income ratio was only 4 .53 (and 4 .88 in 
2001) . As such, prices are beginning to come into line 
with incomes, but there is still a substantial distance to 
go to return to the 2000 ratio, let alone the 4 .02 ratio of 
1990 (see Figure 1.8, which extends the data we origi-
nally presented in Figure 1 .1 to 2008) . As of 2006, over 
31 percent of homeowners were still paying more than 
30 percent of their gross income in principal, interest, 
property taxes, and home insurance . This figure was 
down from 39 percent in 2005, but still higher than the 
27 percent in 2000 .
As for renters, things had not improved at all through 
2006 . Between 2005 and 2006, median gross monthly 
rent increased by 2 .7 percent while median renter 
household income increased by only about half this 
much . As a result, the median renter is now paying 
TABLE 1 .1
Changes in Housing Affordability in Greater Boston, 2001–2007
Percent Change Percent Change
2001 2005 2006 2007 2001–2005 2005 – 2006/2007
Nominal Median Single Family 
Home Price
$288,116 $417,552 -- $394,432 44 .90% -5 .50%
Nominal Median Household 
Income
$59,011 $62,462 -- $68,319 5 .80% 9 .30%
Home Price/Income Ratio 4 .88 6 .68 -- 5 .77
Nominal Median Gross 
Monthly Rent
$915 $1,042 $1,070 -- 13 .80% 2 .70%
Nominal Median Renter 
Income
$39,058 $35,748 $36,251 -- -8 .50% 1 .40%
Annual Rent/Income Ratio 0 .281 0 .35 0 .354
Source: U .S . Census Bureau, 2001–2007 American Community Survey; Case-Shiller Single Family Home Price Series
FIGURE 1 .8
Ratio of Median Selling Price to Median Household 
Income in Greater Boston, 1990–2008
Source: Case-Shiller Median Single Family Home Sales Prices; U .S . Census Bureau data on 
Median Household Income (extrapolated to 2008 at an annual rate of 2% per year)
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How Much Farther will Housing Prices Fall?
As of July 2008, according to Case-Shiller calculations, 
the median selling price for a single family home in 
Greater Boston has declined by over $46,000, or 11 
percent from its peak of $420,131 in September 2005, . 
How much further might prices fall below the current 
$373,800 median?
On the one hand, there is reason to believe that prices 
will continue to fall over the next one to two years . 
The number of adjustable subprime mortgages facing 
upward rate readjustment over the next few years is 
substantially higher than in past housing cycles . If 
inflationary pressure, led by rising food and fuel costs 
and rising import prices based on the weak dollar, 
continues to mount, the Federal Reserve Board will 
undoubtedly begin to raise short-term interest rates, 
thereby causing adjustable mortgage rates to go up, 
as well . These higher interest rates could easily lead to 
additional foreclosures, rising vacancy rates, and fall-
ing prices . If higher interest rates also slow economic 
growth, causing a rise in unemployment and a decline 
in household income, the downward pressure on 
home prices could be exacerbated . 
In its May 2008 Massachusetts forecast, the New 
England Economic Partnership predicted a decline in 
median selling prices of existing homes of 7 .5 percent 
in 2008 and a further decline of 0 .8 percent in 2009, 
followed by modest price increases of 1 .8–3 .8 percent 
per year through 2012 .42 However, it must be noted 
These figures would suggest the need for even larger 
price and rent reductions to increase affordability . Yet 
if the current downward price trajectory continues, 
even more households will see their LTV ratios rise 
above 1 .0, leading almost inevitably to more foreclo-
sures and an exacerbation of the home price vicious 
circle . Consequently, even more communities could 
face the challenges associated with abandoned prop-
erty and devalued neighborhoods . Thus, we are now 
faced with a paradox in which home prices and rents 
are still too high to be affordable for many, but falling 
too fast to stabilize neighborhoods . 
Of course, over the long run, the paradox could disap-
pear, but not the housing crisis . If prices and rents 
were to stabilize at their present levels, the number of 
foreclosures would likely decline . Yet this would still 
leave a serious affordability problem . If prices and 
rents continue their downward spiral, the affordabil-
ity problem would diminish, but foreclosures would 
likely increase sharply with even more communities 
facing all of the problems associated with abandoned 
properties . Somehow, we need to solve the paradox 
by simultaneously increasing the supply of afford-
able housing without unduly depressing home prices . 
Private markets, left alone to the price dynamics of 
supply and demand, are not very good at this .
FIGURE 1 .9 .
Case-Shiller Home Price Index (1988–1993 Cycle v. 2005–2008 Cycle)
Source: Forecast Values based on Case-Shiller Price Index
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Boston, prices began to rise in July 2008 . If prices 
continue to trend as they did during the last major 
price correction (September 1988–June 1992)— 
a period in which home prices fell even more rapidly 
than during the current cycle—we are likely near the 
bottom of the current cycle and can expect prices to 
begin to rise modestly, at least through 2012 . If this 
forecast holds, by June 2012, prices will return to the 
peak level last achieved in September 2005 . Figure 1.9 
depicts this forecast trend .
Added credence to this more optimistic forecast 
is provided by data assembled by Case-Shiller on 
national trends in gross residential investment and 
housing starts over the past three housing cycles plus 
the current one . As Table 1.2 indicates, over the past 
three cycles, residential investment declined by 30 to 
that the NEEP forecasting model has consistently 
underestimated the housing price decline during the 
current housing cycle, and it is expected that NEEP’s 
September forecast update will suggest a somewhat 
steeper and longer home price decline . Interviews with 
researchers at the Warren Group also suggest that the 
housing price decline is far from over, as their August 
press release revealed a much larger monthly price 
decline in July than they have ever recorded . Timothy 
Warren, Jr ., CEO of The Warren Group, noted that “[f]
oreclosure activity has certainly dragged down home 
prices and will continue to affect the overall market .”43
On the other hand, a much less pessimistic view 
follows from a close examination of Case-Shiller data 
for Greater Boston and for the nation . According to 
Case-Shiller single family home price data for Greater 
TABLE 1 .2
Gross Residential Investment and Housing Starts in Down Cycles, 1973–2008
Cycle I* Peak 1973:1 Trough 1975:1 Percent Change
Gross Residential Investment (billions of $ 2000) $310 .60 $189 .20 -39%
      Percent of GDP 5 .70% 3 .60%
Housing Starts (millions of units) 2 .481 0 .904 -63%
Cycle II* Peak 1978:3 Trough 1982:3 Percent Change
Gross Residential Investment (billions of $ 2000) $356 .60 $182 .90 -49%
     Percent of GDP 5 .50% 3 .50%
Housing Starts (millions of units) 2 .141 0 .927 -61%
Cycle III* Peak 1986:4 Trough 1991:1 Percent Change
Gross Residential Investment (billions of $ 2000) $355 .90 $250 .00 -30%
      Percent of GDP 5 .60% 3 .50%
Housing Starts (millions of units) 2 .26 0 .798 -65%
Cycle IV* Peak 2006:1 2008:02:00 Percent Change
Gross Residential Investment (billions of $ 2000) $607 .20 $367 .10 -40%
      Percent of GDP 5 .50% 3 .10%
Housing Starts (millions of units) 2 .265 0 .977 -57%
Source: US Bureau of the Census Construction Reports, July 17, 2008; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Flow of Funds Data, Table F10, Line 19; Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP release July 31, 2008, Table 1 .1 .6 
*Peak and trough dates are for gross residential investment . For housing starts, peak and trough dates are:
Cycle I: January 1973 – February 1975
Cycle II: December 1977–August 1981
Cycle III: February 1984 – January 1991
Cycle IV: January 2006 – May, 2008
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demand for the upcoming five- and 10-year time hori-
zons, we have developed two types of forecasts . The 
first relies strictly on expected demographic trends . The 
second is based on alternative estimates of job growth .
Demographic Projections
According to the U .S . Census Bureau’s population 
projections, the demographic profile of the average 
Massachusetts household will begin to change dramat-
ically over the next 10 years . Assuming that the share 
of the total state population residing in the five-county 
Greater Boston metro region remains the same as in 
2006 (62 percent), Table 1.3 and Figure 1.10 reveal the 
expected net change in the number of households by 
age of the primary householder between 2006 and 2012 
and beyond to 2017 . These projections are based on 
expected births, deaths, net interstate migration, and 
net foreign immigration .44
Using the Census statistics, we project an increase of 
nearly 73,000 net new households in Greater Boston 
between 2006 and 2012 . Of these, about half (37,230) 
will be headed by someone of “working age” (Age 
18–64), while the remaining 35,650 will be of “retire-
ment age” (Age 65+) .45 Notable is the large “loss” of 
35–44 year olds as (1) many current households of this 
age enter the 45–54 year old cohort, (2) fewer 25–34 
49 percent before recovery . Housing starts declined by 
61 to 65 percent . Since the current national cycle began 
in the first quarter of 2006, gross residential investment 
is down 40 percent while housing starts have fallen 
by 57 percent . Since these figures closely mirror past 
trends, one might conclude that the current downturn 
in housing production is near an end and might expect 
a stabilizing of home prices and the beginning of at 
least a modest recovery .
The wild card in all of this is the growing financial 
crisis that began with the lethal combination of falling 
home prices and subprime lending . With hundreds 
of billions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities in 
default, we have already seen the demise of vener-
able financial institutions including Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch and the federal 
takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and bailout 
of AIG . Having been burned so severely by taking on 
mortgage-backed securities, it is almost certain that 
banking institutions and mortgage companies will 
dramatically reduce their exposure to any kind of 
mortgage lending except that carrying almost no risk . 
For millions of American families, even those with 
reasonable credit scores, this will result in their being 
locked out of the homeowner market . With such an 
expected decline in housing demand, two things could 
easily happen . Home prices will continue to drop—
possibly leading to further foreclosures—and rents 
will begin to rise again . All of this is speculation, but 
many of the elements for a continued housing market 
meltdown seem in place, regardless of the emergency 
measures taken by the U .S . Department of Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve Bank to help out troubled 
lenders and restore confidence in financial markets . 
These conditions are so unusual that it is difficult to 
predict outcomes based on past performance .
How Much Housing Does Greater Boston 
Need for the Next Decade?
The amount and types of housing we will have to 
produce to meet Greater Boston’s future needs will 
depend to a great extent on demographic trends in the 
region; the strength of our desire to provide all house-
holds with decent, safe, affordable shelter; and the 
amount of economic growth we can expect and would 
like to sustain . To obtain useful estimates of housing 
TABLE 1 .3
Greater Boston Demographic Projection, 2006–2017
Age
Change in 
Number of 
Households, 
2006–2012
Change in 
Number of 
Households, 
2012–2017
Change in 
Number of 
Households, 
2006–2017
18 – 24 3,496 -3,471 25
25 – 34 9,983 13,379 23,362
35 – 44 -35,723 -15,457 -51,180
45 – 54 16,331 -20,253 -3,922
55 – 64 43,143 25,948 69,091
65 – 74 32,870 40,641 73,511
75+ 2,778 6,283 9,061
Working Age (18 – 64) 37,230 146 37,376
Retirement Age (65+) 35,648 46,924 82,572
Total 72,878 47,070 119,948
Source: Calculated from U .S . Census Bureau, Population Projections, 2000-2030; U .S . Census Bureau, 
“Annual Households and Housing Unit Estimates, 2000, 2005, and 2006; U .S . Census Bureau, 
2006 American Community Survey (ACS), public use files
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is the result of little in-migration into the region and 
significant out-migration, with most of the change due 
to residents simply aging into older age cohorts .
Obviously, if this projection for 2012 to 2017 turns out 
to be true, there will be very few workers available 
to replace those retiring and few to fill any new job 
opportunities created in the region .
New Housing Required to Meet the 
Demographic Projection 
Based on these demographic projections and using the 
methodology developed in the New Paradigm report to 
estimate Greater Boston’s housing needs between 2001 
and 2005, we can forecast the number of additional 
housing units that will be required to satisfy housing 
demand so as not to lead to a new upward spiral in 
home prices . 
To do this we need to calculate (1) how much addi-
tional housing is required to get vacancy rates to 
“normal” levels in order to stabilize prices and (2) how 
much additional housing we need for the expected 
growth in the number of households .
When the New Paradigm report was published in 2001, 
vacancy rates were extremely low . As such, the report 
noted that of the 78,300 new units it called for, 17,600 
were needed to bring the rental unit vacancy rate up 
to 6 .0 percent (from 3 percent) and 9,300 units were 
needed to bring the owner occupied vacancy rate to 2 .0 
percent (from 1 percent) .
Today, according to the most recent data available 
for 2007, both the rental and owner occupied vacancy 
rates are just below “normal” at 5 .0 percent and 1 .9 
percent, respectively .46 Given the number of rental 
and owner occupied units in Greater Boston, to get to 
normal vacancy rates, we need to add only about 1,000 
units of owner-occupied housing and 6,275 units of 
rental housing .47 
In addition to the units required to ensure healthy 
vacancy rates, many more units of additional housing 
will be needed to cover expected household growth 
as suggested by our Census-based projections . By 
2012, nearly 73,000 additional units of housing will be 
needed in Greater Boston; by 2017, the number will be 
close to 120,000 . 
year olds age into this cohort, and (3) more house-
holds of this age leave the region than come to Greater 
Boston from elsewhere . Like much of the rest of the 
country, Greater Boston is getting older . In Boston, 
though, the aging of the population is taking place at a 
faster rate . 
Between 2012 and 2017, this aging of the Greater 
Boston population will become even more dramatic . 
If the underlying trends the Census uses to predict 
population growth hold, growth in the Greater Boston 
population will slow dramatically . This is particu-
larly true of net domestic migration . Since many more 
households have left Massachusetts for other states, 
in part because of high housing costs, and relatively 
few households living in other states have chosen 
the Commonwealth as their new home, net domestic 
migration has been negative for the past five years . 
Based at least partly on this net outflow, the Census 
projects household growth of only 4 .8 percent between 
2006 and 2012 in Massachusetts, compared to 6 .7 
percent nationwide . Over the 10-year period ending in 
2017, Massachusetts household growth is estimated to 
be less than two-thirds that of the U .S . (7 .9 percent v . 
12 .2 percent) . 
As such, only 47,000 additional households are 
expected to be living in the region in 2017 compared to 
2012 . Even more startling is the fact that virtually none 
(only 146) of these households will be of working age . 
All the rest will be of retirement age . This presumably 
FIGURE 1 .10
Change in the Projected Number of Households by 
Age Cohort in Greater Boston, 2006–2017
Source: See Table 1 .3
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16,000 jobs, or 2,670 jobs per year through 2012 and 
a total of only 28,600 through 2017 . Given the demo-
graphic projection of over 37,000 additional work-
ing age households by 2012 with over 48,000 new 
workers, this scenario suggests a significant increase 
in unemployment in the region unless labor force 
participation declines or “surplus” workers leave 
the region for job opportunity elsewhere . Under 
these dire circumstances, there will be no problem 
housing such a small addition to the workforce at 
current housing production levels .
n	 The mid-growth forecast assumes a growth rate of 
0 .4 percent, the rate projected by New England 
Economic Partnership for 2007–2012 in its May 2008 
forecast . This is less than half the job growth rate 
Greater Boston experienced between 1997 and 2002, 
but it still suggests 46,300 additional jobs by 2012 
and 97,500 by 2017 . According to our demographic 
projection, we will have just enough additional 
working age households to meet employment 
demand through 2012, but by 2017 we will need to 
This projection suggests the need for 12,170 additional 
units per year between 2006 and 2012, followed by 
9,400 per year between 2013 and 2017 . Adding in the 
units needed to marginally raise vacancy rates, we 
would need to construct about 13,380 units per year to 
cover household growth and stabilize prices and rents by 
2012 and another 9,400 units per year between 2013 and 
2017 (assuming that earlier production has by that  
time brought vacancy rates to their normal levels) .  
This projection is summarized in Table 1.4 .
Given the average annual housing production levels 
in Greater Boston over the past ten years (1998–2007), 
these calculations suggest that over the 2006–2012 
period we will have a shortfall of about 1,780 units 
per year . With an expected slowdown in household 
growth after 2012, though, production levels close to 
those currently in place will be more than sufficient 
to meet demand . Hence, we face a fairly serious short-
term shortage in housing production if our population 
projections prove correct, with slow household growth 
after 2012 reducing the shortfall to essentially zero . 
Employment-based Projections
The slowdown in household growth is certainly 
welcome from the point of view of housing supply 
and home prices . But what it actually suggests is a 
rather substantial slowdown in economic growth and 
employment . With few young workers coming into 
the workforce, businesses are likely to seek out other 
regions to expand their enterprises or begin new ones . 
Home prices will fall, but we will hardly take pleasure 
in the reason why they do .
If we want or need employment to expand at a faster 
pace in Greater Boston, there will have to be hous-
ing for the workforce . We need to consider just how 
much added supply we might require to accommodate 
economic growth . To do so, we have developed three 
employment scenarios for the period between 2006 
and 2012 and for the period ending in 2017 . These are 
described in Figure 1.11 . 
n	 The weak growth forecast is based on anemic employ-
ment growth at an annual rate equal to 0 .1 percent, 
the average rate experienced over the past five years 
(2002–2007) . This was a period in which high hous-
ing prices retarded employment and population 
growth . If this weak trend continues, we estimate 
a total employment growth in the region of only 
TABLE 1 .4
Additional Housing Units Needed in  
Greater Boston Region, 2006–2017
2006–2012 2013–2017
Total  
2006–2017
Units Needed to 
Account for Household 
Growth
73,000 47,000 120,000
Units Needed to Raise 
Rental Vacancy Rate 
to 6%
6,275 -- 6,275
Units Needed to Raise 
Owner Occupied 
Vacancy Rate to 2%
1,000 -- 1,000
TOTAL UNITS 
REQUIRED
80,275 47,000 127,275
Annual Production 
Required 13,380 9,400 11,570
Average Annual 
Production Level 
(1998–2007)
11,600 11,600 11,600
Annual Housing 
Shortfall 1,780 (-2,200) (-30)
Source: Authors’ calculations from U .S . Census Population Projections
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would need to produce housing at a rate of 17,760 
units per year through 2012 – essentially 75 percent 
more than at current average rates . Projecting out 
to 2017 reveals the need for adding an additional 
133,000 workers to the region’s labor force over the 
next ten years . If this strong growth scenario were 
somehow to occur, we would be looking at the need 
for producing a grand total of almost 21,000 housing 
units per year between now and 2017, an increase 
of nearly 80 percent over current average annual 
production rates . 
A summary of these projected housing unit needs for 
additional members of the Greater Boston workforce is 
found in Table 1.5 . 
Even with the weak growth forecast, we need to boost 
housing production through 2012 in Greater Boston 
by about 15 percent over current average production 
levels . The mid-growth forecast suggests we need to 
boost production by about the same amount through 
2012, but then must ratchet up production to nearly 
17,000 units per year through 2017 . If we are able to 
sustain through 2012 the current “strong” employment 
growth of the past year, we will need to increase hous-
ing production almost immediately by more than 50 
somehow find another 48,900 workers to meet this 
employment goal . This is equivalent to attracting 
another 37,600 working age households to Greater 
Boston to fill these added jobs . Consequently, we 
will have to be prepared to develop an additional 
7,520 housing units per year beginning in 2013 on 
top of the 9,400 required by the demographic projec-
tion, per se . That makes a total of nearly 17,000 
new housing units per year between 2013 and 2017, 
about 45 percent more per year than current average 
production levels (11,600 per year) .
n	 The strong growth forecast assumes a growth rate 
of 0 .775 percent, the rate of growth in employ-
ment enjoyed in the region over the past year (June 
2007-June 2008) . If we could sustain this growth 
rate, we would generate almost 83,000 jobs by 2012 
and 181,000 by 2017 . This is well below the record 
0 .9 percent employment growth we enjoyed from 
1997 to 2002, but would require that we somehow 
encourage an additional 34,200 workers to join the 
Greater Boston labor force by 2012 over and above 
current demographic projection levels . That trans-
lates into an increased demand for 26,300 housing 
units by 2012 or 4,380 per year . Added to the 13,380 
required under the demographic projection, we 
FIGURE 1 .11
Greater Boston Employment Forecast (2006–2017)
Source: New England Economic Partnership; Authors’ calculations based on data from the U .S . Bureau of Labor Statistics
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the loan so that it falls more in line with the actual 
value of the property .
n	 Where foreclosure is inevitable, we need policies 
that expedite the transfer of these properties to new 
owners who can make repairs and occupy these 
units before they become abandoned and targets for 
vandalism and looting .
n	 For prospective homeowners with good credit, 
but sitting on the sidelines waiting for home prices 
to fall even further, we need to consider working 
with banks and mortgage lenders to develop a loan 
instrument that includes some kind of “price insur-
ance .” Such an instrument would allow homebuyers 
to get into the market now with little risk of bear-
ing a sharp reduction in price on the unit they have 
purchased . The insurance “premium” for such price 
protection could be in the form of a small fee paid 
when, and if, the property is ultimately sold at an 
appreciated value . The creation of such a mortgage 
instrument should speed up the transfer of vacant 
properties and thereby reduce the chance that these 
units will become abandoned and vandalized .
Easing the Affordability Crisis
There are a range of policies that can be used to 
increase affordability in both the rental market and in 
the homeownership market .
n	 For low-income renters, we need to find ways of 
increasing the number of rental vouchers at the state 
and federal level . This permits low-income families 
to rent both existing and new properties at rents 
they can afford .
n	 To accommodate the need for more rental property 
and “starter homes,” we need to work even more 
aggressively to assure the production of Chapter 
40B developments and to increase the number of 
communities adopting Chapter 40R smart growth 
zoning . By increasing the amount of land zoned for 
denser, more affordable housing, developers will 
be in a position to respond more rapidly to housing 
demand if and when it arises . The key to Chapter 
40R is to have a surplus of appropriately zoned land 
so that land costs moderate and developers have 
“as of right” development opportunities . By having 
more Chapter 40R districts approved by municipali-
ties, Greater Boston will be in a position to accom-
modate whatever economic growth comes its way .
percent or risk seeing a return to a rapid home price 
appreciation . If we can somehow sustain this strong 
growth scenario all the way out to 2017, we will need 
to produce almost 80 percent more housing each and 
every year . Presumably, that can be done only with an 
aggressive housing policy in the Commonwealth . 
Implications for Housing Policy
What kind of policies can be used to address the para-
dox of “housing prices too high, but falling too fast”? 
The answer lies in crafting separate public policies 
that address the foreclosure crisis and the affordability 
problem . 
Easing the Foreclosure Crisis 
To reduce the number of foreclosures, especially in 
neighborhoods where there are many of them, we 
need the following kinds of policies:
n	 For those homeowners still in their homes, but 
facing foreclosure, we need local and state officials 
to expand their operations aimed at helping mort-
gage lenders restructure loans so that homeowners 
can afford the new terms . This will often involve 
getting mortgage companies to reduce the size of 
TABLE 1 .5
Projected Annual Housing Production Needs Based 
on Various Employment Growth Forecasts
Annual Housing Unit 
Production Requirement 2006–2012 2013–2017 2006–2017
Weak Growth Forecast 13,380 9,400 11,570
Mid-Growth Forecast 13,380 16,920 14,990
Strong Growth 
Forecast 
17,760 24,475 20,810
Percent Change from 
Average Annual (1998–2007) 
Housing Production Rate 
(11,600 units)
Weak Growth Forecast 15% -19% 0%
Mid-Growth Forecast 15% 46% 29%
Strong Growth 
Forecast
53% 110% 79%
Source: Projections based on July 2008 Greater Boston employment and annual 
growth rates of 0 .1 percent; 0 .4 percent, and 0 .775 percent respectively
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n	 Federal and state subsidies will be needed to assure 
that a portion of new housing units built by non-
profit and for-profit developers can be offered at 
prices that are affordable to moderate income home-
buyers including younger families looking for their 
first homebuying opportunity .
These are just a few possibilities for dealing with the 
current housing paradox . If we have the wisdom to 
develop appropriate policy responses, Greater Boston 
will be in a position to meet the housing needs of its 
current population, retain young families already in 
the region, and get its fair share of the small cohort of 
younger working families who will soon be making a 
choice as to where to work, where to live, and where 
to raise their families . If we are smart about housing 
policy, we can solve the housing paradox in a way that 
meets both our moral responsibility to provide afford-
able housing and meets the need for housing to assure 
the region’s economic prosperity .
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The housing market is intimately connected with a 
variety of economic and demographic forces and, as 
such, any analysis of housing trends cannot ignore 
other factors shaping the vitality of the economy and 
the fortunes of individual home buyers, home seekers, 
and renters . In this chapter, we review recent trends in 
economic activity, employment, and interest rates, and 
we examine how the demographic profile of the region 
has changed over the past year . Each of these factors 
affects—and in turn is affected by—trends in housing 
production, home sales, and housing prices . 
Economic Update
Economic Activity Index
Each month the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
calculates a coincident index of economic activity 
for each of the 50 states, as well as for the nation as a 
whole . The index combines data on gross state prod-
uct, nonfarm employment, hours worked in manufac-
turing, unemployment, and real wages and salaries . 
Figure 2.1 compares changes in this index for Massa-
chusetts to changes for the nation as a whole . Accord-
ing to this index, over the past 15 years economic 
growth in Massachusetts has followed a similar trajec-
tory to that of the entire United States, but the state has 
been more acutely affected by swings in the economy . 
In the 1990s, as the national economy expanded, the 
Commonwealth’s economy grew even more rapidly, 
outpacing the nation in every year except 1994 . In the 
recession that took place in the first few years of the 
new millennium, however, the economic activity index 
fell more sharply and for a longer period of time in 
Massachusetts than in the rest of the nation . 
Between 2004 and the end of 2006, the Common-
wealth’s economic growth paralleled that of the United 
States, but over the last two years the U .S . trend 
and the Massachusetts’ trend have begun to diverge 
again . As the American economy slowed through 
2007, Massachusetts continued to see a pronounced 
economic expansion . Between January 2007 and 2008, 
year-over-year growth in economic activity rose a 
full percentage point, from 3 percent to 4 percent, in 
Massachusetts, while it slid a full percentage point 
across the U .S ., from 3 percent down to 2 percent . In 
2008, though, the economic activity index began to 
fall in Massachusetts for the first time in five years . By 
the middle of the year, as economic growth continued 
to slide down toward zero across the nation, it came 
crashing down in Massachusetts . Three months after 
having a year-over-year growth rate 2 .5 percentage 
points higher than the rest of the country (in April), 
Massachusetts’s growth had fallen so rapidly that 
by this July, Massachusetts’s rate was only a quarter 
of a point higher than the U .S . as a whole . As such, 
by mid-year both the U .S . and the Commonwealth’s 
economies were expanding by only 1 percent per 
year, a third as much as Massachusetts grew between 
mid-2004 and early 2007 and only one-fourth the rate 
of late 2007 . The coming national recession seems to be 
finally taking its toll in the Commonwealth .
2.
Current Market Conditions
FIGURE 2 .1
Year-Over-Year Change in Economic Activity Index, 
Massachusetts v. U.S.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, State Coincident Indexes (July 1992 = 100)
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trough has left the state with only 0 .2 percent more 
jobs in July 2008 than in January 2000 . Meanwhile, the 
nation as a whole experienced a 5 .2 percent increase 
in total non-farm employment . Massachusetts contin-
ues to trail the nation in employment growth in 
industrial sectors that have historically had a strong 
presence in the state . Manufacturing, while declining 
across the country, has fallen even more rapidly in 
Massachusetts—although there are some indications 
that job loss in manufacturing is now slowing in the 
state, perhaps quite dramatically .48 Employment in the 
financial activities sector has dropped by 1 .5 percent 
over this period, while it has grown by 7 percent 
nationwide . Job growth in education and health 
services have lagged the nation by eight percentage 
points in Massachusetts, home of some of the world’s 
most respected hospitals and universities . Meanwhile, 
job losses in information-based industries have not 
been quite as severe in Massachusetts as in other 
states, and the Commonwealth has outperformed the 
rest of the nation in construction and professional and 
business services .
Finally, there may be a glimmer of better news on 
the overall employment front in for Greater Boston . 
Since mid-2007, employment growth in the region 
has exceeded the rate of growth for the country as 
Employment
In line with slowing economic activity, employment 
growth in the Commonwealth is lagging . After adding 
nearly 34,000 new jobs in 2005 and 42,000 in 2006, 
the rate of employment expansion in Massachusetts 
slowed somewhat in 2008 . Between January 2007 and 
January 2008 the state added only 17,000 new jobs (a 
growth rate of 0 .5 percent) and since then only 3,000 
jobs through July of this year . As Figure 2.2 illustrates, 
employment has continued to climb slowly from 
its lowest point in December 2003, but the state still 
remains nearly 92,000 jobs short of its peak in February 
2001 . Moreover, the apparent slowing in employment 
growth in the Commonwealth that has accompanied 
the slumping national economy makes it unlikely that 
the pre-recession level will be reached again anytime 
soon . Indeed, projections would suggest that if the 
current rate of job creation is sustained, we still will 
not return to the employment level of 2001 much 
before 2012 .
Figure 2.3 reveals the change in employment by major 
industrial sector in the Commonwealth compared 
to the U .S . for the period since the beginning of the 
decade . Overall, the slow economic recovery in the 
Commonwealth since the December 2003 employment 
FIGURE 2 .2
Total Massachusetts Non-Farm Employment, 1996-2008
Source: U .S . Bureau of Labor Statistics
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a whole, the first time this has been true since early 
2001 (see Figure 2.4) . This is mostly due to the fact 
that the employment growth rate seems to be falling 
sharply elsewhere in the U .S . while the decline is much 
shallower here . Still, if this trend continues, stronger 
demand for housing should resume in Greater Boston 
before the rest of the country and this could begin to 
stabilize home prices in the state .
Employment trends have varied between munici-
palities within the Greater Boston region . Table 2.1 
presents data on shifts in the regional employment 
distribution since 2001 . The employment declines that 
took their toll on the economy in the first half of the 
decade hit the hardest in the immediate vicinity of the 
central city and around the older former mill cities of 
Haverhill and Lowell, north of Boston . The Boston-
Cambridge-Quincy subregion, which accounts for 
more than two thirds of all jobs in the metropolitan 
area, lost more than 137,000 jobs (7 .9 percent), while 
employment in the Haverhill and Lowell regions 
declined by 9 .4 and 7 .0 percent, respectively . 
Employment in these subregions has varied even more 
during the recovery since 2004 . By January 2008, the 
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy area had regained only 
FIGURE 2 .3
Employment Growth by Sector, Massachusetts v. U.S., 2000–2006
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FIGURE 2 .4
Employment Growth, Boston Metro Area v. U.S.
Source: U .S . Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Mortgage Interest Rates
According to Figure 2.5, interest rates on 30-year 
fixed mortgages have varied substantially since 2000 . 
From the beginning of the decade through mid-2003, 
mortgage rates fell dramatically from 8 .5 percent to 
as low as 5 .25 percent . Such low rates helped spur the 
rapid increase in home prices during the first half of 
the decade . Even as late as July 2005, a standard fixed 
rate mortgage carried no more than a 5 .5 percent rate . 
During 2006, rates rose to a peak of 6 .76 percent—low 
by standards set earlier in the decade, but still substan-
tially higher than in the immediate previous period . 
This helped lead to a slowdown in home prices after 
September 2005 . 
Beginning in July 2006, with the exception of an inter-
est rate spike in the second half of 2007, mortgage 
rates began to decline again and fell to a low of 5 .76 
percent at the beginning of this year . Since then, with 
the national credit crisis growing, mortgage rates have 
82,000 of the 137,000 jobs it had lost . Just over half 
of the lost jobs in the Haverhill area had returned by 
2008, and fewer than one quarter of the lost jobs had 
returned to the Lowell area . By contrast, the number of 
jobs in Framingham and Nashua have actually grown 
since the 2001 employment peak, with Nashua boast-
ing 5,000 more jobs than in 2001 . These intraregional 
shifts have changed slightly the total distribution of 
employment in the Boston metro area, as jobs have 
become somewhat less centralized in Boston and other 
historical industrial centers and have spread out to 
more distant cities and towns . Indeed, employment 
seems to be growing faster in areas that have tradition-
ally had more affordable housing .
TABLE 2 .1
Regional Employment Distribution, 2001–2008 (in Thousands)
Boston-
Cambridge-
Quincy
Brockton-
Bridgewater-
Easton Framingham
 Haverhill-
North 
Andover-
Amesbury
Lowell-
Billerica-
Chelmsford Peabody Nashua
Total of  
Seven NECTA 
Divisions
Total for Entire 
Boston-
Cambridge-
Quincy NECTA
January 2001 1,744 90 156 81 124 103 127 2,423 2,531 .3
January 2004 1,607 86 146 73 115 100 126 2,253 2,353 .9
January 2008 1,688 89 157 77 117 100 132 2,360 2,455 .9
Change Jan 01– Jan 04 -137 .4 -3 .3 -9 .6 -7 .6 -8 .6 -2 .6 -1 .4 -170 .5 -177 .4
% Change Jan 01– Jan 04 -7 .9% -3 .7% -6 .2% -9 .4% -7 .0% -2 .5% -1 .1% -7 .0% -7 .0%
Change Jan 04 – Jan 08 81 .7 2 .5 10 .2 4 .2 2 -0 .4 6 .4 106 .6 102
% Change Jan 04 – Jan 08 5 .1% 2 .9% 7 .0% 5 .7% 1 .7% -0 .4% 5 .1% 4 .7% 4 .3%
Proportion of Total 
Regional Employment, 
Jan 2001
68 .9% 3 .5% 6 .2% 3 .2% 4 .9% 4 .0% 5 .0% 95 .7% 100 .0%
Proportion of Total 
Regional Employment, 
Jan 2004
68 .2% 3 .7% 6 .2% 3 .1% 4 .9% 4 .2% 5 .3% 95 .7% 100 .0%
Proportion of Total 
Regional Employment, 
Jan 2008
68 .7% 3 .6% 6 .4% 3 .1% 4 .8% 4 .1% 5 .4% 96 .1% 100 .0%
Source: U .S . Bureau of Labor Statistics, State and Metro Area Employment
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region that rendered many annual comparisons 
invalid, CURP has used the five counties surround-
ing and including Boston (Essex, Middlesex, Norfolk, 
Plymouth, and Suffolk) as a near approximation of 
the original study area . This geographic approxima-
tion comes close to, but does not perfectly match, the 
original 161-community area used in early Housing 
Report Cards, and it permits comparisons over time 
that might prove misleading if other geographic defi-
nitions were used .49 
Table 2.2 highlights some of the important changes 
in the region’s demographic, economic, and housing 
patterns . 
n	After falling for three consecutive years, the popu-
lation of the five-county region grew by a robust 
4 .5 percent between 2005 and 2006, adding 174,000 
residents . This population estimate may be too opti-
mistic, however, as early data from the 2007 ACS 
show a drop of 94,000 residents from 2006 to 2007, 
possibly reflecting a statistical correction .
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been rising again . This has no doubt contributed at 
least marginally to the sharp slowdown in home sales 
during the past year . 
Demographic Update
Beside employment levels and interest rates, demo-
graphic trends have an impact on housing demand . 
The American Community Survey (ACS), released 
annually by the U .S . Census Bureau, combined with 
the more comprehensive data gathered every 10 
years as part of the decennial census, provide power-
ful tools for measuring changes in population, family 
and household characteristics, and the costs that 
homeowners and renters must bear . Ultimately, the 
rate of job growth and population growth determine 
housing demand while interest rates affect both 
demand and price . 
Beginning with the Greater Boston Housing Report 
Card 2006–2007, in response to changes in the Census 
Bureau’s geographic definition of the Boston metro 
FIGURE 2 .5
National Average 30-Year Mortgage Rates, January 2000–August 2008
Source: Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey, 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgages
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TABLE 2 .2
Demographic Profile 1990, 2000–2006
Indicator 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
% 
Change 
2005–
2006
% 
Change 
2000–
2006
Population 3,783,817 4,010,389 4,041,894 4,048,334 4,044,912 4,039,094 4,035,675 4,038,960 0 .08% 0 .71%
Households 1,410,238 1,533,041 1,536,447 1,517,712 1,510,910 1,516,275 1,524,296 1,525,803 0 .10% -0 .47%
Average Real Median 
Household Income ($2006)
$61,953 $64,517 $67,174 $67,673 $65,109 $66,110 $64,477 $64,691 0 .33% 0 .27%
Real Median Family Income 
($2006)
$74,336 $78,984 $83,182 $81,685 $82,115 $80,269 $79,181 $79,937 0 .96% 1 .21%
Real Median Homeowner 
Income ($2006)
$0 $83,634 $85,389 $85,586 $84,223 $83,527 $84,528 $84,972 0 .53% 1 .60%
Real Median Renter Income 
($2006)
$0 $40,043 $44,462 $40,873 $38,605 $41,035 $36,901 $36,251 -1 .76% -9 .47%
Families Below Poverty 
Level
59,124 59,913 57,715 58,882 66,690 68,687 68,038 62,543 -8 .08% 4 .39%
Total Housing Units 1,510,420 1,593,023 1,600,763 1,606,322 1,611,499 1,616,578 1,625,201 1,639,335 0 .87% 2 .91%
Occupied Units 1,412,190 1,532,549 1,536,447 1,517,712 1,510,910 1,516,275 1,524,296 1,525,803 0 .10% -0 .44%
Vacant Units 98,230 60,474 64,316 88,610 100,589 100,303 100,905 113,532 12 .51% 87 .74%
Owner Occupied Units 812,660 916,817 941,906 937,890 944,131 965,201 956,373 965,434 0 .95% 5 .30%
Renter Occupied Units 599,530 615,732 594,541 579,822 566,779 551,074 567,923 560,369 -1 .33% -8 .99%
Median Value Owner 
Occupied Units ($2006)
$276,111 $261,635 $313,281 $348,448 $395,169 $406,057 $425,156 $421,133 -0 .95% 60 .96%
Median Gross Monthly Rent 
($2006)
$991 $920 $1,041 $1,061 $1,058 $1,065 $1,075 $1,070 -0 .47% 16 .33%
Renter HHs Paying >30% of 
Income for Rent
41 .7% 39 .2% 40 .6% 42 .9% 47 .5% 46 .1% 50 .1% 52 .4% 4 .59% 33 .67%
Renter HHs Paying >50% of 
Income for Rent
18 .4% 18 .6% 21 .9% 24 .3% 21 .9% 25 .0% 25 .6% 2 .40% 39 .13%
Median Monthly Owner 
Cost (w mortgage) ($2006)
$1,682 $1,765 $1,883 $1,869 $1,938 $1,962 $2,045 $2,148 5 .02% 21 .68%
Median Monthly Owner 
Cost (w/o mortgage) 
($2006)
$513 $540 $564 $545 $597 $618 $642 $683 6 .34% 26 .54%
Homeowners (w mortgage) 
Paying >30%
28 .3% 26 .7% 28 .2% 30 .8% 33 .4% 37 .5% 39 .3% 43 .1% 9 .56% 61 .15%
Homeowners (w mortgage) 
Paying >50%
9 .0% 9 .7% 9 .2% 11 .4% 14 .1% 13 .9% 16 .3% 17 .56% 81 .47%
Source: U .S . Census Bureau, 1990 and 2000 Decennial Censuses, American Community Survey 2001–2006
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n	 Renters paying 50 percent or more of their income 
in rent reached 25 percent in 2005 and climbed to 
25 .6 percent in 2006 . 
n	 Homeowners paying more than 30 percent of their 
income on mortgage payments, property taxes, and 
insurance reached 43 percent in 2006, up from less 
than 27 percent in 2000 . Nearly one in six homeown-
ers was now paying more than 50 percent of their 
income for housing .
The combination of high rents and home prices that 
have fallen, but not very far in relation to stagnating or 
falling incomes, has made housing affordability every 
bit as difficult for most Greater Boston residents today 
as it was before home prices began to decline . 
Migration
For several years Massachusetts has suffered a severe 
net outmigration of residents . As the cost of living in 
the Commonwealth rose dramatically, many residents 
sought out cheaper alternatives in other regions of the 
country . The outmigration peaked between 2003 and 
2004, when the state lost nearly 62,000 residents to 
other regions of the country . The state’s annual domes-
tic net outmigration is typically offset by a positive rate 
of foreign immigration, but over the past several years 
even the influx of new people settling in Massachusetts 
from abroad could not make up for the precipitous 
population decline due to domestic outmigration .
Recent data indicate, however that the population loss 
resulting from migration is narrowing . While the flow 
of foreigners into Massachusetts remains strong, the 
loss of current residents to other parts of the United 
States continues to slow . The total population loss due 
to migration (both foreign and domestic) has come 
down from a high of 33,538 between 2004 and 2005 to 
just over 8,000 between 2006 and 2007 (see Figure 2.6) . 
This may reflect the softening of home prices in the 
region, reducing the incentive to leave the state and 
making it more feasible for those from out-of-state to 
settle here .
n	Adjusting for inflation, median household income 
in 2006 was virtually unchanged from its 2000 
level . The typical household in Greater Boston had 
no more spending power in 2007 than it did at the 
beginning of the millennium .
n	Adjusting for inflation, median family income 
rose (though only slightly) for the first time in four 
years, but even then was nearly 4 percent less than 
it had been in 2001 . 
n	 Income growth was not evenly distributed among 
homeowners and renters . While the typical home-
owner saw his or her real income fall between 2001 
and 2006 by no more than 0 .5 percent, the typical 
renter had an inflation-adjusted income 18 percent 
lower in 2006 .50
n	After peaking in 2004 at 68,687, the number of 
Greater Boston families in poverty fell by about 
5,500 (8 .1 percent) between 2005 and 2006, only to 
rise again in 2007 .
n	The region added about 14,000 new units of hous-
ing over the year . At the same time, however, the 
number of occupied housing units barely changed 
at all . Instead, the number of vacant housing units 
went up by a staggering 12,627, an increase of 12 .5 
percent over 2005 . 
n	For the first time this decade, Greater Boston saw 
a decline in the median home price, which fell 
by about $4,000 (1 percent) . Even so, home prices 
remained about 61 percent higher than in 2000, 
controlling for inflation . Rents remained close to 
their 2005 level, still $150 (in 2006 dollars) above the 
median gross rent in 2000 .
n	While monthly gross rent has remained stable, 
monthly costs for homeowners have continued to 
rise . For those paying off a mortgage, monthly costs 
went up by $103 between 2005 and 2006, and were 
22 percent higher than in 2000 . For homeowners 
without a mortgage, monthly costs rose by $41, and 
were about 27 percent higher than in 2000, control-
ling for inflation . 
n	More than half of all renters (52 .4 percent) paid 30 
percent or more of their income in rent in 2006, the 
highest rate ever recorded . The proportion paying 
this much for rent was up from 39 .2 percent in 2000 .
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What Do These Economic and Demographic 
Trends Mean?
Taking all these trends together suggests that despite 
the recent decline in home prices, affordability remains 
an important issue in Greater Boston . Moreover, to 
the extent that employment may begin to increase in 
the region, demand for housing could begin to pick 
up putting upward pressure on both rents and home 
prices . Home prices have not fallen far enough, given 
stagnating incomes, to make much of a dent in the 
affordability challenge .
FIGURE 2 .6
Massachusetts Net Migration
Source: U .S . Census Bure, State Population Estimates, Components of Population Change
Foreign Migration Internal Migration Net Migration
-70,000
-60,000
-50,000
-40,000
-30,000
-20,000
-10,000
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
2006-20072005-20062004-20052003-20042002-20032001-20022000-2001
33,292
10,400
-22,892
33,347
-6,159
-39,507
31,785
-16,729
-48,514
29,041
-32,939
-61,980
26,515
-33,538
-60,053
30,285
-19,243
-49,528
27,014
-8,107
-35,121
36 U n d e r s t a n d i n g  B o s t o n
3.
Housing Production in the Region
of units in large structures (with five units or more) is 
expected to decline over this period by much less—25 
percent . Meanwhile, the number of single-family 
homes we expect to be permitted in the region in 2008 
will fall to its lowest level in more than a decade, down 
by more than half since 2005 . 
2007 Housing Production by  
Type and Location
Only 46 out of the 161 cities and towns in the Greater 
Boston Region (29 percent) issued more permits in 
2007 than they had in 2006 . Looking just at units 
permitted in large structures, this number drops to 22 
(14 percent), exceeding their 2006 permitting level . 
Multifamily Homes
As shown in Table 3.2, the construction of multifamily 
homes is down across most of the metropolitan region, 
most notably in Boston . In 2007, the city of Boston 
permitted just 820 housing units in structures with five 
or more units – fewer than half the number (1,967) it 
had permitted the year before .51 For the first time since 
CURP began tracking these data, Boston was not the 
area leader in multifamily housing production . Rather, 
this honor went to North Reading, one of the 24 
municipalities in Massachusetts that has adopted the 
new Chapter 40R Smart Growth Zoning Overlay legis-
lation (see chapter 5 for more on 40R) . North Reading 
is a town with about one-fiftieth as many residents as 
the state capital .
Most municipalities in the Greater Boston Region 
continue to avoid constructing any units of multi-
family housing . In fact, the number of communities 
permitting no units in large structures reached its high-
est level in 2007 – 118 (73 percent of the 161 communi-
ties studied) – since we began tracking these data in 
2000 . Only 22 Greater Boston communities increased 
their multifamily permitting in 2007 over 2006 levels . 
In contrast, 72 communities—just under half of all of 
the cities in towns in Greater Boston—have issued 
any permits for multifamily housing in the eight years 
Back in 2000, civic, political and moral leaders stressed 
the grave importance of expanding the region’s hous-
ing supply in order to make Greater Boston a more 
affordable place to live . Beginning in 2003, developers, 
builders, and zoning officials finally came through, 
expanding production each year through 2005 . The 
expanded production levels—in combination with 
slow population growth—helped to rein in the 
region’s housing price spiral . Between 2000 and 2005, 
the annual rate of price appreciation on single family 
homes declined from 16 .9 percent to 5 .1 percent . 
Yet even after housing prices began to decline in 2006, 
the price reductions were not sufficient to increase 
affordability very much . In this chapter, we assess the 
state of housing production in the region, using data 
from the U.S. Census Bureau Building Permit Survey as 
our primary tool to determine how much new housing 
stock is being added in the region and which commu-
nities are leading the way in the development of new 
housing . In a new addition to Housing Report Card 
analysis, we also compare the Boston metropolitan 
area with that of other major metropolitan regions to 
determine how Boston ranks in relation to other areas 
of the country in terms of production . 
Overall Production Levels
Housing production in Greater Boston peaked three 
years ago in 2005, when a little over 15,000 units were 
permitted . In 2006, the number of permits issued 
dropped by nearly 2,800 units, followed by a drop of 
2,560 in 2007 . Based on production through the middle 
of this year, we project that the total number of permits 
in all of 2008 will be just a little above 8,000—just a 
little more than half the production level in 2005 (see 
Table 3.1) . 
The permitting decline was most acute in small multi-
unit structures: the number of units in two to four unit 
structures was cut almost in half between 2006 and 
2007 and we project the number will fall to fewer than 
300 units this year . That represents more than a 75 
percent drop in production in two years . The number 
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last year . All told, only 48 Greater Boston communities 
increased their single family permitting between 2006 
and 2007 . 
Comparing Boston to Other Cities
Boston is certainly not alone in suffering this housing 
downturn . Most metropolitan regions in the country 
reached their most recent peak in permitting in 2005 or 
2006, and since then permits in almost all metro areas 
nationwide have plummeted . Figure 3.1 compares the 
permitting decline in Boston to that in eight geographi-
cally and demographically diverse metropolitan areas, 
based upon data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual 
Building Permit Survey. Estimates for the number of 
permits issued in 2008 are based upon year-to-date 
data on permits issued through June 2008 divided by 
the proportion of total permits that had been issued by 
mid-year in 2007 for each region .52 
Within this selection of metropolitan areas, Boston falls 
in the middle in terms of the change in permitting over 
the past several years . Nearly all metro areas nation-
wide have followed the path of diminished permitting . 
For example, the Miami area is projected to issue 
since 2000 . Given the extraordinary increase in the 
expected increase in the number of “empty-nesters” 
looking for such housing in the next decade, this 
represents a potentially huge market that so far is 
undersupplied . 
Single Family Homes
Since 2000, the town of Plymouth has led by far every 
other community in the permitting of single-family 
homes in Greater Boston . Issuing 2,035 such permits 
since 2000, Plymouth has accounted for 4 .5 percent of 
all single-family permits in the region . By comparison, 
the second highest permitter of single-family homes, 
Lowell, has made up only 1 .75 percent of the region’s 
single family permits since 2000 . 
In 2007, Plymouth and Lowell again led the way in 
the permitting of single-family homes, but even these 
consistent producers of detached homes saw a sharp 
decline in their permitting . Plymouth, which had 
issued 182 such permits in 2006, issued only 164 in 
2007 . Lowell saw an even bigger drop, from 143 in 
2006 to 101 in 2007 . No other community in the region 
issued more than 100 permits for single-family homes 
TABLE 3 .1
Single Family v. Multifamily Building Permits in Greater Boston
Year Total Units
% Change 
over Prior Year 
(Total Units)
Units in 
Single-Family 
Structures
% Change 
from 
Prior Year  
(SF Units)
Units in 
2-4 Unit 
Structures
% Change 
from Prior Year 
(Units in 2-4 
Unit Structures)
Units in  
5+ Unit 
Structures
% Change 
from Prior 
Year (Units in 
Buildings with 
5+ Units)
1999 9,591 6,790 660 2,141
2000 9,563 -0 .3% 6,376 -6 .1% 660 0 .0% 2,527 18 .0%
2001 8,929 -6 .6% 5,604 -12 .1% 642 -2 .7% 2,683 6 .2%
2002 8,558 -4 .2% 5,531 -1 .3% 709 10 .4% 2,318 -13 .6%
2003 11,120 29 .9% 5,290 -4 .4% 1,067 50 .5% 4,763 105 .5%
2004 12,713 14 .3% 6,222 17 .6% 985 -7 .7% 5,506 15 .6%
2005 15,107 18 .8% 6,552 5 .3% 991 0 .6% 7,564 37 .4%
2006 12,332 -18 .4% 4,910 -25 .1% 1,180 19 .1% 6,242 -17 .5%
2007 9,772 -20 .8% 4,139 -15 .7% 636 -46 .1% 4,997 -19 .9%
2008 (est .) 8,061 -17 .5% 3,051 -26 .3% 274 -56 .9% 4,735 -5 .2%
% Change, 
2000-2008
-15.7%   -52.1% -58.5% 87.4%
Source: U .S . Census Bureau, Annual New Privately-Owned Residential Building Permits for Places in Massachusetts
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TABLE 3 .2
Municipalities Adding the Most and Fewest New Housing Units in 2006 & 2007 
2007 
Rank Municipality
Total Units 
Permitted in 
2007
Total Units 
Permitted in 
2006
Rank 
in 
2006
Top 15
1 North Reading 1249 31 93
2 Boston 1041 2419 1
3 Cambridge 611 898 2
4 Quincy 419 641 3
5 Braintree 359 214 13
6 Bedford 223 114 26
7 Mansfield 211 43 74
8 Plymouth 191 225 11
9 Saugus 177 159 18
10 Abington 151 95 33
11 Westford 140 105 29
12 Sharon 139 9 143
13 Dedham 136 297 7
14 Everett 135 142 20
15 Canton 134 131 21
2007 Rank (from Bottom)
Bottom 15
15 Chelsea 6 6 10
10 Avon 5 5 9
10 Cohasset 5 8 14
10 Hopedale 5 8 14
10 Milton 5 4 7
10 Rowley 5 10 20
7 Sherborn 4 3 4
7 Somerville 4 12 27
7 Topsfield 4 1 2
5 Belmont 3 42 82
5 Boxford 3 10 20
4 Boxborough 2 10 20
2 Hamilton 1 2 3
2 Nahant 1 3 4
1 Winthrop 0 48 92
2007 
Rank Municipality
Single Family 
Units Permitted 
in 2007
Single Family 
Units Permitted 
in 2006
Rank 
in 
2006
Top 15
1 Plymouth 164 182 1
2 Lowell 101 143 2
3 Westford 99 105 4
4 Needham 88 53 35
5 Franklin 87 75 14
6 Tyngsborough 80 116 3
7 Sudbury 79 50 41
8 Hingham 74 34 60
9 Milford 72 41 50
10 Wareham 71 87 11
11 Acton 70 71 16
12 Haverhill 69 95 6
12 Middleborough 69 84 13
12 Pembroke 69 52 38
12 Wellesley 69 53 35
2007 Rank (from Bottom)
Bottom 15
14 Avon 5 5 14
14 Cohasset 5 8 21
14 Hopedale 5 8 21
14 Lawrence 5 23 76
14 Milton 5 4 11
14 Rowley 5 10 27
14 Swampscott 5 3 8
10 Millville 4 0 1
10 Sherborn 4 3 8
10 Somerville 4 6 16
10 Topsfield 4 1 3
8 Boxford 3 10 27
8 Medford 3 4 11
6 Boxborough 2 10 27
6 Watertown 2 2 4
3 Belmont 1 42 113
3 Hamilton 1 2 4
3 Nahant 1 3 8
1 Chelsea 0 0 1
1 Winthrop 0 2 4
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permits for fewer than 7,000 housing units in 2008, just 
three years after it issued more than 45,000 . The drop 
in the Twin Cities is nearly as severe—from 22,000 in 
2005 to just 4,000 projected permits in 2008 . In Boston, 
the number of permits is expected to be half of what 
it was three years ago . Of these nine areas, the only 
one projected to increase its rate of issuing permits is 
New York, a city that experts expect to buck the trend 
of urban population decline by adding more than 1 
million new residents by 2025 .53
While the housing downturn has affected nearly all 
metropolitan areas, it has not necessarily affected all of 
them in the same way . The disparities between areas 
can be demonstrated by comparing recent trends in 
Boston to recent trends in comparable regions that, 
in some ways, compete with Boston for economic 
development and for residents . As Table 3 .1 has 
demonstrated above, the trend in permitting in Greater 
Boston rose steadily through the first half of the 
decade, and has since fallen just as steadily . The steep-
est declines, though, have been in single family homes 
and in units in structures with 2–4 units . In larger 
structures (those with five units or more), permitting is 
up sharply from its 1999 level, and even in the past few 
years the relative drop in multifamily permitting has 
been less severe than that in single family permitting . 
By comparison with Boston, a city with relatively little 
land left on which to build, the sprawling metropo-
lises of the Sunbelt have been much more susceptible 
to fluctuations in housing production . Figures 3.2A 
and Figure 3.2B reveal how Boston has fared relative 
to Las Vegas, Nevada, one of the metropolitan areas 
that has grown the fastest and sprawled the most over 
the past decade . As in many new sprawling cities, the 
boom in housing in Las Vegas has been concentrated 
in detached single-family homes (Figure 3 .2A) . In 2004, 
for example, nearly 32,000 permits for single-family 
homes were granted in Las Vegas . This was nearly 
four times higher than the number in Boston . After 
such excessive buildup, though, came a steep drop . 
We project that Las Vegas will issue only 5,200 single-
family permits by the end of 2008, a decline of more 
than 26,000 in just four years . In Boston, by contrast, 
the drop in single-family permitting, while more than 
50 percent lower than the 2004 level, is relatively mild 
(just 5,000 units fewer than in 2004) . 
TABLE 3 .2
Municipalities Adding the Most and Fewest New 
Housing Units in 2006 & 2007, continued
2007 
Rank Municipality
Units in 5+ 
Unit Structures 
Permitted in 
2007
Units in 5+ 
Unit Structures 
Permitted in 
2006
Rank 
in 
2006
Top 15
1 North Reading 1218 0 46
2 Boston 820 1967 1
3 Cambridge 586 857 2
4 Quincy 396 584 3
5 Braintree 338 180 10
6 Mansfield 200 21 35
7 Bedford 188 84 19
8 Saugus 155 134 13
9 Sharon 124 0 46
10 Abington 120 60 23
11 Canton 114 109 15
12 Everett 93 87 18
13 Westwood 79 102 17
14 Dedham 76 285 6
15 Waltham 74 125 14
2007 Rank (from Bottom)
Bottom 15
118 municipalities did not permit  
any multifamily housing in 2007
117 municipalities did not permit  
any multifamily housing in 2008
Source: U .S . Census Bureau, Annual New Privately-Owned 
Residential Building Permits for Places in Massachusetts
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FIGURE 3 .1
Percent Change in Building Permits for Selected Metropolitan Areas, 2005–2008
Source: U .S . Census Bureau, Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits, Table 3 – Metropolitan Areas
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FIGURE 3 .2A
Units Permitted in Structures with 1 Unit,  
Boston v. Las Vegas, 2003–2008 (Est.)
Source: U .S . Census Bureau, Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits, Table 3 – Metropolitan Areas
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FIGURE 3 .2B
Units Permitted in Structures with 5+ Units,  
Boston v. Las Vegas, 2003–2008 (Est.)
Source: U .S . Census Bureau, Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits, Table 3 – Metropolitan Areas
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Thus, Boston’s already dense building patterns keep 
yearly permitting levels relatively low, compared 
to competitor regions . As a result, however, Boston 
does not feel the effects of nationwide economic ups 
and downs as acutely as metropolitan areas that have 
undergone massive recent expansion .
The problem, of course, will be if the slowdown in 
housing construction remains in place once the state’s 
economy begins to grow faster . In retrospect, the slug-
gish pace of housing production was responsible for 
the housing price spiral the region experienced from 
1995 through 2005, but the slow pace had an unex-
pected silver lining . Because there was little specula-
tive housing production in Greater Boston, we did not 
begin the current economic downturn with a large 
surplus of housing . In other parts of the country, this 
has led to even sharper home price depreciation than 
in Greater Boston .
Over the long-run, the challenge will be to provide 
sufficient new housing to keep vacancy rates from fall-
ing to levels consistent with a strong seller’s market, 
leading to another upward price spiral while not 
overbuilding to the point where vacancy rates rise to a 
point where a strong buyer’s market leads to a collapse 
in home values . With a number of housing policies in 
place such as Chapter 40R and Chapter 40S, we may 
have hit upon a formula that will provide the region 
with a sustainable supply of housing consistent with a 
more healthy housing market .
Meanwhile, as civic leaders in Las Vegas have recog-
nized the problems that come along with spreading 
out further and further into the desert, there has been 
a shift toward denser living in Nevada’s largest city 
(see Figure 3 .2B) . Las Vegas Mayor Oscar Goodman 
himself has marveled at the recent move toward dense 
downtown residential living, saying “[t]hey wouldn’t 
have given you a plugged nickel eight years ago that 
there would ever be a high-rise residential building in 
downtown Las Vegas .”54 In fact, as recently as 2004, 
Las Vegas issued fewer than 3,000 permits for housing 
units in multi-unit structures . In 2008, by comparison, 
we project that the city will issue 26,700 such permits, 
indicating a trend almost diametrically opposed to the 
one that has occurred in single-family permitting . In 
Boston, multi-family permitting has stayed virtually 
flat since 2003 .
In Phoenix, single-family permitting has dropped off 
even more profoundly than in Las Vegas (Figure 3.3A) . 
From a high of 57,360 single-family permits issued in 
2004, we project just 10,700 single-family permits in 
2008, an 81 percent drop . Unlike Las Vegas, however, 
Phoenix has not seen the concomitant rise in multi-
family permitting (Figure 3.3B) . From a 2004 level 
of 6,293 units permitted in five-plus-unit structures, 
Phoenix permitted 9,756 such units in 2007; but if year-
to-date trends are a good indication, the Phoenix area 
should see a severe decline in such permits in 2008 .
FIGURE 3 .3A
Units Permitted in Structures with One Unit,  
Boston v. Phoenix, 2003–2008 (Est.)
Source: U .S . Census Bureau, Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits, Table 3 – Metropolitan Areas
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
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FIGURE 3 .3B
Units Permitted in Structures with Five-Plus Units, 
Boston v. Phoenix, 2003–2008 (Est.)
Source: U .S . Census Bureau, Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits, Table 3 – Metropolitan Areas
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4.
Rents, Home Prices, and Affordability
communities . In Everett, the median rent increased 
almost55 percent while in Revere and Winchester they 
rose 64 and 65 percent, respectively .
Already by 2001 rents in these communities had either 
stabilized or actually declined . In some wealthier 
communities like Brookline and Newton, rents 
remained high . But in other communities including 
Chelsea, Quincy, and Revere, they fell by anywhere 
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, Boston has not suffered 
as severe a drop in housing permits over the past few 
years . Still, despite the relative stability of construc-
tion in the region, compared to some other more vola-
tile regions, affordability remains a major concern in 
Boston . As Table 4.1 shows, Massachusetts remained, 
at least through 2006, one of the least affordable states 
on a large number of indicators . Among the 50 states, 
Massachusetts had the third highest median housing 
value, just as it had in 2005 . Meanwhile, household 
income for homeowners actually fell in 2006, and while 
the Commonwealth still ranks fourth on homeowner 
income, it also ranks very high (seventh highest, 
up from ninth highest in 2005) on the proportion of 
its homeowner households spending more than 30 
percent of their income on housing costs . Even more 
troubling is the growing affordability problem for rent-
ers in the Bay State . In 2005, the proportion of renters 
paying more than 30 percent of their income for rent 
and utilities was the ninth highest in the nation; in 
2006, it had climbed to third highest .
Rental Market
Much of the affordability problem in Greater Boston’s 
rental housing market continues to be the result of 
very low vacancy rates (see Figure 4.1) . In 2007, the 
rental vacancy rate in the Boston area was 5 .0 percent, 
only about half the national rate of 9 .7 percent . 
Nationwide, vacancy rates have hovered around 10 
percent since 2003 . In Boston, by contrast, while the 
vacancy rate has risen somewhat from a low of 2 .7 
percent in 2000, it remains low enough to continue 
boosting rents above the national average . In fact, 2007 
marked the 11th straight year in which Boston’s rental 
vacancy rate trailed the national rate by at least three 
percentage points . 
Table 4.2 tracks rents in selected Greater Boston 
communities from 1998 through 2007, based on rental 
advertisements in the Boston Sunday Globe . Over the 
three year period 1998–2001, each of these communi-
ties experienced a substantial increase in its median 
rent . In general, rents increased fastest in working class 
TABLE 4 .1
How Massachusetts Ranks on Key Housing  
Indicators, 2005 & 2006
Indicator
2005 
Value
2005 
Rank
2006 
Value
2006 
Rank
Median Housing Value  
of Owner Occupied  
Housing Units
$361,500 3 $370,400 3
Median Monthly Housing 
Cost for Owner Occupied 
Units with Mortgage
$1,781 3 $1,925 4
Median Monthly Housing 
Cost (Gross Rent) for  
Renter Occupied Units
$902 4 $933 5
Median Contract Rent $799 4 $823 5
Ratio of Monthly Owner 
Cost to Monthly Renter Cost
1 .97 6 2 .06 5
Percent of Mortgaged 
Households Spending 
30 Percent or More of 
Household Income on 
Housing Costs
37 .3% 9 41 .8% 7
Percent of Renters Spending 
More than 30 Percent of 
Household Income on  
Rent and Utilities
46 .4% 9 48 .6% 3
Median Household Income— 
Homeowner Households
$79,234 4 $77,591 4
Median Household Income—
Renter Households
$31,820 11 $32,402 12
Source: U .S . Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2005 & 2006, Ranking Tables
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borhoods between 1998 and 2001, when, for example, 
rents in Dorchester went up by more than 60 percent .
As more individuals and families who might earlier 
have considered buying a home have instead decided 
to stay in the rental market, and as increasing numbers 
of homeowners who have faced foreclosure have 
been forced to find rental housing, the cost of renting 
has risen steadily . Figure 4.2 displays recent trends 
in average asking and effective rents for apartments 
in Greater Boston . Asking rents held steady from the 
second quarter of 2001 through the second quarter of 
2005, ranging from $1,500 to just over $1,550 in every 
quarter . Since that time, however, the trajectory has 
been steadily upward . Asking rents have increased 
every quarter since that time, rising $170 (11 percent) 
through the second quarter of 2008 . Meanwhile, 
effective rents—rents including any discounts such 
as a month’s free rent—have experienced a parallel 
increase . From an average of $1,466 in the second quar-
from 16 to 26 percent . This was apparently due to 
a disproportionate number of working class house-
holds leaving the rental market to take advantage of 
homeowner opportunities, often made possible by 
subprime loans . With such a “twist” in demand, it was 
not surprising to see home prices rise in these commu-
nities while rents declined .
Within the city of Boston, individual neighborhoods 
have experienced vastly different trajectories since the 
early part of the decade (see Table 4.3) . Rents went 
up in almost every Boston neighborhood between 
1998 and 2001; since then, it has been much more of a 
mixed bag, with some neighborhoods greatly appre-
ciating in rental cost and others falling . Over the past 
year, the largest change in advertised rent took place 
in Roxbury, where rents increased by more than a 
third, after having fallen sharply the year before . Still, 
no neighborhood has seen recently the huge rental 
appreciation that took place in many Boston neigh-
FIGURE 4 .1
Rental Vacancy Rates, Boston Metro v. U.S.
Source: U .S . Census Bureau, Quarterly Vacancy Survey
US Boston Metro
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percent of landlords were asking for between $900 and 
$1,249, and only about 3 .5 percent of all apartments 
had asking rents above $2,000 . By 2005 (the center bar 
in each price category), the distribution had already 
moved remarkably, so much so that the modal price 
grouping, which had been the $300-$599 category in 
2000, was now $900-$1,249 . Nearly a quarter of all of 
the region’s apartments featured asking rents above 
$1,250 . Moreover, by 2006 (the rightmost bar in each 
price category), the distribution of rents continued 
ter of 2005, Greater Boston saw effective rents climb to 
$1,646 (12 percent) through the second quarter of 2008 .
The increasing burden placed upon renters can also be 
illustrated by tracking asking rents by price category 
over time . Figure 4.3 shows how the distribution of 
asking rents has shifted over just a few years .55 In 2000 
(represented by the leftmost bar in each price category) 
more than four fifths of all advertised apartments 
in Greater Boston went for less than $900 . About 13 
TABLE 4 .2
Median Advertised Rents for 2-Bedroom Apartments in Boston Area Cities, 1998–2007
City/Town 1998 2001 2004 2005 2006 2007
%Change 
1998–2001
%Change 
2001–2007
% Change 
2006–2007
Arlington $1,100 $1,500 $1,300 $1,250 $1,250 $1,350 36 .4% -10 .0% 8 .0%
Belmont $1,225 $1,600 $1,350 $1,350 $1,400 $1,300 30 .6% -18 .8% -7 .1%
Brookline $1,400 $1,800 $1,650 $1,838 $1,800 $1,850 28 .6% 2 .8% 2 .8%
Cambridge $1,400 $1,750 $1,550 $1,600 $1,575 $1,750 25 .0% 0 .0% 11 .1%
Chelsea $1,100 $1,350 $1,195 $1,500 $1,300 $1,050 22 .7% -22 .2% -19 .2%
Dedham $1,000 $1,275 $1,100 $1,200 $1,125 $1,025 27 .5% -19 .6% -8 .9%
Everett $775 $1,200 $1,100 $975 $1,000 $1,100 54 .8% -8 .3% 10 .0% 
Framingham n/a n/a n/a $1,075 $1,200 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lexington $1,300 $1,648 $1,600 $1,500 $1,800 $1,400 26 .8% -15 .0% -22 .2%
Lynn n/a n/a n/a $1,000 $999 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Malden $850 $1,250 $1,175 $1,190 $1,125 $1,100 47 .1% -12 .0% -2 .2%
Medford $950 $1,400 $1,200 $1,200 $1,200 $1,200 47 .4% -14 .3% 0 .0%
Melrose $950 $1,400 $1,275 $1,295 $1,375 $1,173 47 .4% -16 .2% -14 .7%
Needham n/a ** $1,350 $1,475 ** $1,625 ** n/a n/a
Newton $1,300 $1,600 $1,450 $1,400 $1,450 $1,550 23 .1% -3 .1% 6 .9%
Quincy $850 $1,250 $1,300 $1,250 $1,250 $1,050 47 .1% -16 .0% -16 .0%
Revere $788 $1,288 $1,100 $1,098 $1,195 $950 63 .5% -26 .2% -20 .5%
Somerville $1,050 $1,400 $1,298 $1,200 $1,250 $1,300 33 .3% -7 .1% 4 .0%
Stoneham n/a n/a $1,225 ** $1,125 $1,150 ** n/a 2 .2%
Waltham $975 $1,350 $1,250 $1,200 $1,150 $1,200 38 .5% -11 .1% 4 .3%
Watertown $1,200 $1,500 $1,300 $1,250 $1,300 $1,300 25 .0% -13 .3% 0 .0%
Winchester $1,050 $1,750 $1,350 $1,373 $1,448 $1,650 66 .7% -5 .7% 14 .0%
Winthrop $900 $1,228 $1,200 $1,200 ** $1,200 36 .4% -2 .3% n/a
Source: Boston Sunday Globe, compiled by the Department of Neighborhood Development, City of Boston
** Number of cases too small for statistical significance
Note: Data before 2007 are for median rents of 2-bedroom apartments . Data for 2007 are for median rents of 1-, 2-, and 3- bedroom apartments, 
so data are not directly comparable . Advertised apartments with parking are excluded from the sample .
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TABLE 4 .3
Median Apartment Rents in Boston Neighborhoods, 1998–2007
Neighborhood 1998 2001 2004 2005 2006 2007
%Change 
1998–2001
%Change 
2001–2007
% Change 
2006–2007
Allston/
Brighton
$1,200 $1,500 $1,300 $1,300 $1,300 $1,400 25 .0% -6 .7% 7 .7%
Back Bay/ 
Beacon Hill 
$1,900 $2,400 $2,250 $2,450 $2,600 $2,100 26 .3% -12 .5% -19 .2%
Central $2,200 $1,875 $2,200 $2,200 $2,300 $2,300 -14 .8% 22 .7% 0 .0%
Charlestown $1,400 $1,925 $1,650 $1,550 $1,650 $1,700 37 .5% -11 .7% 3 .0%
Dorchester $800 $1,295 $1,300 $1,200 $1,200 $1,300 61 .9% 0 .4% 8 .3%
East Boston ** $1,200 $1,100 $1,100 $1,200 $1,000 ** -16 .7% -16 .7%
Fenway/
Kenmore 
$1,350 $1,900 $1,498 $1,225 $1,598 $1,725 40 .7% -9 .2% 7 .9%
Hyde Park $850 $1,275 $1,250 $1,200 $1,200 $1,400 50 .0% 9 .8% 16 .7%
Jamaica Plain $1,100 $1,400 $1,325 $1,400 $1,525 $1,298 27 .3% -7 .3% -14 .9%
Mattapan ** $1,250 $1,200 $1,200 $1,100 $1,225 ** -2 .0% 11 .4%
Roslindale $900 $1,300 $1,225 $1,225 $1,200 $1,300 44 .4% 0 .0% 8 .3%
Roxbury ** $1,300 $1,250 $1,200 $895 $1,200 ** -7 .7% 34 .1%
South Boston $1,200 $1,500 $1,400 $1,400 $1,300 $1,200 25 .0% -20 .0% -7 .7%
South End $1,500 $2,000 $1,950 $2,200 $2,350 $1,850 33 .3% -7 .5% -21 .3%
West Roxbury $1,000 $1,400 $1,225 $1,250 $1,200 $1,150 40 .0% -17 .9% -4 .2%
Source: Boston Sunday Globe, compiled by the Department of Neighborhood Development, City of Boston
** Number of cases too small for statistical significance .
Note: Data before 2007 are for median rents of 2-bedroom apartments . Data for 2007 are for median rents of 1-, 2-, and 3- bedroom apartments, 
so data are not directly comparable . Advertised apartments with parking are excluded from the sample .
FIGURE 4 .2
Asking Rents and Effective Rents in Greater Boston, 
2001–2008
Source: Reis .com
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FIGURE 4 .3
Distribution of Asking Rents in Greater Boston
Source: U .S . Census Bureau, Census 2000 and American Community Survey 2005 & 2006
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free up more than 1,100 units of rental housing in the 
region in the near future .
Homeownership Affordability
Despite softening home prices, affordability continues 
to be a critical challenge in the Greater Boston hous-
ing market . While recent data indicate that home 
prices have begun to fall from the astronomical levels 
of a few years ago, the Commonwealth (and Greater 
Boston in particular) continues to be among the most 
expensive places in the United States to live, work, and 
raise a family, as Table 4 .1 illustrated . 
Historically, the low vacancy rates on Boston-area 
homeowner housing units have contributed signifi-
cantly to elevated prices in the region . In general, 
homeowner vacancy rates must stay between 1 .5 and 
2 percent in order to keep housing prices from rising 
faster than general inflation; lower vacancy rates imply 
a very tight housing market that can lead to rapidly 
its journey upward . Barely 10 percent of the region’s 
apartments had asking rents below $600, while more 
than 30 percent had rents above $1,250 . A comparison 
of the three series of bars across the price categories 
reveals just how rapidly the distribution of prices has 
shifted upward, like a rolling wave, in just six years .
Student Housing
Through August 2008, colleges and universities had 
either completed or were in the process of adding 
more than 4,500 new beds for students in Greater 
Boston . The two largest projects underway currently 
are a 1,200-bed dormitory under construction at North-
eastern University and a 960-bed unit being built at 
Boston University, both set to open in the fall of 2009 . 
In line with the methodology of the Boston Redevel-
opment Authority, which equates four dormitory 
beds with one private apartment unit, the 4,500 beds 
currently in some stage of production could potentially 
Source: U .S . Census Bureau, Quarterly Vacancy Survey
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FIGURE 4 .4
Homeowner Vacancy Rates, Boston v. U.S.
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prices in Massachusetts have actually been rising 
since 2006 . This probably reflects an increase in condo 
demand as older “empty-nesters” vie for condos after 
selling their larger homes . This is a second “twist” in 
the market, akin to the earlier shift from renting to 
home ownership . In this case, the twist induces an 
increase in condo prices while simultaneously reduc-
ing mean single family home prices . 
Figure 4.6 complements Figure 4 .5, by just considering 
the five-county Greater Boston region over the past 
four years and considering the trend in median home 
prices rather than the mean . These data, provided by 
the Warren Group, show median prices in Greater 
Boston declining slightly since 2005 for detached 
single-family homes, but holding steady for condo-
miniums .56 The median price of single-family homes 
dropped about $10,000 between 2005 and 2007 . Based 
on data through June, the median price of homes sold 
in Greater Boston has fallen by another $30,000 just in 
the past year . By contrast, the median price for condo-
miniums has been remarkably constant, hovering just 
above $300,000 . Projections for 2008 indicate that this 
trend will continue . 
The differences in price trajectories between Figures 
4 .5 and 4 .6 are due to the different statistic used . While 
the mean price of single-family homes appears steady, 
and the mean price of condos seems to be going up, 
the median price of single-family homes is falling 
inflating prices . As Figure 4.4 shows, vacancy rates 
in Greater Boston hovered around 1 percent through 
the late 1980s and the 1990s, dipping to as low as 0 .3 
percent in 1998, and again in 2002 . By comparison, 
national homeowner vacancy rates stayed between 1 .5 
and 2 percent every year between 1986 and 2005, with 
the exception of 1992 . 
In the past several years, homeowner vacancy rates 
have risen across the nation, and Boston has been part 
of this trend . Still, vacancy rates in Greater Boston trail 
those in other metropolitan regions . Between 2004 and 
2006, vacancy rates rose in Boston from just 0 .5 percent 
to a more healthy 2 .0 percent; meanwhile, across the 
nation, they rose from 1 .7 percent to 2 .4 percent . In 
2007, though, as vacancy rates continued to climb 
nationwide to 2 .8 percent (the highest level in more 
than two decades), they actually fell in the Boston 
area, dipping one tenth of a percent to 1 .9 percent . This 
figure is high enough to stave off rapid price escala-
tion, but if vacancy rates continue to fall they could 
trigger another round of rising prices .
Statewide, the average (mean) price for single-family 
detached homes has leveled off since 2005 after more 
than a decade of sustained increases (see Figure 4.5) 
and in the first half of 2008 they finally dipped . The 
average statewide condominium price also climbed 
steadily throughout the 1990s and then leveled off after 
2004 . But unlike single-family detached homes, condo 
FIGURE 4 .6
Median Price of Single Family Homes and 
 Condominiums in Greater Boston, 2005–2008
FIGURE 4 .5
Annual Average Selling Prices for Single-Family 
Homes in  Massachusetts
Source: The Warren Group
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Table 4.4 provides data on the price distribution of 
single family homes and condominiums for the five-
county Greater Boston region for the period 2005 
through 2008 .57 In 2005, the most expensive year for 
housing in the history of the region, about three in 10 
cities and towns boasted median selling prices above 
$500,000 for single family homes . And four munici-
palities—Weston, Lincoln, Brookline, and Dover—
had median prices above $1 million . Not a single 
community in Greater Boston had a median price 
below $200,000, a trend dating back to 2003 . The most 
inexpensive place to buy a single family home was 
Lawrence, where the median price was $243,000 . While 
condominiums were more affordable, there were still 
12 communities where the typical condominium sold 
for more than $500,000 and just 16 where the median 
price was under $200,000 .
By 2008, the housing price distribution for cities and 
town in Greater Boston, while still skewing upward, 
had become significantly more balanced . More than 
one in five municipalities had median single-family 
home sales prices below $300,000, and two cities 
(Lawrence and Lowell) featured median prices below 
$200,000 . At the high end of the distribution, there 
were still four communities with median prices above 
$1 million (Weston, Lincoln, Brookline, and Wellesley, 
with Dover dropping just below $1 million), but far 
fewer with median prices in the $500,000–$1,000,000 
range . The condo market had also become more 
reasonable, with only seven communities having 
median prices above $500,000 . The most expensive 
community was Wenham, where the median price for 
a condo was $879,900 (but where only three condos 
were sold in the first half of 2008) . The least expensive 
was Pepperell, at $87,500 .58 
slightly, and the median price of condos is flat . This 
disparity suggests that the most expensive homes in 
the region are holding their value or even appreciating, 
while the majority of Greater Boston’s homes have lost 
some of their value .
Figure 4.7 presents data on the number of single-
family and condominium sales since 2005 . These data 
are even less ambiguous than the price trend data, and 
show a continual decline in the number of sales in the 
five-county region . In just two years, between 2005 and 
2007, the number of single-family home sales fell by 
about 6,000 within these five counties . Meanwhile, the 
number of condominium sales fell by more than 4,000 . 
If sales trends for the second half of 2008 match those 
for the first half, this precipitous decline will only 
worsen this year . Given data through June, detached 
home sales are projected to fall by another 4,000 from 
their 2007 level, while condominium sales plunge 
another 4,000, falling below 16,000 total sales . 
FIGURE 4 .7
Sales of Single Family Homes and Condominiums in 
Greater Boston, 2005–2008
Source: The Warren Group
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Massachusetts buyers remained over $10,000 higher 
than the median for the rest of the country . 
At the same time, though, the median price of the 
homes purchased was $89,000 higher in the Bay 
State . Considering only previously owned homes, the 
difference was $106,000 . The gap between Massachu-
setts and the rest of the states is shrinking however, 
as median prices fell significantly here while other 
states saw, on average, increases in new home prices 
and declines of less than 1 percent for previously 
owned homes .
There were also significant differences between the 
Commonwealth and the rest of the nation among first-
time home buyers, but again these differences dimin-
ished slightly . In Massachusetts, first-time buyers are 
somewhat older and wealthier, and they buy more 
expensive homes (which also happen to be smaller, on 
average) . Here again, though, buyers in other states 
began to catch up to those in Massachusetts in terms 
of income and home purchase price, while Massachu-
setts’s first-time buyers saw lower incomes and bought 
less-expensive homes .
Characteristics of Massachusetts  
Home Buyers
Each year the National Association of Realtors releases 
its Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers for the nation as 
a whole and for each of the individual states . This 
annual report is an important tool for tracking shifts 
in the demographic and economic characteristics of 
home buyers and in the types and prices of the homes 
they are buying . CURP uses these data each year to 
compare Massachusetts home buyers to their counter-
parts around the country . Table 4.5 presents compari-
sons between the Commonwealth and the nation for 
2007, and shows how these trends changed from the 
year before .
Buyers in Massachusetts continue to have higher 
incomes than those in other states . These higher 
incomes are necessary, of course, because the homes 
that Massachusetts buyers purchase tend to be signifi-
cantly more expensive than those found in other 
parts of the country . While buyers in other states saw 
a slightly larger percentage increase in their annual 
income between 2006 and 2007, the median income of 
# of Communities with Single 
Family Sales Price 2005 2006 2007 2008
Below $200,000 0 0 0 2
$200,000 – $299,999 7 7 14 29
$300,000 – $399,999 58 64 64 54
$400,000 – $499,999 38 39 33 31
$500,000 – $999,999 40 36 32 27
$1,000,000 and Above 4 1 4 4
% of Communities with 
Single Family Sales Price 2005 2006 2007 2008
Below $200,000 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 1 .4%
$200,000 – $299,999 4 .8% 4 .8% 9 .5% 19 .7%
$300,000 – $399,999 39 .5% 43 .5% 43 .5% 36 .7%
$400,000 – $499,999 25 .9% 26 .5% 22 .4% 21 .1%
$500,000 – $999,999 27 .2% 24 .5% 21 .8% 18 .4%
$1,000,000 and Above 2 .7% 0 .7% 2 .7% 2 .7%
# of Communities with 
Condominium Sales Price 2005 2006 2007 2008
Below $200,000 16 11 15 23
$200,000 – $299,999 58 61 69 64
$300,000 – $399,999 36 42 26 25
$400,000 – $499,999 16 14 21 10
$500,000 – $999,999 12 7 8 7
$1,000,000 and Above 0 0 0 0
% of Communities with 
Condominium Sales Price 2005 2006 2007 2008
Below $200,000 11 .6% 8 .1% 10 .8% 17 .8%
$200,000 – $299,999 42 .0% 45 .2% 49 .6% 49 .6%
$300,000 – $399,999 26 .1% 31 .1% 18 .7% 19 .4%
$400,000 – $499,999 11 .6% 10 .4% 15 .1% 7 .8%
$500,000 – $999,999 8 .7% 5 .2% 5 .8% 5 .4%
$1,000,000 and Above 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%
Source: The Warren Group
TABLE 4 .4
Home Price Distribution in Greater Boston, 2005–2008
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TABLE 4 .5 
Homebuyer Profile, Massachusetts v. U.S., 2006–2007
2006 2007 Change 06–07
MA US MA US MA US
All Homebuyers
Median Income $82,600 $71,800 $84,400 $73,960 2 .2% 3 .0%
% with Incomes <$45,000 12% 21% 9% 20% -25 .0% -4 .8%
% with Incomes <$55,000 19% 31% 18% 31% -5 .3% 0 .0%
% with Incomes <$75,000 41% 52% 40% 51% -2 .4% -1 .9%
Median Age 38 41 39 39 2 .6% -4 .9%
Median Price of Home Purchased $325,000 $214,000 $306,000 $215,000 -5 .8% 0 .5%
Median Price – New Home $400,000 $250,000 $360,000 $260,000 -10 .0% 4 .0%
Median Price – Previously Owned Home $319,900 $200,000 $305,000 $199,000 -4 .7% -0 .5%
Median % Financed 86% 91% 85% 91% -1 .2% 0 .0%
% Purchasing Homes Price <$150,000 6% 28% 7% 28% 16 .7% 0 .0%
% Purchasing Homes Price <$200,000 18% 46% 21% 46% 16 .7% 0 .0%
% Purchasing Newly Constructed Home 11% 22% 11% 23% 0 .0% 4 .5%
Median Price of a Newly Constructed Home $400,000 $250,000 $360,000 $260,000 -10 .0% 4 .0%
Of Newly Constructed Home Buyers,  
% Paying <$200,000
0% 32% 18% 29% n/a -9 .4%
Of Newly Constructed Home Buyers,  
% Paying <$300,000
16% 62% 40% 59% 150 .0% -4 .8%
Of Newly Constructed Home Buyers,  
% Paying >$500,000
37% 13% 14% 10% -62 .2% -23 .1%
% Purchasing Detached Single Family Home 65% 75% 63% 74% -3 .1% -1 .3%
% Purchasing Townhouse/Row House 8% 9% 8% 9% 0 .0% 0 .0%
% Purchasing Unit in Building with 2-4 Units 12% 3% 9% 2% -25 .0% -33 .3%
% Purchasing Unit in Building with 5 or More Units 13% 8% 18% 9% 38 .5% 12 .5%
Median Size (in Square Feet) 1,688 1,815 1,570 1,810 -7 .0% -0 .3%
Price per Square Foot by Type of Home $200 $118 $200 $116 0 .0% -1 .7%
     Detached Single Family $200 $112 $193 $110 -3 .5% -1 .8%
     Townhouse $176 $136 $204 $138 15 .9% 1 .5%
     Unit in 2-4 Unit Structure $202 $129 $287 $112 42 .1% -13 .2%
     Unit in Structure with 5 or More Units $224 $189 $213 $199 -4 .9% 5 .3%
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TABLE 4 .5  
Homebuyer Profile, Massachusetts v. U.S., 2006–2007, continued
2006 2007 Change 06–07
MA US MA US MA US
First Time Homebuyers
First Time Buyers as % of All Home Buyers 45% 36% 45% 39% 0 .0% 8 .3%
Median Age of First Time Buyers 32 32 32 31 0 .0% -3 .1%
% < Age 25 7% 12% 6% 13% -14 .3% 8 .3%
% Between 25-34 66% 51% 49% 52% -25 .8% 2 .0%
Median Price of Home Purchased $269,000 $165,000 $243,000 $165,000 -9 .7% 0 .0%
Size (in Square Feet) First Time Homebuyers 1,483 1,516 1,270 1,510 -14 .4% -0 .4%
Median Income $75,800 $58,300 $73,500 $58,573 -3 .0% 0 .5%
% with Incomes <$45,000 10% 32% 13% 30% 30 .0% -6 .3%
% with Incomes <$55,000 25% 46% 25% 44% 0 .0% -4 .3%
% with Incomes <$75,000 47% 70% 52% 68% 10 .6% -2 .9%
% Purchasing Detached Single Family Home 63% 66% 53% 67% -15 .9% 1 .5%
% Purchasing Townhouse/Row House 9% 13% 9% 12% 0 .0% -7 .7%
% Purchasing Unit in Building with 2-4 Units 13% 3% 14% 3% 7 .7% 0 .0%
% Purchasing Unit in Building with 5+ Units 13% 11% 21% 13% 61 .5% 18 .2%
% Purchasing Home Costing < $150,000 5% 44% 11% 43% 120 .0% -2 .3%
% Purchasing Home Costing < $200,000 22% 64% 32% 63% 45 .5% -1 .6%
Repeat Homebuyers
Median Price of Home Purchased by Repeat Buyers $370,000 $249,000 $383,000 $250,000 3 .5% 0 .4%
Median Income Repeat Buyers $91,900 $81,900 $106,800 $85,663 16 .2% 4 .6%
% with Incomes <$45,000 12% 15% 7% 14% -41 .7% -6 .7%
% with Incomes <$55,000 13% 23% 13% 14% 0 .0% -39 .1%
% with Incomes <$75,000 32% 43% 30% 39% -6 .3% -9 .3%
% Over 55 31% 30% 25% 31% -19 .4% 3 .3%
% Purchasing Detached Single Family Home 66% 80% 71% 79% 7 .6% -1 .3%
% Purchasing Townhouse/Row House 7% 7% 6% 7% -14 .3% 0 .0%
% Purchasing Unit in Building with 2-4 Units 11% 3% 5% 2% -54 .5% -33 .3%
% Purchasing Unit in Building with 5 or More Units 13% 6% 16% 7% 23 .1% 16 .7%
Source: National Association of Realtors, 2006 Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers Massachusetts Report, 2007 Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers Massachusetts Report
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mortgages, combined with falling home values and 
weak job prospects, has led to a glut of foreclosure 
deeds . In both 2006 and 2007, Brockton, Boston, Lynn, 
and Lowell experienced the highest foreclosure rates . 
Brockton’s path has been the most discouraging of all . 
In 2005—just three years ago—there was not a single 
foreclosure deed issued on a single-family home in that 
city . The following year, the City of Champions led the 
region with 87 foreclosure deeds . In 2007, it stayed in 
front, increasing its foreclosure activity to 188 deeds . 
In the first half of 2008, the city had already eclipsed 
that figure . Through June of 2008, Brockton again led 
the whole region in the number of single family deeds 
issued, with 209 . This was more than the total number 
issued for all of Suffolk County during all 12 months of the 
previous year . 
While the rise in foreclosure deeds has not proven 
as steep for condo owners over the past three years, 
the trend has been equally troubling . Whereas fewer 
than 100 foreclosure deeds were issued on condos in 
the five counties in 2005, 258 such deeds were handed 
down in 2006 . Last year, that figure jumped to 751, and 
in 2008 we expect to see 2,000 deeds .
When it comes to foreclosures on condos, Boston is far 
and away the regional leader . While it is to be expected 
that the region’s largest city would be the site of the 
highest number of condo foreclosures, the more trou-
bling statistic has been the rate at which Boston has 
Foreclosures in Greater Boston
The rapid rise in foreclosure activity, both in Greater 
Boston and around the nation, has emerged as the 
premier challenge to the economy today . Newspa-
per headlines have chronicled the evolution of this 
crisis and the powerful adverse effects it has had on 
unfortunate borrowers, their families, and their neigh-
bors; for whole communities; and for lenders, both 
large and small, facing the threat of insolvency due to 
foreclosures . 
Greater Boston certainly has not been immune from 
this troubling trend . As Figure 4.8 illustrates, the 
number of foreclosure deeds issued each year has 
risen by an order of magnitude in just three years . In 
2005, in the entire five-county Greater Boston region, 
there were only 177 foreclosure deeds issued on single-
family homes . By 2006, that number had climbed to 
792—four and a half times higher than the previous 
year’s total . The figure more than doubled again the 
following year, to 2,033 single-family foreclosure 
deeds . And if trends for the first half of 2008 are indica-
tive of year-long performance, that number is set to 
double once more by the end of 2008, when we project 
a total of 4,275 foreclosure deeds in the region . 
The region’s older industrial cities have been hit the 
hardest by the foreclosure crisis . In these communi-
ties, an abundance of subprime and adjustable-rate 
FIGURE 4 .9
Petitions to Foreclose on Single Family Homes and 
Condos in Greater Boston, 2005–2008
Source: The Warren Group
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FIGURE 4 .8
Foreclosure Deeds on Single Family Homes and 
Condos in Greater Boston, 2005–2008
Source: The Warren Group
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levels while rental vacancies have actually declined 
since 2004—presumably as fewer renters have been 
able to move into homeownership and as foreclosed 
homeowners have been forced into rental housing . The 
home mortgage crisis has contributed to this process 
in that renters who might have liked to buy into the 
housing market have found this more difficult to do .
However, even with home prices declining, afford-
ability has increased only marginally, in part because 
median household incomes have hardly risen and in 
many cases have fallen in Greater Boston .
The new wrinkle in the housing market has been the 
explosion in foreclosures that have contributed to 
rising vacancies and therefore falling prices . It looks as 
if the foreclosure crisis might be easing in the coming 
year, but too many factors related to adjustable mort-
gage rates and a weakening national economy suggest 
this might be a bit of wishful thinking .
pulled away from all other surrounding communities . 
In 2005, Boston saw 29 foreclosure deeds on condos, 
about three times higher than the second ranked city, 
Haverhill . The following year, condo foreclosures in 
Boston doubled to,59 again about three times higher 
than Haverhill, which again came in second . Last year, 
Boston had 211 condo foreclosure deeds; Haverhill, 
again in second place, had only one sixth as many 
(35) . And through June of 2008, Boston has already 
witnessed 293 foreclosure deeds on condos . So far 
this year, the number two position has been taken by 
Framingham, with Haverhill third . Still, Framingham 
has endured only 42 condo foreclosures, one seventh as 
high as Boston’s total .
There may be good reason to believe, however, that the 
worst of the foreclosure crisis is behind us . Figure 4.9 
displays data on the number of petitions to foreclose 
in the five-county region . Filing a petition to foreclose 
is the first step taken by a lender to reclaim property 
from delinquent borrowers . While not all petitions to 
foreclose result in the issuance of foreclosure deeds, 
the trajectory of petitions to foreclose can serve as an 
indicator of what to expect foreclosure deeds in the 
future . 
The number of petitions to foreclose, both on single-
family homes and on condos, rose substantially from 
their 2005 levels in both 2006 and 2007 . In 2005, there 
were just over 3,000 petitions to foreclose on single-
family homes, and just over 500 on condos . In 2007, by 
contrast, the region saw more than 9,000 single-family 
petitions, and nearly 2,800 condo petitions .
The petition rate has begun to slow, though . In the 
first half of 2008, there were 3,774 petitions to foreclose 
on single-family homes in Greater Boston; this figure 
was down 277 from the 4,051 petitions filed in 2007, 
though still significantly higher than the level in 2005 
and 2006 . By the end of 2008, we expect to see slightly 
fewer than 8,400 petitions to foreclose on single-family 
homes, and slightly fewer than 2,800 on condos . These 
numbers represent a leveling-off after several years of 
enormous growth in the amount of foreclosure activ-
ity, and they may indicate a return toward a semblance 
of normalcy in the region’s housing market .
All in all, then, we have seen a decline in Greater 
Boston housing prices, but no relief in terms of the 
monthly cost of rental units . This reflects the rise 
in homeownership vacancy rates to more normal 
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5.
Public Spending and Support for Housing
Public Spending
Federal Funding
Funding from the Federal Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) flows through DHCD, 
Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), “entitlement” 
communities and through direct grants .59 Direct grants 
go to both local organizations and national organiza-
tions with a local presence (e .g ., YouthBuild and Habi-
tat for Humanity) . This report will focus on funds to 
DHCD as well as to communities through the Commu-
nity Development Block Grant (CDBG), the HOME 
Investment Partnership (HOME), McKinney Homeless 
Grants, and the Housing Opportunities for People with 
AIDS program (HOPWA) . 
Funding to DHCD
Since 2004, the federal government has funded DHCD 
at approximately $400 million per year . Rent subsidies 
for low-income tenants in existing housing, home heat-
ing assistance and weatherization programs for low-
income homeowners account for much of this funding 
(79 percent in FY200860) as well as the variation in 
funding from year to year . For FY2009, the Common-
wealth’s Executive Office of Administration and 
Finance anticipates federal funding of $435 million, up 
one percent from $430 million in FY2008 . From FY2008 
to FY2009, Home Heating Assistance will experience 
the largest decrease ($32 million, or -26 percent) in 
federal spending, followed by a $0 .8 million decrease 
(-87 percent) in the Lead Based Paint Control program . 
On a positive note, the combined HOME Investment 
Partnership and Technical Assistance programs will 
experience the largest increase ($17 million, or 54 
percent), rent subsidies increase by $6 million (three 
percent) and the Small Cities Community Develop-
ment Block Grant program increases by $7 million 
(18 percent) . In addition, there will be a combined $3 
million increase (23 percent) for the New Construction 
and Moderate Rehab Section 8 programs .61 Figure 5.1 
tracks total DHCD spending from both the state and 
federal governments . Total spending from state and 
federal dollars declined from almost $600 million in 
As discussed earlier in this report, Greater Boston faces 
foreclosures and dropping home prices as a result of 
the sub-prime meltdown, but at the same time must 
continue to grapple with a long-term housing shortage 
that undermines the economic competitiveness of the 
region relative to other metropolitan regions .  Such 
an economic environment complicates housing policy 
immensely . Falling prices slows market-driven hous-
ing production and undermines advocates’ efforts to 
call for funding for new housing . During the housing 
recession of the early 1990’s (1990–1994), total spend-
ing by the Department of Housing and Community 
Development (“DCHD”, known as EOCD at the time) 
fell 55 percent . As a result, when the housing market 
strengthened, there was insufficient housing available 
to meet the new demand, resulting in higher prices . 
At the same time, foreclosure puts stress not only on 
homeowners, but also on particular neighborhoods . 
The concentration of foreclosures in Greater Boston 
communities such as Brockton, Dorchester, Lawrence 
and others threaten to destabilize these communities 
and undermine long-term efforts by non-profits and 
local governments to restore these neighborhoods to 
health . 
Given the increase of government activity around 
housing since mid-2007, this report expands its 
coverage of programmatic efforts to address Greater 
Boston’s housing needs . Each year, this section exam-
ines the progress made to preserve and expand the 
supply of housing for low-income households; foster 
strong, sustainable neighborhoods; reduce the local 
barriers to new market rate housing; and establish 
smart growth as a guide to future development . This 
year, this section also outlines how government is 
responding to the challenge of addressing the fore-
closure crisis while maintaining funding needed for 
Greater Boston’s long-term housing needs . 
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Final FFY 2008 McKinney Homeless and HOPWA 
grants have yet to be made and funding has varied 
from year to year . Last year, however, McKinney 
grants increased from $57 .4 million in FFY2006 to $59 .5 
million in FFY2007 . HOPWA grants also saw a modest 
increase from $5 .8 million in FFY2006 to $6 .2 million in 
FFY2007 .64
State Funding
The news on the state front continues to be positive, as 
total state funding for DHCD programs has increased 
every year since a low of $187 million in FY2004 to a 
high of $320 million in FY2008 . This represented the 
highest level of support from the state since 1991 . In 
inflation adjusted dollars, however, the FY2008 spend-
ing level is only 74 percent of the 1991 level, and just 45 
percent of the $410 million (actual dollars) committed 
in 1989 . 
FY1989 to under $400 million in FY1993 . Since then, 
funding in current dollars has increased every year 
through FY2008 . (The FY2009 figures do not include 
DHCD capital spending since these figures have yet 
to be released .) State spending itself has increased 
by $125 million between FY2004 and FY2008, while 
federal spending through DHCD has decreased by 
about $31 million .
Federal funding for housing also passes through the 
Department of Transitional Assistance and directly 
to larger communities . A recent report from CHAPA 
reveals that for Federal Fiscal Year (FFY) 2008, only 
31 percent of CDBG funds passed through DHCD . 
The remainder ($73 .7 million) went to entitlement 
communities .62 This amount represents a 19 percent 
drop from FFY2003 funding of $90 .5 million . HOME 
grants to entitlement communities also declined, from 
$33 .4 million in 2003 to $29 .9 million (-10 percent) in 
FFY2008 .63
FIGURE 5 .1
Total DHCD Spending, 1989–2009
Source: Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development
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n	 $0 .25 million for the Soft Second (first-time home-
buyer) mortgage program, an increase of 5 percent .
From FY2008 to FY2009, total operating spending is 
set to increase from $153 million to $161 million, with 
no program receiving a reduced allocation . The largest 
increases are $3 .1 million (10 percent) for the Massa-
chusetts Rental Voucher program, and $1 .4 million (2 
percent) for Subsidies for Public Housing Authorities . 
The Rental Subsidy Program for Department of Mental 
Health Clients, the Alternative Housing Voucher 
Program, state Low Income Housing Tax Credits, 
the Homeless Housing Pilot Project, and the Soft 
Second program will each receive modest $0 .5 million 
increases for FY2009 .
Capital funds for housing also increased in FY2008 . 
After capital funding remained flat from FY2006 to 
FY2007, there was an increase of $40 million from 
FY2007 to FY2008 . While operating funds are more 
targeted to subsidizing tenants and public housing 
projects, capital funds are essential to the physical 
The Commonwealth’s housing resources come from 
its operating and capital budgets and as Figure 5.2 
illustrates, operating funds continue to increase . From 
FY2006 to FY2007, the spending of operating funds 
increased $8 million . From FY2007 to FY2008, spending 
increased an additional $28 million, to $153 million . 
From FY2007 to FY2008, funding remained stable for 
the Homeless Housing Pilot Project, for Tenant Preser-
vation, for Transitional Rental Assistance, and for the 
Service Coordinators program, but funding increased 
for most programs, including:
n	 $9 .5 million for subsidies to public housing authori-
ties, a 17 percent increase 
n	 $2 .5 million for the Massachusetts Rental Voucher 
program, a 9 percent increase
n	 $0 .5 million for the Rental Subsidy Program for 
Department of Mental Health Clients, a 17 percent 
increase
n	 $0 .4 million for Family Shelter/Transitional  
Housing, a 26 percent increase
Source: Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development
Operating Funds Capital Funds
Millions
$0
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
$300
$350
$400
$450
200920082007200620052004200320022001200019991998199719961995199419931992199119901989
*
* Data for FY2009 do not include state capital budgeting for housing.
FIGURE 5 .2
DHCD Operating and Capital Spending, 1989–2009
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complete and needs to be verified . An estimated $551 
million in funds has been raised by CPA towns and 
cities in combination with state matching funds raised 
from registration fees on real estate transactions to 
support housing, open space, recreation and historic 
preservation . Participation in the CPA program has 
increased to the level that, according to the Commu-
nity Preservation Coalition, municipalities will no 
longer get a 100 percent match of funds in the October 
2008 distribution .
Every town enacting CPA must use at least 10 percent 
of its CPA funds in each area under the Act: housing, 
open space and historic preservation . Towns are free to 
set the overall priority for the funds and housing is not 
the primary goal of every town . From FY2002 through 
most of FY2008, housing got the largest piece of this 
pie, at 32 percent of CPA appropriations, compared to 
29 percent for open space uses (see Figure 5.3) .66 
preservation of existing housing and construction 
of new affordable housing . While public housing 
modernization and renovation made up 43 percent 
of capital funds in FY2008, 26 percent of funding 
($44 million) was set aside for housing development 
through the Affordable Housing Trust Fund, the Hous-
ing Innovations Fund, the Housing Stabilization Fund, 
and the Transit Oriented Development program .
Capital Planning and Budgeting
In May, 2008, a five-year, $1 .275 billion housing bond 
bill was enacted, including $500 million for public 
housing modernization, $220 million for the Afford-
able Housing Trust Fund, $125 million for the Housing 
Stabilization Fund and $100 million for the Capital 
Improvement and Preservation Fund . 
Although such a bill shows a strong commitment 
to housing, the housing bond bill only authorizes 
spending . Annual appropriations are limited by the 
bond volume cap set by the state’s Executive Office 
of Administration and Finance . The federal housing 
legislation passed in July allows states to increase their 
bond caps exclusively for housing purposes, making 
full funding of capital-based projects more likely .
Local Funding
Schools and basic city services are the primary mission 
of Massachusetts municipalities, which spend little 
to no operating funds on housing initiatives . In this 
respect, the Community Preservation Act (CPA) has 
created a method for cities and towns to raise and 
spend funds dedicated to housing, open space, recre-
ation and historic preservation . The CPA became law 
in 2000 and allows Massachusetts municipalities to 
levy a property tax surcharge of up to 3 percent . As of 
mid-2008, 133 towns and cities had passed CPA ballot 
questions, of which 74 of these are Greater Boston 
towns covered by this report . Of these, Hanson, Plym-
pton, Stoughton and West Bridgewater passed the 
CPA in early 2008 . Of the remaining towns and cities 
in Greater Boston included in the Municipal Scorecard, 
50 have not held CPA votes, and votes have failed in 
36 municipalities, including Boston (although Glouces-
ter is scheduled for a second vote in November 2008) .65
At time of publication, the Community Preservation 
Coalition had gathered preliminary spending infor-
mation for FY2002 through FY2008 . This data is not 
MAP 5 .1
Passage of the Community Preservation Act among 
Massachusetts Municipalities.
Source: Community Preservation Coalition
CPA Community
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The Federal Response
Before the passage of the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008 (the Federal Act) in July 2008, 
the Federal response to foreclosures had been piece-
meal . The Federal Act may not have all the solutions 
to the sub-prime meltdown and the foreclosure crises, 
but it represents an important step towards softening 
the blow and putting into place the most far-reaching 
changes to the mortgage finance system  
in a generation .
Current Homeowners 
Among the first actions by the Bush administration to 
address foreclosures was the creation of FHA Secure in 
August 2007 . FHA was given new flexibility to insure 
mortgages for those refinancing out of sub-prime loans 
when the initial adjustable interest rate was going 
to reset .67 Eligibility was expanded in April 2008 to 
include more distressed homeowners .68 
The HOPE NOW program followed in October 2007 . 
This voluntary program links mortgage servicers 
with counselors and mortgage lenders in an attempt 
to provide loan work-outs for subprime borrow-
ers .69 According to the most recent HOPE NOW data 
available, 13,102 Massachusetts sub-prime borrow-
ers received repayment plans or loan modifications 
from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the second quarter 
2008 .70 Increasingly, borrowers are obtaining loan 
modifications, and are thus more likely to keep their 
homes, with loan modifications increasing from 10 
percent of workouts in the second quarter of 2007 
(prior to the program launch) to 52 percent in the 
second quarter 2008 .
Federal legislation passed in December 2007 provided 
$180 million in one-time funding for the Neighborhood 
Reinvestment Corporation’s National Foreclosure Miti-
gation Counseling Program, which funded 14 Greater 
Boston organizations to assist low- and moderate-
income homeowners .71 The Federal Act (mid-2008) 
provided an additional $180 million for this program, 
of which $30 million can be used for homeowner legal 
assistance .72
Also in December, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 
in conjunction with five local banks, launched the 
mortgage relief initiative to help Massachusetts home-
owners refinance their sub-prime loans . Deteriorating 
Addressing Specific Problems
Foreclosures
The 2006/2007 Housing Report Card cautioned that 
rising mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures could 
be the harbinger of a market disruption similar to 
what Greater Boston experienced in the early 1990s . As 
outlined in this year’s report (Chapter 4), foreclosures 
continued to increase, and certain cities, neighbor-
hoods and individuals streets have been adversely 
affected . This section outlines the public response to 
the foreclosure crises . Although the section is orga-
nized by level of government (federal, state and local), 
these responses will be discussed in terms of responses 
that address:
n Current homeowners threatened by foreclosure,
n Current renters facing displacement from foreclosed 
properties,
n Future buyers/borrowers in need of a reliable and 
affordable system of mortgage finance,
n Neighborhoods adversely affected by the concentra-
tion of foreclosed properties, and
n The national financial institutions that form the back-
bone of the mortgage finance system .
FIGURE 5 .3
Community Preservation Act Appropriations by Use, 
FY2002–FY2008
Source: Preliminary data from the Community Preservation Coalition . Chart does not include 
$151 million in “bonded” projects, which could be in any of the four spending areas .
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requires use of the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing 
System and Registry (NMLS), which was operation-
alized in January, with Massachusetts a founding 
member .78
The Federal Act encourages homeownership through 
a temporarily available tax credit of up to $7,500 for 
first-time buyers, and includes a number of reforms to 
FHA loan limits, downpayment requirements, product 
types, fees and homeowner counseling .79 
Neighborhoods
The Federal Act provides $3 .92 billion for a Neigh-
borhood Stabilization program . Until HUD finalizes 
the funding formula, it is unclear how much Massa-
chusetts will receive and whether the funds will go 
through the state or through cities and the state, as 
with CDBG funds . These funds are to be used to revive 
abandoned and foreclosed homes through mecha-
nisms such as soft second loans that will encourage 
the purchase of such homes by new owners, and the 
purchase of abandoned properties by local entities 
that can renovate these units and return them to the 
market, either for rent or purchase . The program 
requires that homes are purchased at less than current 
market value, so it is not clear if these funds will be 
useable for purchase except in the most distressed 
neighborhoods .
Financial Institutions 
The Federal Act required that Government Sponsored 
Enterprises (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac pay into a new Affordable Housing Trust (HUD) 
and contribute to Capital Magnet (Treasury) funds . 
In the short term, proceeds will be used to repay the 
costs of the HOPE Homeowners program, but in the 
long term Affordable Housing Trust Fund money will 
be used for housing for very low-income households 
(less than 50 percent of area median income) . Capital 
Magnet funds will be used to attract matching funds 
for affordable housing and economic development 
projects in distressed areas .80 The Federal Act also 
merged and strengthened the oversight of Freddie 
Mac, Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Bank 
system into one agency, the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA) . 
Investors in Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae mort-
gage-backed securities have long assumed that the 
home prices have made it more difficult to provide 
refinancing for borrowers who now have negative 
equity, but the Boston Fed remains committed to the 
program, and in conjunction with the Massachusetts 
Bankers Association, announced an expansion of the 
program to 50 lenders in June 2008 .73 In addition, the 
Boston Fed, in conjunction with the New England 
Patriots Charitable Foundation, hosted an event 
August 12 at Gillette Stadium to bring together home-
owners with their lenders for face-to-face workout 
consultations .74 
Incremental responses continued in February 2008, 
with the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, which 
increased the loan limits on mortgages purchased by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and for the purchase of 
FHA insurance . 
By July of this year, the Federal Act began to address 
distressed homeowners with declining home values 
through the $300 billion HOPE for Homeowners 
program . The program allows homeowners who 
cannot afford their mortgages to refinance into an FHA 
insured mortgage . The program will be in effect for 
three years beginning October 1 .75
Current Renters
Despite the potential displacement of renters living in 
foreclosed properties, federal action has not addressed 
this group, and no efforts appear to be underway at 
this time .
Protections and Programs for  
Future Buyers/Borrowers 
In July 2008 the Federal Reserve finalized new mort-
gage lending regulations, banning certain advertising 
and servicing practices, requiring more prompt and 
detailed good faith estimates (required in all mort-
gage transactions), ended pre-payment penalties, and 
increased income qualification standards for high 
interest loans . The new regulations will apply to loan 
applications made after October 1, 2009 .76
The Federal Act addressed the safety of the mortgage 
origination system, called for additional require-
ments for good faith estimates of credit worthiness, 
and required that all loan originators be licensed .77 
Although the states are still responsible for the licens-
ing process, the Federal Act sets a floor on standards, 
including pre- and post-licensure education, and 
60 U n d e r s t a n d i n g  B o s t o n
and served as the outline for the Act Protecting and 
Preserving Homeownership (the “2007 Act”), that passed 
the legislature and was signed by Governor Patrick 
into law in November, 2007 .86
Current Homeowners
In June 2007, Attorney General Martha Coakley 
released emergency consumer regulations banning 
certain types of foreclosure rescue schemes . Schemes 
ranged from expensive (but non-existing) foreclosure 
prevention services to complex real estate transac-
tions that promised to save the home from foreclosure 
but only resulted in the loss of the home .87 This was 
quickly followed by the announcement of the Mass-
Housing Home Saver mortgage . MassHousing agreed 
to provide $250 million in mortgage funds to refinance 
homeowners who were not immediately facing fore-
closure out of unaffordable loans .88
The 2007 Act provided foreclosure prevention coun-
seling funds and created a new 90-day window for 
homeowners to resolve a mortgage default before 
foreclosure proceedings began . The Act took effect on 
May 1, 2008, and Massachusetts foreclosure petitions 
dropped by 84 percent between June 2007 and June 
2008 .89
In February 2008, the Attorney General filed a lawsuit 
against one of the largest subprime lenders, Fremont, 
placing a temporary stay on the foreclosures for many 
Fremont borrowers .90 This was followed by a simi-
lar lawsuit against Option One in June .91 In June and 
July 2008, foreclosure fairs were held in Brockton, 
Lawrence, Springfield and Worcester, intended to 
bring together borrowers and eight major lenders/loan 
servicers in order to try to find refinancing options that 
would prevent foreclosure .92
Current Renters 
Although no funds were allocated in the 2007 Act to 
address the displacement of renters from foreclosed 
properties, the tenant’s right to be considered a “tenant 
at will” in a foreclosed property was clarified and 
strengthened . In Massachusetts, tenants can only be 
evicted through a judicial process, providing extra 
time for the tenant to find another home .
government would come to the rescue of Freddie and 
Fannie . In perhaps the Federal Act’s most far-reaching 
provision, the Treasury Department was given the 
power to lend to these GSEs .81 On September 7th, 
the Treasury announced it will use this new power 
in conjunction with FHFA acting as conservator for 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac .82 This rapid change in 
the financial landscape throws doubt upon the future 
of Freddie, Fannie and their commitments to afford-
able housing and the new Affordable Housing Trust 
Fund . In the short term, interest rates are likely to 
stabilize and Freddie and Fannie will be allowed to 
increase the size of their portfolios to meet the current 
credit crunch, but both agencies will be downsized 
over the long term .83
State Responses to Foreclosures
The outlines of the foreclosure crisis could be seen 
in 2006, and given the slow Federal response, states 
began to act on their own to address foreclosures . A 
study by the Pew Charitable Trusts found that as of 
January 31, 2008:84
n Nine states had created mortgage broker regulations 
requiring that the broker consider the interest of the 
borrower,
n Twenty-four states have statewide consumer educa-
tion campaigns,
n Thirteen states had statewide consumer education 
hotlines in place, and
n Fourteen states had a statewide foreclosure task 
force .
Massachusetts, Minnesota and Ohio were the only 
states that had put all four of these responses into 
place . 
As such, Massachusetts is a leader in efforts to address 
the foreclosure crisis . Individual state agencies have 
initiated efforts to address sub-prime lending and 
foreclosure prevention, but the Division of Bank’s 
Mortgage Summit held in November 2006 served as a 
turning point, bringing together representatives from 
the lending industry, non-profits, and local, state and 
federal governments . This led to a more cohesive effort 
by the Commonwealth to address the problem . Two 
working groups were established and the recommen-
dations of these groups were released in April, 2007,85 
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Boston
In 1999, the City of Boston and the Massachusetts 
Community & Banking Council (MCBC) created the 
Don’t Borrow Trouble campaign . Created to steer 
borrowers away from predatory lending products, the 
program joined marketing efforts to the city’s Boston 
Home Center and mortgage counseling/foreclosure 
prevention services . Cited as a model program, Fred-
die Mac spread this program to 47 cities by mid-2008,95 
and MCBC helped to establish the program in an addi-
tional eight Massachusetts communities .96 
In early 2006, the City of Boston Department of Neigh-
borhood Development’s ongoing research revealed 
an alarming increase in foreclosure activity . The city 
responded with a new foreclosure prevention initia-
tive that included increased funding for foreclosure 
prevention services, outreach to homeowners with 
sub-prime loans, and the innovative First Choice Lend-
ers program .97
While the Foreclosure Prevention Initiative focused 
primarily on homebuyers and homeowners, the City 
of Boston responded to the concentration of foreclo-
sures in certain neighborhoods through the Foreclo-
sure Intervention Team (FIT) . Launched in February 
2008, FIT gathered the efforts of multiple city agencies 
to address streets hardest hit by foreclosure, starting 
with Dorchester’s Hendry Street . In a house-by-house 
approach, emergency board-ups and cleanings were 
followed by the Boston Redevelopment Authority 
purchase of several homes and assignment of a devel-
oper for rehab/resale . Both homeowners and renters 
received services to keep them in their homes, and 
owner occupant homebuyers have been found for 
other properties . The City is attempting to apply the 
same practices to two other foreclosure concentra-
tions, and is making a portion of the $5 million it has 
allocated in FY2009 for housing towards this effort . In 
addition, a new city ordinance requires the registration 
and maintenance of foreclosed properties .
Other Localities
CHAPA’s March 2008 report on foreclosures reports 
the following activities by other Greater Boston cities:98
n	 Brockton has created a task force on housing and 
foreclosure prevention and is focusing on foreclo-
sure prevention counseling, but is also working 
Protections and Programs for  
Future Buyers/Borrowers 
In October 2007, the state Attorney General released 
revised mortgage lending regulations that clarified 
and extend prohibited lending practices and required 
mortgage lenders to take the borrower’s ability to pay 
into account .93 
The 2007 Act created further protections by provid-
ing $3 million to the Division of Banks for a new 
system of licensing mortgage originators . As a part of 
this, Massachusetts was one of the seven states that 
launched the National Mortgage Licensing System, 
later made a requirement by the Federal Act . In addi-
tion, the Division received $2 million for a combination 
of foreclosure prevention and first-time homebuyer 
counseling, and for studies of best lending practices .
Neighborhoods 
In July 2008, Governor Patrick announced the forma-
tion of a $20 million Neighborhood Stabilization Loan 
Fund . The Massachusetts Housing Investment Corpo-
ration and the Massachusetts Housing Partnership 
will provide $17 million in funds, with an additional 
$3 million from the Boston Foundation and the Hyams 
Foundation . Funds are to be used to purchase and 
rehab abandoned and foreclosed properties in neigh-
borhoods with a high number of foreclosures . The 
national funding for neighborhood stabilization found 
in the Federal Act mirrors this program .94
Local Responses
Massachusetts cities and towns are grappling with 
increased costs, from fuel and energy costs to contin-
ued increases in health care costs . Foreclosed and 
abandoned buildings only add to these problems by 
undermining property tax receipts and increasing the 
need for basic services including public safety . Outside 
of the federal and state resources described above, 
municipalities have few dedicated sources of funding 
to address foreclosures . Despite this, a few cities have 
made valiant efforts to address the problem, and the 
Foreclosed Properties Task Force (a collaborative effort 
of non-profits and government/quasi-government 
entities) is working to find ways for non-profits and 
municipalities to address the neighborhood impact of 
foreclosures .
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profits led to the August 2008 announcement by the 
Senate Post Audit and Oversight Committee that a 
hearing will be held on the matter in September, 2008 .99
Progress in Meeting 40B Affordability Goals
A number of Greater Boston communities have made 
headway in increasing the supply of housing for low-
income people in the recent years . Municipalities can 
take a proactive approach to meeting 40B affordable 
housing production goals by adopting a five-year 
Housing Production Plan (HPP) . Seven Greater Boston 
municipalities received DHCD approval of their HPPs 
between August 2007 and July 2008 (down from 12, as 
reported in the 2006/2007 GBHRC), bringing to 60 the 
number approved through July 2008 . 
However, some the earliest plans are now expiring . 
Plans have already expired in Abingdon, Lincoln and 
Tyngsborough . Lincoln has now met the 10 percent 
affordability threshold, but Abingdon and Tyngsbor-
ough have not . An additional nine plans will expire 
by the end of July 2009, and of these, only Bedford 
and Peabody have met the 10 percent affordable hous-
ing goal . Just nine of the communities with approved 
plans are currently certified as having made adequate 
progress under those plans . To comply with a 40B plan 
and obtain a DHCD compliance certificate giving a one 
year reprieve from comprehensive permit petitions, a 
municipality must demonstrate that new affordable 
housing equal to at least three-quarters of 1 percent 
of its year round housing stock has been permitted in 
the past calendar year . The nine communities certified 
in Greater Boston as of August 2008 include Bedford, 
Berlin, Boxborough, Ipswich, Lakeville, Sharon, 
Stoughton, Tewksbury and Wakefield .
The Municipal Scorecard (Appendix A) details the 
progress each community made, if any, to expand 
affordable housing opportunity in 2007 and what tools 
they used . Currently the subsidized housing inventory 
credits 33 Greater Boston municipalities with being 
at 10 percent affordable or better, with three having 
achieved that milestone since last year’s Report Card . 
From July 2007 to July 2008, Boxborough, Lincoln and 
Randolph went over the 10 percent threshold . One 
former 10 percent community—Bellingham—dropped 
below that threshold during the past year .
During the year, the Subsidized Housing Inventory 
reported a net increase of 2,277 units of housing that 
with partners to purchase six distressed three-family 
homes for rental housing . 
n	 Chelsea has joined with the Chelsea Restoration 
Corporation to provide foreclosure prevention 
services .
n	 Lawrence provides foreclosure prevention counsel-
ing and has created a task force to secure abandoned 
buildings and register foreclosed properties with the 
city .
n	 Lowell’s foreclosure prevention task force was 
established in 2006, and has made funds available to 
assist distressed homeowners complete a refinance . 
Increasing Supply
While dealing with foreclosures has been the number-
one priority of state and local housing efforts during 
the past two years, long-standing efforts to generate 
new affordable housing continued despite attempts to 
repeal the state’s longest standing affordable housing 
legislation, Chapter 40B . 
Chapter 40B
Chapter 40B allows developers to seek a comprehen-
sive permit for construction of new housing in munici-
palities where less than 10 percent of the units are 
affordable, in exchange for the construction of a mini-
mum number of units affordable to households earn-
ing less than 80 percent of the HUD-determined area 
median income . The current HUD income limits for 
most of the cities and towns included in the Housing 
Report Card are $46,300 for a single-person household; 
$52,950 for a two-person household; $59,550 for a three-
person household; and $66,150 for a four-person house-
holds . These income limits are unchanged from 2007 .
Chapter 40B remained in the spotlight in the last year . 
In December 2007, signatures were submitted to the 
Secretary of State’s office in an attempt to repeal 40B at 
the November 2008 election . The initiative failed to get 
enough signatures to be placed on the ballot . 
In February 2008, DHCD released revised 40B regu-
lations that combined previous regulations and 
addressed decisions made both by the courts and the 
Housing Appeals Committee . This has not stopped 
criticism of the program, as complaints that some 
developers of 40B properties may be getting excessive 
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Through August 2008, 24 cities and towns in Massa-
chusetts, including 18 in the 161-community Greater 
Boston region, had approved Smart Growth Districts 
under Chapter 40R . This year alone, districts were 
approved in Boston (Olmsted Green), Easton (Queset 
Commons), and Lawrence (Arlington Mills), as well as 
in the western Massachusetts city of Pittsfield . Upon 
completion, all of the 40R districts approved to date 
will add 8,829 new units of housing across the state, 
including 7,429 in Greater Boston . Included among 
these new housing units will be an estimated 1,852 
units of affordable housing (1,571 affordable units in 
Greater Boston) . Still, most of these promised units 
have yet to be constructed . The majority of approved 
40R projects have not begun construction yet, and 
only two (in North Reading and Norwood), have been 
completed .101 
The most important contribution of Chapter 40R, 
though, is the flexibility it provides . Once a Smart 
Growth district has been approved by DHCD and the 
municipal government, construction can begin once 
demand picks up . As of August 2008, there were 26 
additional municipalities, including 17 in Greater 
qualified toward their host community’s 10 percent 
requirement in the 161 municipalities covered by the 
Report Card . This increase was concentrated in rela-
tively few municipalities . There was a net increase 
of affordable units in only 38 municipalities, and 84 
percent of the increase occurred in only ten towns . 
This list is lead by Tewksbury (409 additional units), 
Randolph (287 units), Boxborough (245 units) and 
Bedford (188 units) . Given the severe slow-down in the 
housing market, the increase for FY 2008 is encourag-
ing, but this good news must be tempered by the fact 
that many of these were projects already on the draw-
ing board before the credit squeeze began in August 
2007 . In addition, towns are credited for units that 
have been permitted . Given current market conditions, 
some of these units may not be completed, and would 
be removed from the inventory before the next release 
of the Housing Report Card .
Adding Affordability in the City of Boston
With approximately 20 percent of Boston’s housing 
classified as affordable under 40B guidelines, develop-
ers do not have the option of using a comprehensive 
permit to expedite the development process – although 
they may request that the city support a “friendly 
40B .” Despite the housing slump, Boston continued to 
build new housing in 2007, adding 2,022 total units, of 
which 232 were affordable to those making less than 80 
percent of area median income . The Leading the Way 
II housing production strategy ended in June 2007, but 
the city did not slow its efforts with 1,081 of these units 
permitted after July 1, 2007 .100
Smart Growth Housing— 
Chapter 40R and Chapter 40S
In 2004, Chapter 40R was signed into law in Massa-
chusetts, paving the way for new housing construction 
in Smart Growth districts – higher-density, mixed-
use, areas with convenient access to mass transit – in 
cities and towns across the Commonwealth . To allay 
concerns that the additional housing created in these 
Smart Growth districts would overwhelm municipal 
budgets through increased school costs, the legisla-
ture followed up by approving Chapter 40S, which 
authorizes the state to pick up the additional financial 
burden placed on local budgets by the new Smart 
Growth districts .
MAP 5 .2
Affordable Housing Inventory in Greater Boston, 2008
Source: Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development
Percent 40B Eligible Units,
by Municipality
Greater than 10%
Less than 5%
5% to 7.5%
7.5% to 10%
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Preservation of Existing Affordable Housing
With the supply/demand equation so out of balance at 
the time the first Greater Boston Housing Report Card 
was initiated in 2002, its focus has been on produc-
tion . While that remains a priority, preservation has 
become an increasingly critical concern . The region’s 
existing subsidized housing stock is threatened on 
several fronts . Rental developments built during the 
1960s to the 1980s with federal or state subsidized 
mortgages and/or project-based rental assistance may 
be converted from low income to market rate housing 
once the restrictions that limited their occupancy to 
low-income residents expire . Some more recent proj-
ects are, or will be, affected as well . These projects are 
often referred to as “expiring use” projects . According 
to CEDAC, Massachusetts has lost a net of 5,616 subsi-
dized housing units in expiring use properties and 
another 19,475 are at risk by the end of 2010 .103 
Units most at risk are located in neighborhoods with 
strong rental markets . Even in today’s overall weak 
housing market, there are still neighborhoods where 
the conditions are ripe for a conversion of affordable 
units to market rents . At conversion, the long-term 
affordability of the units is lost, but current low-
income tenants are rarely evicted . Typically, qualified 
residents are provided HUD rent subsidies called 
enhanced vouchers that enable them to remain in 
their homes, while providing the full market rent for 
their unit . These vouchers are only made available to 
tenants in projects where the mortgage is pre-paid . 
Tenants in projects with mortgages that have reached 
their original expiration term (typically 40 years), 
do not have such protections . As time passes, this is 
becoming a bigger concern for residents and affordable 
housing advocates .104
At the federal level, there were preservation initia-
tives among the many provisions of the Federal Act 
(July 2008) . These included the extension of enhanced 
Section 8 vouchers to tenants at the Heritage Apart-
ments in Malden, an increase in the maximum Section 
8 contract terms for use by public housing authorities 
from 10 to 15 years, and allowance of Section 8 moder-
ate rehab assistance to be used in conjunction with 
Low Income Housing Tax Credits, opening the doors 
to additional financing options for preservation .105 
At the state level, Massachusetts has made preserva-
tion a priority for its federal and state Low Income 
Boston, at some stage in the process of applying for or 
approving new 40R districts . Upon approval in city 
councils and town meetings, these proposed districts 
have the potential to add thousands more units to the 
ready supply that can be constructed quickly and effi-
ciently to meet demand and to make the communities 
of Greater Boston more affordable . 
In addition to Chapters 40R and 40S, the state govern-
ment has taken a number of initiatives aimed at 
producing new housing in smart-growth areas . These 
include an effort to promote transit-oriented develop-
ment—high-density, pedestrian-friendly areas, all built 
near heavily trafficked transit corridors .102 State financ-
ing for transit-oriented development encourages the 
construction of housing, as well as vehicle and bicycle 
parking facilities near public transit stations . The most 
recent transportation bond bill, filed by Governor 
Patrick in November 2007, included $20 million for 
transit oriented development .
MAP 5 .3
40R/40S Smart Growth Districts in Greater Boston, 
September 2008
Source: Community Housing Task Force
40R District Status (09/08)
Approved
Under Consideration
Planning Funds
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A long-term decline in the number of shelter beds 
(currently 2,900 beds for individuals and 1,900 family 
units) should result in cost savings for the state, but 
in the short-term, $10 million in state and MassHous-
ing funds have been allocated for the demonstration 
portion of the project . 
Rising Energy Costs
Rising energy costs threaten to destabilize Greater 
Boston’s households . Between July 2005 and July 2008, 
fuel and utility costs increased 59 percent .111 In late 
July, ABCD, citing the potential for a “human trag-
edy,” found that Massachusetts will need $250 million 
in additional funding for fuel assistance to help those 
most in need . Despite these warnings, federal funding 
for Massachusetts fuel assistance initially decreased 
from $120 million last year to $83 million this year,112 
but $11 .5 million of this funding was restored in 
September 2008, when the Bush administration 
announced the release of emergency heating assistance 
funds .113
Summary: Government Action to Deal with 
the Housing Paradox
The last year has been a busy one for Greater Boston’s 
housing community . Table 5.1 attempts to make sense 
of the enormous array of measures used by varying 
levels of government to address this report’s premise 
that Greater Boston faces a paradox in which housing 
is still not affordable to many households, despite the 
falling prices caused by the sub-prime induced foreclo-
sure crisis . As one can tell, as the housing situation has 
deteriorated, every level of government has attempted 
to implement policies to reduce the threat of a real 
housing market meltdown . This next year will tell how 
well these new policies have fared .
Housing Tax Credits, the Affordable Housing Trust 
Fund, the Housing Stabilization Fund, and the Capital 
Improvement and Preservation Fund (which is dedi-
cated to preservation activities) .106 Of these, the last 
three benefited from the 2008 housing bond bill . In 
addition, in June 2008 MassHousing received a unique 
waiver from HUD that will make it possible to finance 
$100 million in the next year and $250 million total to 
preserve 30 developments by 2010 .107
In July 2008, An Act Preserving Publicly Assisted Afford-
able Housing was proposed in the Massachusetts Senate 
(S . 2799) . This bill would have given DHCD (or its 
agent) a right of first refusal to purchase an expiring 
use property, and gave extra rights to low-income 
tenants living in such properties . Although support 
exists for this bill, it did not pass before the end of the 
2008 legislative session .108 
Homelessness
In January 2008, the state’s Special Commission Rela-
tive to Ending Homelessness in the Commonwealth 
released its final report .109 The report calls for a shift 
from shelter-based care to one focused on homeless-
ness prevention and provision of permanent housing, 
and establishes a plan that would end homelessness 
in Massachusetts by 2013 . Recommendations fall 
into three categories: prevention; affordable housing 
production and access; and asset development . Local 
agencies would be given the flexibility to tailor indi-
vidual service plans for individuals and families facing 
homelessness . The long term goal is to reduce the 
reliance on high-cost shelter beds and replace it with 
prevention and long-term housing . 
Rather than create a new agency to provide homeless 
services, it called for the use of a uniform assessment 
tool and closer tracking of consumers, along with 
better coordination of existing services across the spec-
trum of agencies . With this in mind, the Interagency 
Council on Housing and Homelessness (ICHH) was 
charged with coordinating the implementation of 
the Commission’s recommendations .110 The ICHH is 
currently identifying six regional networks that will 
implement demonstration programs, to be funded 
for January 2009 to June 2010 . These demonstrations 
will be assessed to guide and refine further policy and 
program responses .
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TABLE 5 .1
Government Action to Deal with the Housing Paradox
Local Government State Government Federal Government
Foreclosure Crisis •	 Boston	Foreclosure	
Intervention Team
•	 Purchase	of	foreclosed	
properties
•	 “First	Choice”	Lenders	
Program
•	 Secure	and	register	
foreclosed properties
•	 Building	code	enforcement
•	 Abandonment	fees
•	 Foreclosure	prevention	
counseling
•	 MassHousing	Home	Saver	
Mortgage program
•	 Banning	of	foreclosure	
rescue schemes
•	 Foreclosure	prevention	
counseling funds
•	 90-day	waiting	period	
before filing foreclosure 
petitions
•	 Lawsuits	against	Fremont	
and Option One
•	 Strengthened	tenant	
protections
•	 Neighborhood	Stabilization	
Loan Fund for CDCs 
to purchase foreclosed 
properties
•	 FHA	Secure	Program
•	 HOPE	NOW	program
•	 National	Foreclosure	
Mitigation Counseling 
Program
•	 Federal	Reserve	of	Boston	
Mortgage Relief Fund
•	 $300	billion	HOPE	for	
Homeowners Program*
•	 $3.92	billion	Neighborhood	
Stabilization Program*
Long-term Housing 
Market Stabilization
•	 Homebuyer	/Financial	
Education
•	 Continued	pressure	on	
universities & colleges to 
provide student housing
•	 State	regulation/licensing	of	
mortgage lenders & brokers
•	 Homebuyer	counseling	
funds
•	 New	Federal	Reserve	
regulation of mortgage 
lenders
•	 Loan	originator	licensing/
registration*
•	 Tax	Credit	for	First-Time	
Homebuyers*
•	 Creation	of	the	FHFA	
to oversee Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac and Federal 
Home Loan Banks .*
•	 Federal	takeover	of	Fannie	
Mae and Freddie Mac
Housing Affordability •	 Community Preservation 
Act
•	 Increase share of CPA funds 
for housing
•	 Expanded use of Chapter 
40B
•	 Expanded use of Chapter 
40R and 40S
•	 Expanded rental vouchers
•	 New Chapter 40B 
regulations
•	 Preservation of Existing 
Affordable Housing
•	 Expanded Low Income 
Housing Tax Credits
•	 State Affordable Housing 
Trust Fund
•	 Housing Stabilization Fund
•	 Capital Improvement and 
Preservation Fund
•	 Housing Bond Bill
•	 Increased Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac loans limits
•	 Increased Low Income Tax 
Credit allocations*
•	 Federal Affordable Housing 
Trust Fund*
*Included in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 .
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6.
Conclusion
the other component of the housing paradox: sharply 
rising home prices . Unless we have zoning in place 
that will permit developers to match housing supply 
to expanded housing demand, we will see vacancy 
rates decline to the point where housing prices begin 
to rise at rates well above normal inflation . Even as 
the current decline in home prices has not led to suffi-
cient housing affordability in Greater Boston, faster 
economic growth could exacerbate the region’s ability 
to offer housing at competitive prices . Not only will 
the absolute affordability of housing in the region 
decline, relative affordability will likely decline, as 
well . The gap in home prices between Greater Boston 
and competing regions of the country could expand 
rapidly, compromising the region’s ability to retain 
young families in the region and to attract others from 
various parts of the country . We will be right back in 
a situation where high housing prices begin to under-
mine Greater Boston’s economy prosperity .
Some Good News
Despite increasingly bad news about the national 
economy, the Greater Boston region has fared better 
than many other regions of the country . Unlike places 
like Las Vegas, Miami, and Phoenix, our region has 
experienced very little speculative housing construc-
tion over the past five years . Because we did not have 
sufficient production, expanding housing demand led 
to skyrocketing prices from 1995 through 2005 . But 
when housing markets suddenly weakened, as they 
have over the past two years, the region did not suffer 
anywhere near as serious a drop in prices as other 
metro areas . 
We have also benefited from early, proactive policies 
initiated by both the City of Boston and the Common-
wealth . The city focused its attention on concentrated 
foreclosures in low-income neighborhoods, buying up 
foreclosed properties so that they could be rehabbed 
and returned to occupancy . The state has moved to 
provide homeowners in jeopardy of foreclosure with 
assistance in refinancing their mortgages . Now the 
Since we began studying the Greater Boston hous-
ing market in 2000 and reporting each subsequent 
year on progress made toward resolving the hous-
ing challenges we face, we have never encountered a 
period like the present . With financial markets in more 
turmoil than at any time since the Great Depression, 
and with growing weakness throughout the national 
economy, it is difficult to forecast what might happen 
to housing prices or to the ability of homeowners to 
hold on to their homes in the immediate future . It is 
possible that markets will be calmed by the recent 
historic actions taken by the U .S . Secretary of the Trea-
sury and by the Federal Reserve Board . If the federal 
takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; the bailout 
of the American International Group (AIG) insurance 
company; the forced acquisition or liquidation of a 
host of large, venerable banking institutions; the impo-
sition of a battery of new regulations in credit markets; 
and federal assistance to reduce housing foreclosures 
works to buoy investor confidence, we may yet see a 
soft landing and a reestablishment of normal mort-
gage markets . This could help reverse the downward 
cycle in housing prices that has developed over recent 
months, and it could help to rein in the rash of housing 
foreclosures . Stabilization of housing prices could go a 
long way toward stabilizing the entire U .S . economy . 
If these measures do not work, however, then just 
the opposite could occur . The number of foreclosures 
could rise dramatically, accelerating the adverse hous-
ing price spiral, jettisoning thousands of more families 
from their homes, and leading to additional neighbor-
hood blight, where abandoned properties encourage 
increased vandalism and rapidly falling property 
values . The overall economy will suffer as families 
cut back on spending, businesses reduce their capi-
tal investments, and we face a full-blown economic 
recession .
Nevertheless, once the current crisis is resolved by the 
more benign federal bailout or by a full-scale recession 
that finally hits bottom, the economy of Massachusetts 
and Greater Boston will begin to grow again, possibly 
at a very healthy rate . That could raise the specter of 
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Being Vigilant and Being Prepared
With markets in such great flux, it is difficult to 
anticipate exactly what will be needed to assure that 
households in Greater Boston will be able to afford 
their mortgages, pay their rent, or purchase their first 
home . In such times and under such circumstances, the 
best we can do is offer short-term assistance to those 
in need and set in place the pre-conditions necessary 
to assure that we will have an adequate and appropri-
ately priced housing stock in the future .
In the short-run this means providing assistance to 
homeowners who are at risk of losing their homes 
because of a combination of falling property values 
and rising mortgage rates . It also means finding addi-
tional ways to focus federal, state, and local resources 
on purchasing recently foreclosed and abandoned 
properties so that they can be salvaged and resold in 
order to keep them occupied .
For those who cannot afford a mortgage in a market 
that will inevitably require a better credit score to qual-
ify, we need to assure an increased supply of rental 
units at monthly costs that do not overly strain house-
hold budgets . That will require more production as 
well as an increase in rental subsidies for those whose 
incomes are too low to afford market rates .
Finally, we need to continue to increase the number 
of communities adopting Chapter 40R and maintain 
Chapter 40B so that sufficient appropriately zoned 
land will be readily available for development when 
the economy begins to grow again . 
If we can somehow remain vigilant and prepared, we 
will weather the current housing paradox under which 
housing prices are too high and falling too fast . From 
there, we will be better able to provide the housing 
we still need in order both to meet our moral obliga-
tion to provide affordable, decent shelter for all and to 
respond to the economic necessity of having sufficient 
affordable housing to remain competitive in our strug-
gle to retain and attract the young families necessary to 
maintain the region’s economic prosperity .
federal government is stepping in with huge amounts 
of money that can be used to shore up the hous-
ing market and help homeowners refinance out of 
subprime mortgages . Most importantly, after doing 
almost nothing to stabilize the housing market until 
we began to see the collapse of major financial institu-
tions, the federal government is now taking the most 
dramatic action since the Great Depression to support 
the housing market . Stabilizing home values is seen as 
the most critical action that can now be taken to keep 
the entire national economy from following the Japa-
nese example of the 1990s, when a massive speculative 
housing bubble led to a collapse in housing values, 
which in turn triggered a full decade of slow economic 
growth and a decline in living standards . 
Alternative Housing Futures for  
Greater Boston
Between December 2007 and July of this year, Greater 
Boston’s civilian unemployment rate has increased 
from 3 .7 to 4 .8 percent . More than 30,000 additional 
jobless workers have joined 91,000 who were already 
unemployed . As long as the economy remains this 
weak, there will be little upward pressure on home 
prices or rents in most parts of the region . 
But we can expect that sometime in 2009, if the 
extraordinary federal measures now being imple-
mented work, we will begin to see a recovery in 
the national economy that will benefit the region as 
well . Even if the recovery is so weak that employ-
ment grows at little more than 0 .1 percent per year, 
we will need to boost housing production by about 
15 percent above the average production level that 
Greater Boston experienced between 1998 and 2007 
if home prices are to rise no faster than general infla-
tion . If the recovery is much stronger, however, and 
employment grows on the order of 0 .775 percent 
per year, our estimates of housing demand suggest 
that we will have to provide substantial additional 
supply, ultimately increasing annual production by 
about 50 percent over recent levels . While this seems 
like a large increase in needed units, it is significantly 
smaller than the increase called for in 2000, when the 
original New Paradigm report was released . 
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 Appendix A Municipal Scorecard Appendix A Municipal Scorecard, continued
Production and Sales Foreclosure Activity Affordability and At-Risk Units
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Expiring 
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Risk – 2010
Abington 5,332 151 56 38 -32% $330,450 $290,000 -12% Abington 67 69 73 1 .37% 458 8 .6% 0
Acton 7,645 70 80 74 -8% $509,000 $482,150 -5% Acton 24 27 30 0 .39% 501 6 .6% 0
Amesbury 6,570 23 71 43 -39% $346,000 $277,500 -20% Amesbury 68 81 92 1 .40% 729 11 .1% 0
Andover 11,513 29 163 132 -19% $575,000 $535,150 -7% Andover 46 55 59 0 .51% 1,027 8 .9% 0
Arlington 19,358 48 153 119 -22% $465,000 $495,000 6% Arlington 29 35 37 0 .19% 1,071 5 .5% 0
Ashland 5,781 45 62 53 -15% $392,500 $407,500 4% Ashland 52 58 60 1 .04% 248 4 .3% Y 96
Avon 1,737 5 18 13 -28% $304,000 $289,900 -5% Avon 17 17 17 0 .98% 74 4 .3% 0
Ayer 3,141 38 27 19 -30% $279,000 $240,000 -14% Ayer 25 29 32 1 .02% 271 8 .6% Y 0
Bedford 4,692 223 67 33 -51% $492,450 $485,000 -2% Bedford 16 17 17 0 .36% 857 18 .3% Y 0
Bellingham 5,632 15 69 58 -16% $313,000 $265,500 -15% Bellingham 101 108 115 2 .04% 532 9 .4% 0
Belmont 9,936 3 85 73 -14% $710,000 $717,000 1% Belmont 21 23 23 0 .23% 321 3 .2% 0
Berkley 1,870 15 Berkley 15 0 .8% 0
Berlin 891 67 Berlin 68 7 .6% 40
Beverly 16,150 13 133 120 -10% $370,000 $355,000 -4% Beverly 80 84 92 0 .57% 1,859 11 .5% 332
Billerica 13,055 58 179 132 -26% $345,000 $315,000 -9% Billerica 171 183 192 1 .47% 649 5 .0% 0
Blackstone 3,321 13 Blackstone 123 3 .7% 48
Bolton 1,472 20 Bolton 49 3 .3% 0
Boston 250,367 1,041b 598c 429 -28% $372,500c $350,000 -6% Boston 1,375 843 362 0 .14% 49,759 19 .9% 5,460
Boxboro 1,900 2 16 7 -56% $612,500 $545,000 -11% Boxboro 20 29 32 1 .68% 268 14 .1% 0
Boxford 2,602 3 45 33 -27% $580,000 $590,000 2% Boxford 24 24 24 0 .92% 19 0 .7% Y 0
Braintree 12,924 359 124 104 -16% $371,000 $337,500 -9% Braintree 89 99 104 0 .80% 1,140 8 .8% Y 194
Bridgewater 7,639 46 74 55 -26% $376,250 $303,000 -19% Bridgewater 72 72 73 0 .96% 241 3 .2% Y 0
Brockton 34,794 57 279 273 -2% $255,000 $204,000 -20% Brockton 792 815 832 2 .39% 4,464 12 .8% 817
Brookline 26,224 53 96 77 -20% $965,000 $1,065,000 10% Brookline 32 41 43 0 .16% 2,050 7 .8% 131
Burlington 8,395 34 97 66 -32% $402,500 $367,500 -9% Burlington 43 43 43 0 .51% 977 11 .6% 0
Cambridge 44,138 611 62 41 -34% $832,500 $885,000 6% Cambridge 53 78 86 0 .19% 6,976 15 .8% Y 268
Canton 8,129 134 70 56 -20% $410,000 $463,700 13% Canton 70 80 84 1 .03% 934 11 .5% 0
Carlisle 1,647 7 32 25 -22% $755,000 $850,000 13% Carlisle 6 6 6 0 .36% 20 1 .2% Y 18
Carver 4,063 23 46 47 2% $315,000 $310,000 -2% Carver 92 93 93 2 .29% 118 2 .9% Y 0
Chelmsford 12,981 23 132 120 -9% $345,350 $319,500 -7% Chelmsford 97 103 110 0 .85% 885 6 .8% Y 0
Chelsea 12,317 6 7 13 86% $310,000 $220,000 -29% Chelsea 92 117 133 1 .08% 2,116 17 .2% 115
Cohasset 2,752 5 61 40 -34% $789,000 $729,000 -8% Cohasset 9 9 10 0 .36% 89 3 .2% Y 0
Concord 6,095 27 90 76 -16% $775,500 $705,000 -9% Concord 14 15 16 0 .26% 330 5 .4% Y 0
Danvers 9,712 61 89 70 -21% $393,200 $358,450 -9% Danvers 86 93 98 1 .01% 1,007 10 .4% 0
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Expiring 
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Abington 5,332 151 56 38 -32% $330,450 $290,000 -12% Abington 67 69 73 1 .37% 458 8 .6% 0
Acton 7,645 70 80 74 -8% $509,000 $482,150 -5% Acton 24 27 30 0 .39% 501 6 .6% 0
Amesbury 6,570 23 71 43 -39% $346,000 $277,500 -20% Amesbury 68 81 92 1 .40% 729 11 .1% 0
Andover 11,513 29 163 132 -19% $575,000 $535,150 -7% Andover 46 55 59 0 .51% 1,027 8 .9% 0
Arlington 19,358 48 153 119 -22% $465,000 $495,000 6% Arlington 29 35 37 0 .19% 1,071 5 .5% 0
Ashland 5,781 45 62 53 -15% $392,500 $407,500 4% Ashland 52 58 60 1 .04% 248 4 .3% Y 96
Avon 1,737 5 18 13 -28% $304,000 $289,900 -5% Avon 17 17 17 0 .98% 74 4 .3% 0
Ayer 3,141 38 27 19 -30% $279,000 $240,000 -14% Ayer 25 29 32 1 .02% 271 8 .6% Y 0
Bedford 4,692 223 67 33 -51% $492,450 $485,000 -2% Bedford 16 17 17 0 .36% 857 18 .3% Y 0
Bellingham 5,632 15 69 58 -16% $313,000 $265,500 -15% Bellingham 101 108 115 2 .04% 532 9 .4% 0
Belmont 9,936 3 85 73 -14% $710,000 $717,000 1% Belmont 21 23 23 0 .23% 321 3 .2% 0
Berkley 1,870 15 Berkley 15 0 .8% 0
Berlin 891 67 Berlin 68 7 .6% 40
Beverly 16,150 13 133 120 -10% $370,000 $355,000 -4% Beverly 80 84 92 0 .57% 1,859 11 .5% 332
Billerica 13,055 58 179 132 -26% $345,000 $315,000 -9% Billerica 171 183 192 1 .47% 649 5 .0% 0
Blackstone 3,321 13 Blackstone 123 3 .7% 48
Bolton 1,472 20 Bolton 49 3 .3% 0
Boston 250,367 1,041b 598c 429 -28% $372,500c $350,000 -6% Boston 1,375 843 362 0 .14% 49,759 19 .9% 5,460
Boxboro 1,900 2 16 7 -56% $612,500 $545,000 -11% Boxboro 20 29 32 1 .68% 268 14 .1% 0
Boxford 2,602 3 45 33 -27% $580,000 $590,000 2% Boxford 24 24 24 0 .92% 19 0 .7% Y 0
Braintree 12,924 359 124 104 -16% $371,000 $337,500 -9% Braintree 89 99 104 0 .80% 1,140 8 .8% Y 194
Bridgewater 7,639 46 74 55 -26% $376,250 $303,000 -19% Bridgewater 72 72 73 0 .96% 241 3 .2% Y 0
Brockton 34,794 57 279 273 -2% $255,000 $204,000 -20% Brockton 792 815 832 2 .39% 4,464 12 .8% 817
Brookline 26,224 53 96 77 -20% $965,000 $1,065,000 10% Brookline 32 41 43 0 .16% 2,050 7 .8% 131
Burlington 8,395 34 97 66 -32% $402,500 $367,500 -9% Burlington 43 43 43 0 .51% 977 11 .6% 0
Cambridge 44,138 611 62 41 -34% $832,500 $885,000 6% Cambridge 53 78 86 0 .19% 6,976 15 .8% Y 268
Canton 8,129 134 70 56 -20% $410,000 $463,700 13% Canton 70 80 84 1 .03% 934 11 .5% 0
Carlisle 1,647 7 32 25 -22% $755,000 $850,000 13% Carlisle 6 6 6 0 .36% 20 1 .2% Y 18
Carver 4,063 23 46 47 2% $315,000 $310,000 -2% Carver 92 93 93 2 .29% 118 2 .9% Y 0
Chelmsford 12,981 23 132 120 -9% $345,350 $319,500 -7% Chelmsford 97 103 110 0 .85% 885 6 .8% Y 0
Chelsea 12,317 6 7 13 86% $310,000 $220,000 -29% Chelsea 92 117 133 1 .08% 2,116 17 .2% 115
Cohasset 2,752 5 61 40 -34% $789,000 $729,000 -8% Cohasset 9 9 10 0 .36% 89 3 .2% Y 0
Concord 6,095 27 90 76 -16% $775,500 $705,000 -9% Concord 14 15 16 0 .26% 330 5 .4% Y 0
Danvers 9,712 61 89 70 -21% $393,200 $358,450 -9% Danvers 86 93 98 1 .01% 1,007 10 .4% 0
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Dedham 8,893 136 132 104 -21% $361,250 $375,000 4% Dedham 77 78 79 0 .89% 1,092 12 .3% 0
Dighton 2,261 28 Dighton 110 4 .9% 0
Dover 1,874 11 32 24 -25% $947,500 $968,750 2% Dover 6 6 6 0 .32% 17 0 .9% 0
Dracut 10,597 68 76 88 16% $293,650 $264,000 -10% Dracut 147 165 178 1 .68% 614 5 .8% Y 0
Dunstable 933 18 12 11 -8% $461,500 $413,000 -11% Dunstable 5 5 5 0 .54% 0 0 .0% Y 0
Duxbury 5,103 41 83 63 -24% $600,000 $610,000 2% Duxbury 21 21 21 0 .41% 172 3 .4% Y 0
East Bridgewater 4,423 58 37 29 -22% $330,000 $300,000 -9% East Bridgewater 65 71 75 1 .70% 154 3 .5% 0
Easton 7,596 40 Easton 248 3 .3% Y 0
Essex 1,357 9 11 11 0% $450,000 $425,000 -6% Essex 7 7 7 0 .52% 40 2 .9% 2007 0
Everett 15,886 135 41 46 12% $314,000 $261,750 -17% Everett 134 168 185 1 .16% 1,302 8 .2% 0
Foxborough 6,260 23 59 50 -15% $399,000 $375,000 -6% Foxborough 54 54 54 0 .86% 270 4 .3% 64
Framingham 26,588 28 261 214 -18% $369,000 $345,000 -7% Framingham 270 323 352 1 .32% 2,724 10 .2% 875
Franklin 10,296 101 150 116 -23% $437,282 $363,500 -17% Franklin 84 97 102 0 .99% 1,058 10 .3% 58
Georgetown 2,601 36 49 27 -45% $453,000 $350,000 -23% Georgetown 26 26 26 1 .00% 361 13 .9% Y 0
Gloucester 12,997 57 83 81 -2% $390,000 $380,000 -3% Gloucester 66 68 70 0 .54% 1,032 7 .9% 80
Groton 3,339 16 47 36 -23% $464,900 $403,750 -13% Groton 20 20 20 0 .60% 192 5 .8% Y 0
Groveland 2,090 75 28 20 -29% $434,750 $404,789 -7% Groveland 31 33 35 1 .67% 74 3 .5% Y 0
Halifax 2,804 12 19 25 32% $315,000 $282,000 -10% Halifax 45 48 49 1 .75% 28 1 .0% 0
Hamilton 2,717 1 39 34 -13% $413,000 $550,000 33% Hamilton 8 8 9 0 .33% 90 3 .3% Y 0
Hanover 4,440 30 62 51 -18% $473,750 $385,000 -19% Hanover 35 35 35 0 .79% 375 8 .4% Y 0
Hanson 3,167 35 43 42 -2% $340,000 $280,000 -18% Hanson 43 43 43 1 .36% 143 4 .5% 2008 0
Harvard 2,156 15 Harvard 61 2 .8% Y 0
Haverhill 23,675 117 163 149 -9% $303,000 $270,000 -11% Haverhill 273 331 366 1 .55% 2,153 9 .1% 149
Hingham 7,307 88 147 80 -46% $610,000 $609,580 0% Hingham 26 27 27 0 .37% 433 5 .9% Y 60
Holbrook 4,145 9 46 35 -24% $305,000 $236,900 -22% Holbrook 76 78 80 1 .93% 2 0 .3% 0
Holliston 4,861 19 98 56 -43% $398,200 $345,000 -13% Holliston 47 54 56 1 .15% 168 3 .5% Y 0
Hopedale 2,284 5 Hopedale 110 4 .8% 0
Hopkinton 4,521 37 102 69 -32% $601,000 $555,000 -8% Hopkinton 40 44 46 1 .02% 143 3 .2% Y 0
Hudson 7,144 41 64 44 -31% $350,000 $294,000 -16% Hudson 53 57 59 0 .83% 726 10 .2% 2007 0
Hull 4,679 13 58 48 -17% $378,500 $345,000 -9% Hull 53 54 54 1 .15% 204 4 .4% 0
Ipswich 5,414 17 49 34 -31% $519,000 $379,500 -27% Ipswich 29 32 35 0 .65% 492 9 .1% 0
Kingston 4,370 16 56 49 -13% $369,750 $350,000 -5% Kingston 63 64 64 1 .46% 216 4 .9% Y 20
Lakeville 3,385 44 49 29 -41% $340,000 $309,000 -9% Lakeville 44 44 44 1 .30% 287 8 .5% 0
Lancaster 2,103 15 Lancaster 103 4 .9% 0
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2007
Median Single 
Family Home 
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Community 
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Expiring 
Use Units at 
Risk – 2010
Dedham 8,893 136 132 104 -21% $361,250 $375,000 4% Dedham 77 78 79 0 .89% 1,092 12 .3% 0
Dighton 2,261 28 Dighton 110 4 .9% 0
Dover 1,874 11 32 24 -25% $947,500 $968,750 2% Dover 6 6 6 0 .32% 17 0 .9% 0
Dracut 10,597 68 76 88 16% $293,650 $264,000 -10% Dracut 147 165 178 1 .68% 614 5 .8% Y 0
Dunstable 933 18 12 11 -8% $461,500 $413,000 -11% Dunstable 5 5 5 0 .54% 0 0 .0% Y 0
Duxbury 5,103 41 83 63 -24% $600,000 $610,000 2% Duxbury 21 21 21 0 .41% 172 3 .4% Y 0
East Bridgewater 4,423 58 37 29 -22% $330,000 $300,000 -9% East Bridgewater 65 71 75 1 .70% 154 3 .5% 0
Easton 7,596 40 Easton 248 3 .3% Y 0
Essex 1,357 9 11 11 0% $450,000 $425,000 -6% Essex 7 7 7 0 .52% 40 2 .9% 2007 0
Everett 15,886 135 41 46 12% $314,000 $261,750 -17% Everett 134 168 185 1 .16% 1,302 8 .2% 0
Foxborough 6,260 23 59 50 -15% $399,000 $375,000 -6% Foxborough 54 54 54 0 .86% 270 4 .3% 64
Framingham 26,588 28 261 214 -18% $369,000 $345,000 -7% Framingham 270 323 352 1 .32% 2,724 10 .2% 875
Franklin 10,296 101 150 116 -23% $437,282 $363,500 -17% Franklin 84 97 102 0 .99% 1,058 10 .3% 58
Georgetown 2,601 36 49 27 -45% $453,000 $350,000 -23% Georgetown 26 26 26 1 .00% 361 13 .9% Y 0
Gloucester 12,997 57 83 81 -2% $390,000 $380,000 -3% Gloucester 66 68 70 0 .54% 1,032 7 .9% 80
Groton 3,339 16 47 36 -23% $464,900 $403,750 -13% Groton 20 20 20 0 .60% 192 5 .8% Y 0
Groveland 2,090 75 28 20 -29% $434,750 $404,789 -7% Groveland 31 33 35 1 .67% 74 3 .5% Y 0
Halifax 2,804 12 19 25 32% $315,000 $282,000 -10% Halifax 45 48 49 1 .75% 28 1 .0% 0
Hamilton 2,717 1 39 34 -13% $413,000 $550,000 33% Hamilton 8 8 9 0 .33% 90 3 .3% Y 0
Hanover 4,440 30 62 51 -18% $473,750 $385,000 -19% Hanover 35 35 35 0 .79% 375 8 .4% Y 0
Hanson 3,167 35 43 42 -2% $340,000 $280,000 -18% Hanson 43 43 43 1 .36% 143 4 .5% 2008 0
Harvard 2,156 15 Harvard 61 2 .8% Y 0
Haverhill 23,675 117 163 149 -9% $303,000 $270,000 -11% Haverhill 273 331 366 1 .55% 2,153 9 .1% 149
Hingham 7,307 88 147 80 -46% $610,000 $609,580 0% Hingham 26 27 27 0 .37% 433 5 .9% Y 60
Holbrook 4,145 9 46 35 -24% $305,000 $236,900 -22% Holbrook 76 78 80 1 .93% 2 0 .3% 0
Holliston 4,861 19 98 56 -43% $398,200 $345,000 -13% Holliston 47 54 56 1 .15% 168 3 .5% Y 0
Hopedale 2,284 5 Hopedale 110 4 .8% 0
Hopkinton 4,521 37 102 69 -32% $601,000 $555,000 -8% Hopkinton 40 44 46 1 .02% 143 3 .2% Y 0
Hudson 7,144 41 64 44 -31% $350,000 $294,000 -16% Hudson 53 57 59 0 .83% 726 10 .2% 2007 0
Hull 4,679 13 58 48 -17% $378,500 $345,000 -9% Hull 53 54 54 1 .15% 204 4 .4% 0
Ipswich 5,414 17 49 34 -31% $519,000 $379,500 -27% Ipswich 29 32 35 0 .65% 492 9 .1% 0
Kingston 4,370 16 56 49 -13% $369,750 $350,000 -5% Kingston 63 64 64 1 .46% 216 4 .9% Y 20
Lakeville 3,385 44 49 29 -41% $340,000 $309,000 -9% Lakeville 44 44 44 1 .30% 287 8 .5% 0
Lancaster 2,103 15 Lancaster 103 4 .9% 0
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Inventory 
(SHI)a
Percent of 
Total Units 
in SHI
Adoption of 
Community 
Preservation 
Act
Expiring 
Use Units at 
Risk – 2010
Lawrence 25,540 39 96 78 -19% $222,250 $175,548 -21% Lawrence 240 264 276 1 .08% 3,713 14 .5% 463
Lexington 11,274 91 180 159 -12% $666,000 $720,000 8% Lexington 23 24 24 0 .21% 1,279 11 .3% Y 0
Lincoln 2,076 50 27 20 -26% $1,150,000 $1,140,000 -1% Lincoln 3 3 3 0 .14% 218 10 .5% Y 0
Littleton 3,018 21 43 27 -37% $375,000 $340,000 -9% Littleton 21 21 21 0 .70% 271 9 .0% 2007 0
Lowell 39,381 114 203 183 -10% $265,000 $196,000 -26% Lowell 405 472 504 1 .28% 5,231 13 .3% 319
Lynn 34,569 26 195 171 -12% $265,000 $217,000 -18% Lynn 413 437 460 1 .33% 4,510 13 .0% 333
Lynnfield 4,249 31 72 47 -35% $521,500 $490,000 -6% Lynnfield 24 25 25 0 .59% 118 2 .8% 0
Malden 23,561 84 106 77 -27% $335,000 $300,000 -10% Malden 168 182 196 0 .83% 2,694 11 .4% 202
Manchester 2,219 11 24 31 29% $825,250 $710,000 -14% Manchester 13 13 13 0 .59% 105 4 .7% Y 0
Mansfield 8,083 211 Mansfield 947 11 .7% 0
Marblehead 8,746 10 113 81 -28% $540,000 $518,000 -4% Marblehead 50 53 54 0 .62% 332 3 .8% 0
Marlborough 14,846 26 122 111 -9% $343,750 $319,000 -7% Marlborough 190 227 244 1 .64% 1,564 10 .5% 0
Marshfield 9,117 37 136 94 -31% $397,500 $386,000 -3% Marshfield 119 126 129 1 .41% 431 4 .7% Y 0
Maynard 4,398 31 42 41 -2% $330,750 $331,880 0% Maynard 24 25 27 0 .61% 355 8 .1% Y 0
Medfield 4,038 15 76 49 -36% $620,000 $525,000 -15% Medfield 11 12 13 0 .32% 193 4 .8% 0
Medford 22,631 13 129 112 -13% $385,000 $360,000 -6% Medford 105 110 114 0 .50% 1,623 7 .2% 93
Medway 4,243 11 70 55 -21% $386,250 $339,000 -12% Medway 30 30 30 0 .71% 227 5 .3% Y 0
Melrose 11,200 39 122 85 -30% $420,000 $410,000 -2% Melrose 46 48 51 0 .46% 878 7 .8% 0
Mendon 1,870 10 Mendon 49 2 .6% 0
Merrimac 2,281 37 13 10 -23% $400,000 $283,400 -29% Merrimac 24 25 25 1 .10% 148 6 .5% 24
Methuen 16,848 80 186 162 -13% $299,900 $278,700 -7% Methuen 179 190 191 1 .13% 1,564 9 .3% 0
Middleborough 7,195 83 79 71 -10% $309,000 $281,900 -9% Middleborough 93 94 94 1 .31% 358 5 .0% 16
Middleton 2,337 35 33 22 -33% $450,000 $430,000 -4% Middleton 14 15 16 0 .68% 99 4 .2% Y 48
Milford 10,682 72 Milford 744 7 .0% 61
Millis 3,060 14 27 34 26% $415,000 $322,500 -22% Millis 38 39 40 1 .31% 108 3 .5% Y 0
Millville 956 10 Millville 20 2 .1% 0
Milton 9,142 5 146 118 -19% $447,500 $445,000 -1% Milton 74 75 75 0 .82% 427 4 .7% 139
Nahant 1,676 1 16 10 -38% $468,750 $365,000 -22% Nahant 9 10 10 0 .60% 48 2 .9% Y 0
Natick 13,337 47 155 109 -30% $419,000 $390,000 -7% Natick 58 59 59 0 .44% 992 7 .4% 0
Needham 10,793 88 230 142 -38% $617,825 $632,000 2% Needham 25 29 30 0 .28% 498 4 .6% Y 61
Newbury 2,614 18 38 34 -11% $462,500 $400,500 -13% Newbury 12 12 12 0 .46% 94 3 .6% 0
Newburyport 7,717 37 101 79 -22% $427,000 $460,000 8% Newburyport 28 31 34 0 .44% 658 8 .5% Y 0
Newton 31,857 115 317 276 -13% $752,500 $741,950 -1% Newton 61 65 67 0 .21% 2,434 7 .6% Y 41
Norfolk 2,851 33 59 55 -7% $405,000 $475,000 17% Norfolk 26 26 26 0 .91% 111 3 .9% Y 0
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Lawrence 25,540 39 96 78 -19% $222,250 $175,548 -21% Lawrence 240 264 276 1 .08% 3,713 14 .5% 463
Lexington 11,274 91 180 159 -12% $666,000 $720,000 8% Lexington 23 24 24 0 .21% 1,279 11 .3% Y 0
Lincoln 2,076 50 27 20 -26% $1,150,000 $1,140,000 -1% Lincoln 3 3 3 0 .14% 218 10 .5% Y 0
Littleton 3,018 21 43 27 -37% $375,000 $340,000 -9% Littleton 21 21 21 0 .70% 271 9 .0% 2007 0
Lowell 39,381 114 203 183 -10% $265,000 $196,000 -26% Lowell 405 472 504 1 .28% 5,231 13 .3% 319
Lynn 34,569 26 195 171 -12% $265,000 $217,000 -18% Lynn 413 437 460 1 .33% 4,510 13 .0% 333
Lynnfield 4,249 31 72 47 -35% $521,500 $490,000 -6% Lynnfield 24 25 25 0 .59% 118 2 .8% 0
Malden 23,561 84 106 77 -27% $335,000 $300,000 -10% Malden 168 182 196 0 .83% 2,694 11 .4% 202
Manchester 2,219 11 24 31 29% $825,250 $710,000 -14% Manchester 13 13 13 0 .59% 105 4 .7% Y 0
Mansfield 8,083 211 Mansfield 947 11 .7% 0
Marblehead 8,746 10 113 81 -28% $540,000 $518,000 -4% Marblehead 50 53 54 0 .62% 332 3 .8% 0
Marlborough 14,846 26 122 111 -9% $343,750 $319,000 -7% Marlborough 190 227 244 1 .64% 1,564 10 .5% 0
Marshfield 9,117 37 136 94 -31% $397,500 $386,000 -3% Marshfield 119 126 129 1 .41% 431 4 .7% Y 0
Maynard 4,398 31 42 41 -2% $330,750 $331,880 0% Maynard 24 25 27 0 .61% 355 8 .1% Y 0
Medfield 4,038 15 76 49 -36% $620,000 $525,000 -15% Medfield 11 12 13 0 .32% 193 4 .8% 0
Medford 22,631 13 129 112 -13% $385,000 $360,000 -6% Medford 105 110 114 0 .50% 1,623 7 .2% 93
Medway 4,243 11 70 55 -21% $386,250 $339,000 -12% Medway 30 30 30 0 .71% 227 5 .3% Y 0
Melrose 11,200 39 122 85 -30% $420,000 $410,000 -2% Melrose 46 48 51 0 .46% 878 7 .8% 0
Mendon 1,870 10 Mendon 49 2 .6% 0
Merrimac 2,281 37 13 10 -23% $400,000 $283,400 -29% Merrimac 24 25 25 1 .10% 148 6 .5% 24
Methuen 16,848 80 186 162 -13% $299,900 $278,700 -7% Methuen 179 190 191 1 .13% 1,564 9 .3% 0
Middleborough 7,195 83 79 71 -10% $309,000 $281,900 -9% Middleborough 93 94 94 1 .31% 358 5 .0% 16
Middleton 2,337 35 33 22 -33% $450,000 $430,000 -4% Middleton 14 15 16 0 .68% 99 4 .2% Y 48
Milford 10,682 72 Milford 744 7 .0% 61
Millis 3,060 14 27 34 26% $415,000 $322,500 -22% Millis 38 39 40 1 .31% 108 3 .5% Y 0
Millville 956 10 Millville 20 2 .1% 0
Milton 9,142 5 146 118 -19% $447,500 $445,000 -1% Milton 74 75 75 0 .82% 427 4 .7% 139
Nahant 1,676 1 16 10 -38% $468,750 $365,000 -22% Nahant 9 10 10 0 .60% 48 2 .9% Y 0
Natick 13,337 47 155 109 -30% $419,000 $390,000 -7% Natick 58 59 59 0 .44% 992 7 .4% 0
Needham 10,793 88 230 142 -38% $617,825 $632,000 2% Needham 25 29 30 0 .28% 498 4 .6% Y 61
Newbury 2,614 18 38 34 -11% $462,500 $400,500 -13% Newbury 12 12 12 0 .46% 94 3 .6% 0
Newburyport 7,717 37 101 79 -22% $427,000 $460,000 8% Newburyport 28 31 34 0 .44% 658 8 .5% Y 0
Newton 31,857 115 317 276 -13% $752,500 $741,950 -1% Newton 61 65 67 0 .21% 2,434 7 .6% Y 41
Norfolk 2,851 33 59 55 -7% $405,000 $475,000 17% Norfolk 26 26 26 0 .91% 111 3 .9% Y 0
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North Andover 9,896 19 122 85 -30% $477,500 $500,500 5% North Andover 54 66 73 0 .74% 581 5 .9% Y 0
North Reading 4,839 1,249 65 45 -31% $369,000 $392,000 6% North Reading 41 43 43 0 .89% 134 2 .8% 0
Norton 5,942 57 Norton 590 9 .9% 24
Norwell 3,299 17 58 60 3% $623,000 $643,900 3% Norwell 12 12 12 0 .36% 144 4 .4% Y 0
Norwood 11,911 65 84 69 -18% $373,750 $359,000 -4% Norwood 53 56 57 0 .48% 711 6 .0% 0
Peabody 18,838 31 143 134 -6% $350,000 $335,000 -4% Peabody 162 171 180 0 .96% 1,957 10 .4% Y 411
Pembroke 5,834 69 76 53 -30% $344,000 $329,000 -4% Pembroke 74 75 75 1 .29% 632 10 .8% Y 0
Pepperell 3,905 15 35 25 -29% $366,000 $310,000 -15% Pepperell 22 23 24 0 .61% 122 3 .1% 40
Plainville 3,088 41 39 18 -54% $344,500 $337,500 -2% Plainville 23 24 26 0 .84% 185 6 .0% 0
Plymouth 19,008 191 304 254 -16% $325,000 $313,750 -3% Plymouth 334 347 357 1 .88% 844 4 .4% Y 158
Plympton 865 8 18 9 -50% $330,000 $280,000 -15% Plympton 12 12 12 1 .39% 43 5 .0% 2008 0
Quincy 39,912 419 228 195 -14% $347,500 $330,000 -5% Quincy 187 207 227 0 .57% 4,063 10 .2% Y 349
Randolph 11,497 9 121 107 -12% $315,000 $262,900 -17% Randolph 251 251 262 2 .28% 1,146 10 .0% Y 0
Raynham 4,197 29 Raynham 480 11 .4% 0
Reading 8,811 22 99 80 -19% $405,000 $394,500 -3% Reading 36 37 41 0 .47% 738 8 .4% 113
Revere 20,102 26 84 67 -20% $303,500 $250,000 -18% Revere 257 298 321 1 .60% 2,108 10 .5% 0
Rockland 6,632 57 58 41 -29% $288,750 $279,900 -3% Rockland 101 104 104 1 .57% 426 6 .4% 204
Rockport 3,652 12 25 28 12% $415,000 $414,150 0% Rockport 11 11 11 0 .30% 135 3 .7% Y 0
Rowley 1,985 5 22 22 0% $475,000 $417,500 -12% Rowley 18 21 23 1 .16% 88 4 .4% Y 0
Salem 18,103 16 90 56 -38% $311,000 $303,500 -2% Salem 124 146 171 0 .94% 2,389 13 .2% 250
Salisbury 3,456 49 12 19 58% $251,000 $305,000 22% Salisbury 37 39 43 1 .24% 288 8 .3% 0
Saugus 10,111 177 120 107 -11% $341,000 $305,000 -11% Saugus 121 125 126 1 .25% 737 7 .3% 0
Scituate 6,869 55 89 97 9% $500,000 $420,000 -16% Scituate 57 59 60 0 .87% 311 4 .5% Y 0
Sharon 6,006 139 91 94 3% $452,500 $343,000 -24% Sharon 56 57 58 0 .97% 380 6 .3% Y 0
Sherborn 1,449 4 20 12 -40% $640,500 $857,750 34% Sherborn 5 5 5 0 .35% 34 2 .3% 0
Shirley 2,140 22 24 12 -50% $344,000 $369,725 7% Shirley 13 14 14 0 .65% 61 2 .9% 0
Somerville 32,389 4 46 30 -35% $441,475 $390,500 -12% Somerville 47 58 65 0 .20% 3,075 9 .5% 30
Southborough 2,988 29 Southborough 105 3 .5% Y 0
Stoneham 9,231 11 82 69 -16% $420,000 $378,000 -10% Stoneham 57 61 62 0 .67% 510 5 .5% 0
Stoughton 10,429 32 91 102 12% $338,000 $301,000 -11% Stoughton 135 145 150 1 .44% 1,319 12 .6% 2008 207
Stow 2,108 55 33 20 -39% $415,700 $410,000 -1% Stow 11 11 11 0 .52% 132 6 .3% Y 0
Sudbury 5,582 79 101 78 -23% $695,000 $549,350 -21% Sudbury 29 31 31 0 .56% 266 4 .8% Y 0
Swampscott 5,804 10 81 46 -43% $470,000 $437,050 -7% Swampscott 42 45 46 0 .79% 211 3 .6% 0
Taunton 22,874 100 Taunton 1,838 8 .0% 244
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North Andover 9,896 19 122 85 -30% $477,500 $500,500 5% North Andover 54 66 73 0 .74% 581 5 .9% Y 0
North Reading 4,839 1,249 65 45 -31% $369,000 $392,000 6% North Reading 41 43 43 0 .89% 134 2 .8% 0
Norton 5,942 57 Norton 590 9 .9% 24
Norwell 3,299 17 58 60 3% $623,000 $643,900 3% Norwell 12 12 12 0 .36% 144 4 .4% Y 0
Norwood 11,911 65 84 69 -18% $373,750 $359,000 -4% Norwood 53 56 57 0 .48% 711 6 .0% 0
Peabody 18,838 31 143 134 -6% $350,000 $335,000 -4% Peabody 162 171 180 0 .96% 1,957 10 .4% Y 411
Pembroke 5,834 69 76 53 -30% $344,000 $329,000 -4% Pembroke 74 75 75 1 .29% 632 10 .8% Y 0
Pepperell 3,905 15 35 25 -29% $366,000 $310,000 -15% Pepperell 22 23 24 0 .61% 122 3 .1% 40
Plainville 3,088 41 39 18 -54% $344,500 $337,500 -2% Plainville 23 24 26 0 .84% 185 6 .0% 0
Plymouth 19,008 191 304 254 -16% $325,000 $313,750 -3% Plymouth 334 347 357 1 .88% 844 4 .4% Y 158
Plympton 865 8 18 9 -50% $330,000 $280,000 -15% Plympton 12 12 12 1 .39% 43 5 .0% 2008 0
Quincy 39,912 419 228 195 -14% $347,500 $330,000 -5% Quincy 187 207 227 0 .57% 4,063 10 .2% Y 349
Randolph 11,497 9 121 107 -12% $315,000 $262,900 -17% Randolph 251 251 262 2 .28% 1,146 10 .0% Y 0
Raynham 4,197 29 Raynham 480 11 .4% 0
Reading 8,811 22 99 80 -19% $405,000 $394,500 -3% Reading 36 37 41 0 .47% 738 8 .4% 113
Revere 20,102 26 84 67 -20% $303,500 $250,000 -18% Revere 257 298 321 1 .60% 2,108 10 .5% 0
Rockland 6,632 57 58 41 -29% $288,750 $279,900 -3% Rockland 101 104 104 1 .57% 426 6 .4% 204
Rockport 3,652 12 25 28 12% $415,000 $414,150 0% Rockport 11 11 11 0 .30% 135 3 .7% Y 0
Rowley 1,985 5 22 22 0% $475,000 $417,500 -12% Rowley 18 21 23 1 .16% 88 4 .4% Y 0
Salem 18,103 16 90 56 -38% $311,000 $303,500 -2% Salem 124 146 171 0 .94% 2,389 13 .2% 250
Salisbury 3,456 49 12 19 58% $251,000 $305,000 22% Salisbury 37 39 43 1 .24% 288 8 .3% 0
Saugus 10,111 177 120 107 -11% $341,000 $305,000 -11% Saugus 121 125 126 1 .25% 737 7 .3% 0
Scituate 6,869 55 89 97 9% $500,000 $420,000 -16% Scituate 57 59 60 0 .87% 311 4 .5% Y 0
Sharon 6,006 139 91 94 3% $452,500 $343,000 -24% Sharon 56 57 58 0 .97% 380 6 .3% Y 0
Sherborn 1,449 4 20 12 -40% $640,500 $857,750 34% Sherborn 5 5 5 0 .35% 34 2 .3% 0
Shirley 2,140 22 24 12 -50% $344,000 $369,725 7% Shirley 13 14 14 0 .65% 61 2 .9% 0
Somerville 32,389 4 46 30 -35% $441,475 $390,500 -12% Somerville 47 58 65 0 .20% 3,075 9 .5% 30
Southborough 2,988 29 Southborough 105 3 .5% Y 0
Stoneham 9,231 11 82 69 -16% $420,000 $378,000 -10% Stoneham 57 61 62 0 .67% 510 5 .5% 0
Stoughton 10,429 32 91 102 12% $338,000 $301,000 -11% Stoughton 135 145 150 1 .44% 1,319 12 .6% 2008 207
Stow 2,108 55 33 20 -39% $415,700 $410,000 -1% Stow 11 11 11 0 .52% 132 6 .3% Y 0
Sudbury 5,582 79 101 78 -23% $695,000 $549,350 -21% Sudbury 29 31 31 0 .56% 266 4 .8% Y 0
Swampscott 5,804 10 81 46 -43% $470,000 $437,050 -7% Swampscott 42 45 46 0 .79% 211 3 .6% 0
Taunton 22,874 100 Taunton 1,838 8 .0% 244
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Production and Sales Foreclosure Activity Affordability and At-Risk Units
Municipality
Total 
Housing 
Units 
(2000 
Census)
Units 
Permitted 
in 2007
Number 
of Single 
Family 
Home Sales 
Through 
June 2007
Number 
of Single 
Family 
Home Sales 
Through 
June 2008
Percent Change 
in Number of 
Single Family 
Sales, June 
2007–June 2008
Median Single 
Family Home 
Selling Price 
Through June 
2007
Median Single 
Family Home 
Selling Price 
Through June 
2008
Percent Change 
in Median Single 
Family Sales 
Price, June 
2007–June 2008 Municipality
Petitions to 
Foreclose, 
2007
Foreclosure 
Auctions, 2007
Foreclosure 
Deeds, 2007
Foreclosure 
Deeds 
(2007) as a 
Percentage 
of Total Units 
(2000)
Total Units in 
Subsidized 
Housing 
Inventory 
(SHI)a
Percent of 
Total Units 
in SHI
Adoption of 
Community 
Preservation 
Act
Expiring 
Use Units at 
Risk – 2010
Tewksbury 10,125 48 97 92 -5% $345,900 $319,450 -8% Tewksbury 97 104 110 1 .09% 921 9 .1% Y 0
Topsfield 2,126 4 27 19 -30% $517,645 $473,000 -9% Topsfield 13 13 13 0 .61% 114 5 .4% 0
Townsend 3,162 29 52 38 -27% $275,000 $252,250 -8% Townsend 45 48 50 1 .58% 86 2 .7% 0
Tyngsborough 3,784 80 38 29 -24% $373,000 $328,750 -12% Tyngsborough 42 45 50 1 .32% 292 7 .7% Y 0
Upton 2,083 37 Upton 178 8 .5% Y 0
Wakefield 9,914 57 105 75 -29% $385,000 $375,000 -3% Wakefield 63 64 66 0 .67% 736 7 .4% 104
Walpole 8,202 24 106 69 -35% $420,000 $400,000 -5% Walpole 49 52 53 0 .65% 472 5 .8% 0
Waltham 23,749 113 166 126 -24% $409,950 $405,000 -1% Waltham 70 72 74 0 .31% 1,767 7 .4% Y 0
Wareham 8,650 97 118 90 -24% $263,750 $224,250 -15% Wareham 173 174 174 2 .01% 559 6 .5% Y 0
Watertown 14,959 15 47 44 -6% $472,500 $440,000 -7% Watertown 32 36 39 0 .26% 979 6 .5% 0
Wayland 4,703 17 63 58 -8% $600,000 $509,000 -15% Wayland 22 23 24 0 .51% 150 3 .2% Y 0
Wellesley 8,789 69 202 171 -15% $966,250 $1,084,500 12% Wellesley 30 30 30 0 .34% 480 5 .5% Y 125
Wenham 1,310 18 21 17 -19% $600,000 $480,000 -20% Wenham 9 9 9 0 .69% 116 8 .9% Y 0
West Bridgewater 2,507 11 35 22 -37% $348,000 $288,500 -17% West Bridgewater 21 21 21 0 .84% 63 2 .5% 2008 0
West Newbury 1,414 12 27 19 -30% $465,000 $570,000 23% West Newbury 13 13 13 0 .92% 26 1 .8% Y 0
Westford 6,877 140 99 73 -26% $460,000 $430,000 -7% Westford 32 33 34 0 .49% 306 4 .4% Y 0
Weston 3,796 39 91 69 -24% $1,169,265 $1,210,000 3% Weston 14 15 16 0 .42% 132 3 .5% Y 0
Westwood 5,218 88 98 74 -24% $522,250 $539,050 3% Westwood 9 9 9 0 .17% 490 9 .4% 32
Weymouth 22,471 63 197 130 -34% $330,000 $288,750 -13% Weymouth 212 229 237 1 .05% 1,827 8 .1% Y 289
Whitman 5,100 48 47 39 -17% $310,000 $257,000 -17% Whitman 78 79 80 1 .57% 243 4 .8% 0
Wilmington 7,141 32 110 68 -38% $367,385 $331,000 -10% Wilmington 73 73 73 1 .02% 707 9 .9% 0
Winchester 7,860 31 133 118 -11% $649,900 $757,500 17% Winchester 31 34 34 0 .43% 148 1 .9% 0
Winthrop 8,009 0 34 23 -32% $345,000 $361,000 5% Winthrop 44 49 53 0 .66% 641 8 .0% 0
Woburn 15,312 24 94 116 23% $338,650 $330,000 -3% Woburn 107 111 113 0 .74% 1,134 7 .4% 0
Wrentham 3,477 17 69 38 -45% $435,000 $430,000 -1% Wrentham 33 34 34 0 .98% 192 5 .5% 0
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Production and Sales Foreclosure Activity Affordability and At-Risk Units
Municipality
Total 
Housing 
Units 
(2000 
Census)
Units 
Permitted 
in 2007
Number 
of Single 
Family 
Home Sales 
Through 
June 2007
Number 
of Single 
Family 
Home Sales 
Through 
June 2008
Percent Change 
in Number of 
Single Family 
Sales, June 
2007–June 2008
Median Single 
Family Home 
Selling Price 
Through June 
2007
Median Single 
Family Home 
Selling Price 
Through June 
2008
Percent Change 
in Median Single 
Family Sales 
Price, June 
2007–June 2008 Municipality
Petitions to 
Foreclose, 
2007
Foreclosure 
Auctions, 2007
Foreclosure 
Deeds, 2007
Foreclosure 
Deeds 
(2007) as a 
Percentage 
of Total Units 
(2000)
Total Units in 
Subsidized 
Housing 
Inventory 
(SHI)a
Percent of 
Total Units 
in SHI
Adoption of 
Community 
Preservation 
Act
Expiring 
Use Units at 
Risk – 2010
Tewksbury 10,125 48 97 92 -5% $345,900 $319,450 -8% Tewksbury 97 104 110 1 .09% 921 9 .1% Y 0
Topsfield 2,126 4 27 19 -30% $517,645 $473,000 -9% Topsfield 13 13 13 0 .61% 114 5 .4% 0
Townsend 3,162 29 52 38 -27% $275,000 $252,250 -8% Townsend 45 48 50 1 .58% 86 2 .7% 0
Tyngsborough 3,784 80 38 29 -24% $373,000 $328,750 -12% Tyngsborough 42 45 50 1 .32% 292 7 .7% Y 0
Upton 2,083 37 Upton 178 8 .5% Y 0
Wakefield 9,914 57 105 75 -29% $385,000 $375,000 -3% Wakefield 63 64 66 0 .67% 736 7 .4% 104
Walpole 8,202 24 106 69 -35% $420,000 $400,000 -5% Walpole 49 52 53 0 .65% 472 5 .8% 0
Waltham 23,749 113 166 126 -24% $409,950 $405,000 -1% Waltham 70 72 74 0 .31% 1,767 7 .4% Y 0
Wareham 8,650 97 118 90 -24% $263,750 $224,250 -15% Wareham 173 174 174 2 .01% 559 6 .5% Y 0
Watertown 14,959 15 47 44 -6% $472,500 $440,000 -7% Watertown 32 36 39 0 .26% 979 6 .5% 0
Wayland 4,703 17 63 58 -8% $600,000 $509,000 -15% Wayland 22 23 24 0 .51% 150 3 .2% Y 0
Wellesley 8,789 69 202 171 -15% $966,250 $1,084,500 12% Wellesley 30 30 30 0 .34% 480 5 .5% Y 125
Wenham 1,310 18 21 17 -19% $600,000 $480,000 -20% Wenham 9 9 9 0 .69% 116 8 .9% Y 0
West Bridgewater 2,507 11 35 22 -37% $348,000 $288,500 -17% West Bridgewater 21 21 21 0 .84% 63 2 .5% 2008 0
West Newbury 1,414 12 27 19 -30% $465,000 $570,000 23% West Newbury 13 13 13 0 .92% 26 1 .8% Y 0
Westford 6,877 140 99 73 -26% $460,000 $430,000 -7% Westford 32 33 34 0 .49% 306 4 .4% Y 0
Weston 3,796 39 91 69 -24% $1,169,265 $1,210,000 3% Weston 14 15 16 0 .42% 132 3 .5% Y 0
Westwood 5,218 88 98 74 -24% $522,250 $539,050 3% Westwood 9 9 9 0 .17% 490 9 .4% 32
Weymouth 22,471 63 197 130 -34% $330,000 $288,750 -13% Weymouth 212 229 237 1 .05% 1,827 8 .1% Y 289
Whitman 5,100 48 47 39 -17% $310,000 $257,000 -17% Whitman 78 79 80 1 .57% 243 4 .8% 0
Wilmington 7,141 32 110 68 -38% $367,385 $331,000 -10% Wilmington 73 73 73 1 .02% 707 9 .9% 0
Winchester 7,860 31 133 118 -11% $649,900 $757,500 17% Winchester 31 34 34 0 .43% 148 1 .9% 0
Winthrop 8,009 0 34 23 -32% $345,000 $361,000 5% Winthrop 44 49 53 0 .66% 641 8 .0% 0
Woburn 15,312 24 94 116 23% $338,650 $330,000 -3% Woburn 107 111 113 0 .74% 1,134 7 .4% 0
Wrentham 3,477 17 69 38 -45% $435,000 $430,000 -1% Wrentham 33 34 34 0 .98% 192 5 .5% 0
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Notes
a . The Subsidized Housing Inventory keeps track of how many units are available in each municipality to meet the target of having at least 10% of each 
community’s housing units be affordable .
b . U .S . Census building permit data consistently understate the number of units permitted each year in the city of Boston .  According to data from the 
City of Boston Department of Neighborhood Development, there were 2,022 permits issued in Boston in 2007 .
c . Median sales price for Boston through June 2007 is an average of the median for the first and second quarters .  Data for this figure and for number of 
sales through June, 2007 in Boston provided by the Department of Neighborhood Development, City of Boston .
Sources
Data on the number of sales and median sales prices, along with data on foreclosure petitions, auctions, and deeds, were provided by the Warren Group . Foreclosure numbers apply on to single-family homes and condominiums .
Data on building permits are taken from the U .S . Census Building Permits Survey (see Note a .) .
Subsidized Housing Inventory data come from the Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development, Chapter 40B Subsidized Housing Inventory . Retrieved September 19, 2008 (http://www .mass .gov/
Ehed/docs/dhcd/hd/shi/shiinventory .htm) . 
Data on Expiring Use Units at Risk come from the Community Economic Development Assistance Corporation (CEDAC), Expiring Use Database, available from the Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association (http://www .
chapa .org/pdf/ExpUseDatabase2008 .pdf) .
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